Foreign Things No Longer Foreign

How South Koreans Ate U.S. Food

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For My Mother

Introduction:

The U.S. Empire Brings Globalization

This is a story of appropriation, making unfamiliar foodstuffs familiar. The diverse processes and phases of the familiarization of foreign foodstuffs in South Korea provide insights into equally various processes and meanings of globalization at the intersection of the local and the global. For the period from 1945 to 1972, South Korea changed from receiving foreign foodstuffs as emergency aid in the immediate postwar era, to purchasing them in the global market, and finally to achieving domestic production of the foodstuffs, now nationalized in the process of being appropriated. My work investigates multifarious processes of globalization through the foodstuffs' distribution channels, which reflected particular political and historical situations of their times and the places. While foodstuffs as commodities retained their traceable national-geographical and political origins, the content of the meanings of the origins were produced by interacting with the social and cultural meanings of the commodities' distribution and consumption on the ground in the locality.

I argue that the cultural and social contexts of the distribution channels of foreign foodstuffs such as general rationing, free feeding stations, school-lunch programs and work-relief (kuho kŭllo) self-help programs, shaped the ways in which local recipients experienced the foodstuffs. The local experiences changed and newly imparted the meanings attached to the foodstuffs. Thus, the meanings associated with U.S. wheat flour and powdered milk given as foreign aid could not be separable with the historical contexts in South Korean and the meaning of U.S. hegemony in post-1945 Korea that instigated the supply, distribution and con-

sumption of the foodstuffs. Over time, the meanings attached to foodstuffs changed with the changes in distribution channels, which served varied purposes from military-administered emergency relief from 1945 to 1955, to humanitarian assistance from 1955 to 1961, and to economic development from 1961 to 1972. By the mid-1970s, the meanings of foodstuffs were overlapped with very different messages over time, and the earlier messages were not erased, but they were re-interpreted as overcoming of the past.

My study of the meanings imparted by foodstuff's distribution channels contribute to the field by establishing the period from 1945 to 1961 as a crucial period in the history of South Korea's development. It does so by demonstrating the significance of the period from the perspectives of distribution and consumption of foreign foodstuffs. I argue that the processes of distribution and consumption *prior to* industrialization and mass consumer market are equally important to the story of development as the story after the instigation of industrialization. South Korea has long been cited as the case of successful economic development under American auspices. However, this story we are told about begins in 1961 with Park Chung Hee regime's state-led industrialization, which only emphasizes export-led production (Woo 1991; Janelli 1993). In this, 1950s in the history of South Korea has largely been disregarded as a politically corrupt and economically stagnant period ruled by an idiosyncratic and authoritarian Rhee Syngman.

Recently, however, scholars such as Brazinsky and DeMoia produced much needed works that highlight the important developments of the 1950s *before* industrialization (Brazinsky 2007; DiMoia 2013). Brazinsky emphasizes the transfer of ideas of democracy

while DiMoia focuses on the transfer of the concept of hygiene and health through local education, and exchanges of experts and students.

On the other hand, I approach the field differently by following the movements of food materials through multiple distribution channels. True, U.S. givers of food had the transfer of democracy and science looming at the back of their minds as the ultimate goal that Koreans should aspire to with the help of U.S. food. However, each of U.S. food programs had more immediate and concrete goals for action such as preventing starvation and social unrest by feeding (1945-1955), educating about nutritional science and hygiene (1955-1961), and providing work for unskilled unemployed workers (1961-1972). By examining the contacts that new foodstuffs made with the locals in the space provided by particular distribution methods, my work reveals the ways in which the holders of ration or relief cards, and forestal and fishing villagers at the peripheries of the Korean peninsula interacted with the intermediaries such as foreign voluntary agencies and Korean local government officials. In doing so, I am also able to show how the local meanings of democracy, science, and economic development were produced in association with particular context of each distribution channel.

By returning to 1945 and investigating the processes of familiarization of foreign foodstuffs, I maintain that South Korea's industrialization in the late 1960s and the 1970s was not built on the ingenuity of Park Chung Hee's regime and the voluntarist zeal of the Korean people alone, as had been the official interpretation widely espoused. I argue that South Korea's industrialization in the 1960s and the 1970s should be seen as a continuation of the developments that began during the colonial period and the period from in 1945 to 1972 that

depended on the supply of U.S. surplus foodstuffs.[1] Thus, by focusing on the period 1945 to 1972, my work provides a missing piece thus far between colonial modernity (1910-1945) and Third World Developmentalism after 1960. Also importantly, I examine shifts instigated by the transition from the Japanese empire to U.S. hegemony in the post-1945 period. I end this project with 1972 when U.S. Congress terminated major parts of U.S. surplus food programs, a.k.a. Public Law 480, to South Korea and when South Korea's industrialization plans were already producing results.[2]

The period from 1945 to 1965 (~1972) were crucial as during this period, school aged children from destitute families, housewives, and the villagers at the nation's peripheries were introduced the knowledge and practice of nutritional science, child care, and self-help, in the processes of receiving U.S. foodstuffs. The knowledge on nutrition and child care formed the basis for nation-building by the way of taking care of its population. Surplus food programs in the period also set the rudimentary approaches to later national social welfare system in South Korea.[3] U.S. surplus food programs also consolidated the South Korean state apparatus since the sales and distribution of U.S. foodstuffs generated a significant amount of money and political power for the state. By the same token, however, U.S. concessional sales program also provided the structure for the corruption that the South Korean state and its elite industrialists have been criticized for by the political opponents. Further, the Rural De-

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[1] For an example of developmentalism during the Japanese colonial period, see Carter J Eckert, *Offspring of Empire: the Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945*. University of Washington Press, c1991.

[2] Title II (Self-Help Programs) and Title III (Voluntary Agency Programs) of U.S. Public Law 480 were terminated in 1972 in South Korea. However, other Titles lingered on until 1981.

[3] Won-gyu Choi, Activities of Foreign Voluntary Agencies and their Influences upon Social Work Development in Korea," *Ph.D. Dissertation*. Seoul National University, 1996.

velopment Programs in the 1960s prompted Korean local villagers to the practice of "self-help (chajo)" by giving U.S. grain donations only as a payment for work in provincial development. Thereby, U.S. Food for Peace Provincial Development Programs in South Korea reached out to the remote villages in Korea and mobilized the local villagers *before* the South Korean state did. We can conjecture the importance of Food for Peace developments of the 1960s in South Korea's development by Park Chung Hee's continuation of basically the same programs under a different name, the New Village Movement in the 1970s.

By the same token, investigating various meanings and processes of the spread of foreign foodstuffs also open up a venue to discuss the processes and meanings of U.S. influence in post-1945 South Korea. In 1945 Korea, U.S. and Soviet military advisors replaced the Japanese colonizers. Yet, U.S. imperial governance was different from the Japanese governance, and the new U.S. imperial strategies changed over time. Partly, food distribution shows a picture of U.S. power expanding in Korea through the channels of commodity supplies like blood transfusing through veins and then to their myriads of capillaries.

There are scholars who already moved in the direction of linking U.S. imperial strategy, food, and science. Matthew Connelly's work on population control in India in *Fatal Misconception* and Nick Cullather's work on the Green Revolution of India in *the Hungry World study population control and food questions in order to discuss U.S. intervention in the Third World*.[4]

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[4] Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: the Struggle to Control World Population.* Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008 Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010.

I share the topic with them since the objectives of U.S. Food for Peace Program and the overall U.S. food assistance was to tackle the problems of population increase and food shortage in the Third World, which was gaining political urgency in the Cold War competition in the 1950s. Starting immediately in the winter of 1945 and 1946, famine was a worldwide problem. In 1946, U.S. government estimated that the tonnage of wheat required to avert starvation in allied and potentially friendly nations was 17 million tons. In order to alleviate the situation, the United States committed to provide 6 million tons of surplus wheat to its allies.[5] In this context, the Pacific Theater which included Korea, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands in U.S. occupation zone was only one in the long list of recipient countries of U.S. surplus wheat flour.

Compared to Connelly and Cullather's works, that show U.S. organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and U.S. agricultural experts brining contraceptive devices and agricultural science to the Third World people who were not necessarily enthusiastic about them, my study reveals much more mutual interaction among U.S. governmental and civilian voluntary agencies, Korean recipients of food, and Korean central and local governments. As a result, my study gives a picture of decentralized and multifarious actors by breaking the agency down to individuals such as U.S. volunteer workers and soldiers, and Korean relief recipients, farmers, fishermen, and foresters in investigating locally produced meanings of the new habits and commodities.

Thus, I add to the works by Connelly and Cullather the perspectives from the ground recipients and their interactions with U.S donor-institutions and local Korean authorities. I was

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[5] To this American offer, wheat from Canada, Argentina and Australia was supposed to match that 6 million tons.However, the sum of 12 million tons was still 5 million tons short of the requirement to avoid famine. *Fortune Magazine*, May issue, 1946

able to see the contacts formed around U.S. foodstuffs by investigation the various distribution channels of them. The movement of commodities from one location to other locations bring forth the interactions on the ground. Thus, U.S. commodities and the U.S. personnel who controlled their distribution in Korea as the agents of producing an imperial power only tell half the story. The other half is to study the contexts in which U.S. commodities and personnel contacted local Koreans in order to see the process of producing meanings and nuances of US influence in South Korea. In doing so, I was able to trace crucial intermediary processes that were necessary to artificially construct an humanitarian image of U.S. food assistance. In another channel of distribution through U.S. Food for Peace Program, relief recipients and local bureaucrats in provincial governments interacted with U.S. officials in Korea through the medium of U.S. food assistance.

The changes in U.S. policy, from emergency food relief from 1945 to 1955, to civilian humanitarian food programs from 1955 to 1961, and finally to the work-relief programs of the 1960s, were instigate by the responses of the recipients. After merely giving relief food (1945-1948) failed to foster the goodwill of the Korean recipients and the press that were already politically against USAMGIK's decision on national division and trusteeship in Korea, the U.S. Department of State changed its strategy to civilian humanitarian food assistance in 1955. Further, in step with the political and social changes in Korea such with Park Chung Hee regime's Five-Year Industrialization plans, U.S. Food for Peace program its surplus grain program to work-relief programs in the 1960s. The changes in the uses of U.S. surplus grain over time demonstrate that USAMGIK and later U.S. Operations Mission learned from

their initial failures to bring "democracy" to the people and how they changed their strategies by "assessing" the different needs of the recipient country.

On the other hand, U.S. tendency that stayed constant throughout the period from 1945 to 1972 was their continued effort to form direct relationships with the locals. Forming direct relationships was possible because the contacts were established when giving grains to the locals. Cash aid or transfer of science and technology were less conducive to forming direct relationships on the ground. Administrators of U.S. Food for Peace Program such as Richard Reuter, Director of Food For Peace Council and Special Assistant to President Kennedy from 1962 to 1965, assumed a division between state and society in foreign nations, including the dictatorial regimes. Thus, people like Reuter sought to exploit the fissure between the state and the people through their direct food assistance to local people.[6] For example, in South Korea in the early 1960s, U.S. government made a partial attempt to overcome its close association with the corrupt South Korean regime by forming direct contacts with local governments and villagers. However, these decentralized multiple direct relationships existed in parallel to the state-to-state supply which continued in order to maintain a friendly regime in Korea.

In fact, giving weight to forming direct relationships on the ground was intended on the American belief about the process of seeding and sprouting democracy in the Third World; democracy was naturally attractive to any people, and when people had direct contacts with U.S. aid commodities and were fed, *they would naturally choose democracy and capitalism. Thus, it became crucial to reach the local people directly. All of the humanitarian assistance*

[6] Richard W. Reuter, Special Assistant to the President, Director Food For Peace, to the National Conference on Food for Peace, September 30, 1963, 4/329 (note 5/67); #1; P153; RG 286

programs via U.S. voluntary agencies and rural self-help programs were efforts to reach the locals directly. Starting from 1955, using U.S. foreign voluntary agencies as intermediaries and distributers opened up multiple civilian channels of relief commodity supply that by-passed the central state of South Korea. In the latter 1960s, U.S. Food for Peace's Comprehensive Provincial Development Program (CPDP) implemented small village-scale self-help work (chajo kŭllo) programs, working directly with provincial government and paying the workers with surplus grain.

The U.S. belief about local people's "natural" predilection for liberal capitalist "democracy" formed an interesting contrast with the communist conceptualization of their "democracy" in North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. The communists acknowledged that their "revolutions" had to be brought about artificially. By contrast, U.S. givers of food believed that what was required to lead Koreans towards democracy and capitalism *by themselves was to "Help the Koreans to help themselves."* Thus, while changing tactics to humanitarian assistance and to self-help, U.S. givers of food continued to believe in giving food to Koreans because they believed in the natural and universal attraction for democracy.

More fundamentally, the reason why U.S. initially failed to produce legitimacy by feeding the Koreans from 1945 to 1955 was because of the competition and comparison with the Communists in the north. When Communists were as successfully and as unsuccessfully feeding the people in the north, American food gifts to southern Koreans was rendered politically ineffective. Besides the communists in the north were also claiming democracy as seen in the name, the People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Thus, after this initial U.S. failure, what gave an advantage for the U.S. Cold War camp was to define American "democracy" by setting it apart from commu-

nist "democracy." This difference between U.S. democracy and communist democracy was artificially constructed through instituting humanitarian food assistance.

Chapters are organized chronologically to demonstrate the changes in the Korean reception of new foodstuffs and U.S. food assistance policy to Korea. I arbitrarily divide my period from 1945 to 1972 into three phases: Emergency food relief phase from 1945 to 1955 is covered in chapter 1 and chapter 2, the second phase of civilian humanitarian food assistance from 1955 to 1962 is covered in chapter 3 and 4, and lastly, the self-help work (chajo kŭllo) program in the 1960s is covered in chapter 6. The latter three chapters 4, 5, and 6 are organized according to the three Titles of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480) of 1954, later also known as the Food for Peace Program.

In chapter 1. IMPERIAL SURPLUS: POLITICIZED GRAIN, 1945-1950 traces the process in which US surplus wheat flour spread through general rationing and emergency relief networks under U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) from 1945 to 1948, and for the first two years of the new South Korean state from 1948 to 1950. The chapter ends with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The chapter is divided into three sections, eventually leading up to the politicization of U.S. surplus wheat in south Korea:

Section 1 of chapter 1 focuses on the period *before* USAMGIK began importing wheat from July 1946. Before the importation of wheat, which was from September 1945 to July 1946, USAMGIK only managed to collect half of the required rice harvest and failed to keep the price of rice under control. The failure of USAMGIK's food policy provided a field to satirize Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP)'s decision on the national division of Korea and putting them under UN Trusteeship. I provide several examples from the

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Chayu Sinmun, which used foreign food and inadequate food provisions as a political metaphor to taunt U.S. imperial motivations, and ultimately, its indistinguishability from the communists in the north. It conveyed the message that the United States and the Soviet Union were equally imperial, or at times, the communists were doing better in the north. The cartoons in the newspaper taunted USAMGIK for putting Korea under UN trusteeship and failing to tackle the food shortage. Further, it mocked USAMGIK for hoping the Koreans to choose the U.S. side of the camp in the Cold War while even failing to feed the people. In this way, food was politicized in multi layers.

Section 2 of chapter 1 traces the meanings and history of wheat flour during the colonial era during which the wheat flour industry and market began. During the colonial period, 1910-1945, wheat flour was identified with the new-style cooking, and also with the modern machine-milling industry, originating from Japanese capital. On the other hand, wheat flour was also known as a substitute for rice for the poor. This second usage of wheat flour was extended and overtook wheat flour's link with "modern" lifestyle once USAMGIK began overhauling large shipments of wheat in the post-1945 period. This shift in association was largely shaped by the change in the main channel of distribution which was general rationing under USAMGIK.

Section 3 of chapter 1 explains the shifts in the meanings in wheat flour after USAMGIK began importing wheat en-mass to substitute for rice, which was from July 1946 onwards. Despite the dislike of wheat flour, the Korean recipients had to eat it because they did not have other food given the shortage of rice and the post-liberation poverty. In other words, it was involuntary consumption. The tension between not liking wheat flour but having to eat it

in order to keep survive had impacts on the politicization of wheat flour in this period. The politicization as a result of this tension is important for my argument throughout the whole project since it imparts a comment on processes of globalization that was inseparable with locally produced meaning and uses. I argue that the distribution channels of foreign relief, which were general rationing and relief programs, gave meaning to wheat flour as an inferior substitute for rice, and it was embedded in the memories of post-liberation poverty and U.S. occupation. Most importantly, the identification of wheat and wheat flour with USAMGIK's food assistance already linked wheat with USAMGIK's earlier failure in food policy and the earlier politicization as a metaphor of U.S. imperial motivations and its indistinguishability with the imperial communists in the north.

In my larger argument of the whole project, examining the failure of USAMGIK's food policy of this period is crucial since the lessons learnt from the failure was what instigated the changes of later decades to the conceptualizations of humanitarian food relief and also rural self-help programs.

Chapter 2. THE KOREAN WAR AND THE INVASION OF AMERICAN FOOD-STUFFS, 1950-1953, demonstrates that US foodstuffs such as powdered milk and factory-manufactured foodstuffs spread in the context of two massive population movements, produced by the internationalized Korean War. Firstly, the Korean War refugees, numbering approximately 3 million during the war, were fed with powdered milk at Free Milk Stations, administered by the South Korean Ministry of Social Affairs, U.S. Military, and later also by U.S. voluntary agencies. Importantly, powdered milk was served as a substitute for rice and other grains in a dish invented as "milk gruel." The choice of powdered milk as relief food to

substitute for grain was incidental, depending on the particular year's surplus stock in the United States. Thus, as an example of a process of globalization, this indicates that the familiarization with milk was not an inevitable result in South Korea, but was historically produced. The second population movement that I deal with is the influx of a large-scale U.S. army contingents to South Korea. U.S. Military brought with them the pipeline of military food provisions, including factory-manufactured foodstuffs such as Spam, chocolate, beer and whiskey. Then, these commodities were illegally diverted to the local black market and sold to Koreans. Thus, in this case, the familiarization of these food commodities was an unintended result of the presence of a large-scale U.S. army contingents.

Chapter 3. THE INVENTION OF HUMANITARIAN FOOD RELIEF, 1953-1955, investigates the ways in which the UNICEF milk feeding program in the mid-1950s made powdered milk familiar to school-aged children. During the colonial period, milk was available in the market, but the scale of its market was small, and even less familiar was the milk coming in non-fat powdered form. However, the UNICEF program collaborated with the local community volunteer groups and employed concepts such as food hygiene and nutritional needs of school-aged children in distributing powdered milk. Within the larger framework of this project, the chapter is designed as a bridge-way to chapter 4, which examines the development of the Voluntary agency program of U.S. Public Law 480 of 1955. The U.S. Department of State had initially objected to UNICEF's using U.S. government donated powdered milk for the milk program in Korea in 1953. Over time, however, the food administrators in the U.S. Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul observed the effectiveness of health and nutritional education and mobilization, and began channeling positive reports to the U.S. De-

partment of State. In the next chapter, I argue that part of the process that instigated the Department of State to conceptualize the tactics of UNICEF as humanitarian food assistance was drawn from the success of its milk programs, and thus the Department instituted it as the Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of U.S. Public Law 480.

Next three chapters 4,5, and 6 each deals with a title in U.S. Public Law 480, known as the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act. U.S. Public Law 480 was a global program that channeled U.S. farm surpluses to foreign nations. For twelve years from 1955 to 1966, U.S. Public Law 480 moved $15.5 billion worth of U.S farm commodities to eighty developing countries.[7] South Korea, Pakistan and India were the major recipients of the Public Law 480 aid throughout all three decades. In the 1950s, Israel and Turkey received major portions of the Public Law 480 aid, and in the 1960s and the 1970s, South Vietnam was the single largest beneficiary. Until 1972, ten countries - South Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel, Turkey, South Vietnam, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Indonesia and Brazil - received more than half of the total Public Law 480 shipments.

Within the structure of U.S. Public Law 480, chapter 4 investigates Title III of Public Law 480, called the "Voluntary Agency Program," by which the U.S. Department of State donated surplus food to U.S. voluntary agencies for general distribution in foreign nations. Chapter 5 examines Title I of Public Law 480, called the" Concessional Sales Program," by which the U.S. Department of Agriculture sold U.S. farm surpluses to the South Korean state at one tenth of the

[7] New Food Aid Program (Pamphlet), November, 1966, U.S. Department of Agriculture, GPO; 3222; #16; P583; RG 286

market price. Chapter 6 studies Title II of Public Law 480, which had been initially intended for short term emergency fund, but then was changed to "Self-help Program" in the mid 1960s.[8]

Chapter 4. C.A.R.E. AND THE NEW COLD WAR POLICY, 1955-1962, discusses a turn to civilian humanitarian food assistance in U.S. foreign policy and the impacts this new concept had in Korea. Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of U.S. Public Law 480 authorized the U.S. Department of State to donate surplus food to U.S. foreign voluntary agencies and international organizations for free. In other words, the U.S. Department of State inserted foreign voluntary agencies as intermediaries to deliver PL 480 surplus food to the Korean recipients. This opened up multiple channels of contacts with the local Koreans. However, the identity of the original donor, the U.S. government, was intentionally de-emphasized, and this formed the key in fostering an image of civilian humanitarian assistance.

When foreign voluntary agencies distributed food to the locals, the locals' contact with the civilian agencies de-emphasized the role of the original donator, the U.S. government. As a result, Koreans (mis-) understood food donations as civilian endeavors. Thus, it was possible for the U.S. Department of State to personalize food aid through a two-stage fictional process: Firstly, U.S. voluntary agencies distributed food, which was donated by U.S. government. However, more importantly, the second step was to set up a construction that relief food and fund was voluntarily donated by individual U.S. citizens to the voluntary agencies. Despite the fact that most of the food was donated by U.S. government, it was advertised that these institutions were patronized by individual citizens who voluntarily donated their small moneys to help the Koreans. An image of American citizens' donating money decentralized the agents of food assistance even

[8] Title VI of the 1966 amendment is not covered in this piece.

further away from the U.S. government. This was helpful as, in chapter 1, Koreans were suspecting the U.S. government of imperial motivations with regards to the issues of national division and U.N. trusteeship. The construction of donors as U.S. individual citizens enabled "imagined" person to person connection between American donors and Korean recipients. It was no longer the U.S. state that was "taking care" of the Korean people. Instead, from the U.S. to Korea, each bag of reinforced added wheat flour and powdered milk were transmitted from the "People of the United States" *directly* to the needy families in Korea.

Importantly then, the U.S. Department of State visualized "democracy" for the Korean people as a system in which small individual citizens made decisions towards the whole, just like small people making decisions to voluntarily donate money. Thus, this humanitarian maneuver helped artificially construct a difference between US capitalist democracy, which had humanitarian assistance, and communist democracy, which was constructed as without. This way, humanitarianism was used as a tool to persuade the Koreans towards democracy. However, this was in addition to the function of humanitarianism which had already been naturalized and universalized as good.

Thus, when Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of Public Law 480 authorized U.S. government to donate surplus food to U.S. civilian agencies, the program produced a new relationship between U.S. food and politics by seemingly breaking down the link between food assistance and U.S. imperial motivations, which had been suspected by the Koreans. Title III broke the link by hiding the original donor as U.S. surplus food was distributed by civilian voluntary agencies. Thereby, instead of being bogged down by the suspicion of the

imperial motivations of U.S. government, U.S. voluntary agencies were able to claim giving food solely for humanitarian reasons.

However, the broken link between food and politics was only to be immediately restored, but this time in a reverse order through the naturalization of humanitarian assistance and democracy. Principles such as humanitarian food assistance was based on the belief of its self-legitimatizing power. Its self-legitimateness was argued as a universal value, in which rough simplification the food safety and human decency assumed to be granted for the general Americans was made applicable to all other peoples. Thus, what Koreans were getting were the replications, or multi-plications, on a new "imperial" scale.

Then, how did it move from the approval of humanitarian food assistance to the promotion of "democracy"? The linkage between the two did not function by any logic. Rather, the linkage worked by imaginary associations, and through personal feelings and impressions. The feeling that associated humanitarian food assistance with democracy was that the two shared their originating place, which was construed as coming from the power by the sum of individual U.S. citizens. of the foodstuffs and donations, which was also where the individual American donators were. The foodstuffs were construed to be donated by individual U.S. citizens who adapted the system of democracy, one of which dispersed practices was voluntary donation of food to Koreans.

Thus, under Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of Public Law 480, humanitarian food assistance was an artificial political construct, staged by the U.S. Department of State. In this, politics was merely delayed, only to come back more perversely. In reality, the actual donations through civilian voluntary agencies were in small amounts in comparison to the U.S.

government donations. However, the political image exploited from an image of humanitarian food assistance by civilian voluntary agencies produced disproportionately strong impression and propaganda success.

Chapter 5. FEEDING CORRUPTION: *Failed naturalization of wheat and the April Revolution of 1960* demonstrates the ways in which the South Korean state's artificial effort to naturalize the consumption of wheat flour backfired in its entanglement with the politics of PL 480. The South Korean state attempted to create a commercial market for wheat flour so that it could create a market to sell the U.S. surplus wheat flour it purchased from U.S. government at concessional prices. The Concessional Sales Program, Title I, of U.S. Public Law 480 authorized the sales of U.S. farm surpluses to the Korean government at one tenth of the market price. In this structure of Concessional Sales Program, the South Korean state reaped 90% profit through this, and this exceptional profit rate motivated the South Korean state to encourage wheat consumption. This encouragement of wheat flour consumption was different from the earlier Save Rice Campaign from 1948 to 1952, in which the state tried to substitute rice with wheat flour. In the late 1950s, the state actually aspired to create a commercial market. Thus, it instigated a mass campaign, "Improvement on Eating Life" by coopting nutritional scientists, and by advertising wheat flour as a nutritiously superior food.

The state coopted nutritional science and their practitioners in order to establish wheat flour as a politically neutral and nutritional food. However, nutritional propaganda failed to induce the increase in consumption that absorbed the ever increasing amount of surplus wheat that the South Korean state purchased from the U.S. government. The market for wheat flour was supposed to be encouraged by categorizing wheat flour in terms of nutritional science which was pro-

moted to be universal. However, instead of accepting wheat flour as cleansed of its previous political tints of U.S. imperial implications, quite the opposite was the result.

Major South Korean newspapers such as *Kyŏnghyang* and *Tong'a* mounted yet another layer of meaning to wheat flour. These newspapers scandalized the access to the U.S. surplus wheat flour as a major channel of political and business corruption in South Korea. Thereby, wheat flour coming under the Concessional Sales Program was associated with the corrupt South Korean state. This was especially a focal issue in the aftermath of the April Revolution of 1960. In spite of the fact that the instigators of the electoral bribery and collusions were the South Koreans, this did not replace earlier suspicion of U.S. imperial motivations. Instead, newspapers such as *Sŏul Kyŏngje* extended the corruption, associated with wheat flour, to its originating place, the United States, because the United States continued to be the sole supplier of concessional wheat to the corrupt South Korean state.

Chapter 6. FROM DEPENDENCY TO SELF-HELP: AMERICAN FOOD RELIEF TO THE KOREAN PERIPHERIES, 1962-1972, focuses on the U.S. Food for Peace's Provincial Development Program from 1964. The chapter discusses the significance of this Provincial Program that excluded the use of technology and capital in their vision of a Third World development. In this case, U.S. surplus carried out the development. The program employed unskilled workers on the state's relief rosters, and paid them in U.S. surplus grain. The wages in grain funded self-help projects such as reforestation, marine life cultivation, and land reclamation. The U.S. Provincial Program was a global program funded under Title II of Public Law 480 with developmental projects in countries such as Taiwan and Israel. The global application of Title II programs urges that we need to re-contextualize the origins of

the New Village Movement under the Park Chung Hee regime in the 1970s in a larger global context, and I lay the groundwork for the 1960s in this chapter.

In summing up the introduction, imagined person-to-person connections triggered by humanitarian food assistance, Title III, and self-help, Title II, of Public Law 480 programs attempted to legitimatize U.S. hegemony by urging the Koreans to "catch up with" the United States. Thus, U.S. surplus programs applied U.S. domestic policies in Korea. For example, in 1963, Korean social works experts introduced the Comprehensive Provincial Development Programs (CPDP, a work-relief program) of 1964 to Koreans as an application of Roosevelt's Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and the Work Project Administration (WPA) programs during the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States, with a gap of thirty years.

Did the applications of the same policies display U.S. imperial tendency to see Korea as an extension of its own territory? Can it be compared to internal colonizations as in the Manifest Destiny? In fact, this question misses the point. Rather, what I observed in the documents of the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State was that U.S. officials were working within clearly set bureaucratic procedures. U.S. inter-governmental communications showed a picture of cooperation, mostly exchanged in numbers of dollar values and metric tons. After all, U.S. officials in the Army and the Department of State practiced the administrative accounting that they knew, and they did not consciously display, nor knew, what they plan to make by treating Korea as an extension of the United States.

Method of Research

Introduction

In terms of my method of research, I focus on the process of familiarization of wheat flour and powdered milk because these two unfamiliar foodstuffs were visible and known for originating from the U.S. food assistance. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, wheat flour and powdered milk were almost solely imported from the United States. Thus, by following the movements of these foreign objects and examining the local uses of them, I could open up spaces to discuss the relationship between U.S. influence in Korea and Korea's modernization, and the role of the local Koreans in it. For example, novelist Yi Hoch'ŏl, who fled the north and was taking refugee in Pusan, pointed out the visibility of U.S. surplus wheat flour during the Korean War. in the structuring of the wartime state and capitalism in his autobiographical novel, *So Simin (Little Citizen*), he singled out wheat flour for structuring the beginning of a new capitalism. In other words, Yi Ho-ch'ŏl identified U.S. aid wheat flour as the source of power, the accessibility to which arranged the newly emerging political and economic elite hierarchy in wartime South Korea.[9]

Since the program's inauguration, Korean public had been well informed about U.S. Public Law 480 as the source of wheat flour and powdered milk. The vibrant scholarly discussions about the "Three White Industries (Sambaek Saŏp)" since the 1950s show the significance of U.S. surplus farm commodities in the perception of Korean economic growth. In this, Korean economy of the 1950s was argued to have entirely depended on U.S. surplus agricultural commodities, especially wheat flour, sugar and cotton.

As a history of objects, it was possible to link the interaction between local Koreans and various U.S. offices with U.S. foodstuffs because for the period between 1945 and 1972,

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[9] Yi Hoch'ŏl, *So Simin (Little Citizen)*, serialized from July 1964 to August 1965 in *Sedae (Generation*)

most of U.S. assistance to Korea was in materials. For example, cash aid would lose the track of its origin once it is exchanged with the local currency. However, the foreignness of materials such as wheat flour kept the history of its origin throughout various stages of its travel as a substance of U.S. food assistance, and the origin played a big role producing the local narratives. This was possible because Korean end-users consumed the commodity with the imperial marking on it.

Sending aid in materials, and not in cash, was useful for U.S. government as well. U.S. government could maintain and foster its influence in Korea to by channeling its aid materials to programs and regions that it selected. For example, in chapter 6, U.S Operations Mission in Seoul shaped and exercised its power within Korea by delivering foodstuffs directly to the provinces and to local villagers in rural areas. Food supply channels provided a space to forge a direct relationship with the locals.

In the list of U.S. commodities in Korea, surplus food was only one of many possible choices such as used clothing, bio-medicine, and chemical fertilizers that the United States donated and sold to Korea. Apart from surplus food, U.S. civilian relief materials included other options for research such as construction materials and machines, medical and sanitary supplies, cotton cloth, sewing thread, blankets, socks, soap, laundry, finished clothing, coal bituminous, and used vehicles.[10] After a preliminary survey of a comprehensive list of U.S. commodities in Korea, I decided to limit my discussion to surplus foodstuffs because it best brought out the picture and the arguments that I could make, my research reached "saturation" on the topic of surplus foodstuffs, as sociologists use the term.

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[10] [Community Development and Relief Category] CRIK Programs; #11; 1267; RG 469

Introduction

Food aid for civilian feeding in Korea was a significant part of U.S. aid materials. Since U.S. Public Law 480 from 1955 only traded U.S. farm surpluses, we need not doubt the weight that food carried in Public Law 480. However, even before the implementation of U.S. PL 480 for the period between 1945 to 1955, U.S. surplus foodstuffs comprised approximately 50% of the total foreign civilian relief materials to Korea. Also, an overwhelming majority of the material aid came from the United States. From 1950 through 1955, U.S. Congress funded approximately 80% of the total U.N. civilian relief supplies to Korea. In the overall U.S. economic aid to Korea for the same period, military aid received 75% of the fund and civilian relief materials was allocated approximately 8%.[11] Military funding also included expenses for foodstuffs to feed the U.S. military contingents, part of which were illegally diverted to the local black market and made impacts in the Korean everyday life.

From 1951 to 1955, all civilian relief supplies, including food, had to be processed by the Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK), subordinate the U.S. Eight Army. The CRIK Program for 1953 had $55.2 million, and of this, $40.2 million was released by the Foreign Operations Agency (FOA), subordinate to the U.S. Department of State. The rest $15 million belonged to the SUN Part Programs, as in sundry programs, and the fund was contributed by other member nations of the United Nations and by foreign civilian voluntary agencies. In 1953, relief grain to Korea was valued at $24.3 million, and relief milk at $0.7 million. In addition, U.S. government sent salable commodities to Korea. Over 30% was foodstuffs to be sold in

[11] For example, in 1954, civilian relief goods took up 7.7% of the total aid. Office of the Economic Coordinator, FY 1954, Raw materials and merchandise $200 million, 52.7%; materials required for installations, $120 million, 34.3%; relief goods $27 million, 7.7%; technical assistance 3 million , 0.8%; In Economic Rehabilitation Program for Korea 699,400,000 dollars program for 1955; #11; 1267; RG 469

the Korean market to bring in local currency for military spending. In 1955, the value of salable commodities to Korea was $288 million.[12]

In the organization of my dissertation, 1954 is emphasized as a key year in which U.S. Congress inaugurated the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act, known as Public Law 480, that linked the sales and disposal of U.S. farm surpluses to U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War. On March 24, 1954, *New York Times* published an article by Fred Spark, "Free Asia Turns to U.S." Spark's article captures the 1954 moment which I see as a beginning of the U.S. Cold War foreign policy which enlisted humanitarian assistance and Third World development in its larger politics. Fred Spark wrote this article in anticipation of the Geneva Conference which was held from April to June 1954. The question of Korea's national division was discussed at the end of the Geneva Conference, and for this, Spark's American compatriots had sent around Help Korea Trains around the cities in the United States to display the American solidarity with the South Koreans. Spark's article was reprinted in over 20 newspapers around the globe, including the Korea Republic, and it text is reproduced below.

I have seen the face of Asia. It is turned our way.

The face of Asia is the face of the young Vietnamese soldier in a primitive village studying, as if it were a Bible, an ancient copy of the Saturday Evening Post, studying the four-color ads that speak of a world he aspires to.

The face of Asia is the face of the aged North Korean, in utter rags, who walked into our command post during the fury half dead with cold. He clutched this note, written on a torn bit of C-ration tissue paper: "We are three wounded GIs.. . Hiding in a hut.. . This man will lead you to us.. . You can trust him.. . He has been good to us."

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[12] From 1950 to 1953, U.S. aid to Korea was all together was $657 million. In 1955, Korean Program, the U.S. pledged $231 million out of total U.N. commitment of $281 million. The U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA, 1953-1958) contributed $50 million dollars. However, only $ 190 million arrived to Korea, among which for Community Development and Relief, $54 million was allotted, and military spending received $125 million, Funds-Programs; #11; 1267; RG 469.

Introduction

The face of Asia is the laughing, if shocking, face of the leper girl in the hills of Formosa playing jacks with a burly U.S. Sergeant at a pleasing sanatorium paid for by the U.S.A.

The face of Asia is the collective face of perhaps one billion brown and yellow people, long double-crossed by foreigners, who look to this strange America, so far away, to help them graduate to full membership in the human race.

This I believe.

I leave to historians and sociologists the explanation for this phenomenon. As a reporter I merely record its existence. In lands where millions cannot read, children know Lincoln. In lands where millions have never seen a movie, all know the mighty jeep.

Those of us who have visited with average Orientals often disagree how to exploit the rich soil of good will. But we agree it is there.

Good Salesmen

The mystery is how to hold and inflate it. For if Lincoln and the jeep are good salesmen for America- only the color of our skin is bad.

I recall sitting cross-legged in a native hut near Kuala Lumpur in mid-Malaya. As green lizards scampering on the bamboo walls chirped like crickets, my host said: "It is a shame your Americans are white men."

We must rise above being "white men" in the sense he meant it, because the white man, the colonialist, the "pukka sahib" snot with his polo ponies and restricted clubs, is through in that world.

It's unfortunate that in many places, Malaya, Indochina, we are associated with the "wrong kind of white man"- even if in the right kind of struggle.

Good Will Helpful

Our good will was earned by stories of America's growth and opportunities, by fair American businessmen, by kindly American missionaries. Some of our government representatives are doing little to consolidate these gains.

A Filipino told me: "You Americans say you come here to help the poor- but you live with the rich."

The Orient's gaudiest gin mills teem with U.S. Bureaucrats. Their cars crowd ox-carts off narrow alleys. The finest homes are American.

Of course, you can't expect a man raising an American family to live in a thatched shack. His wages locally converted make him today's pukka sahib.

Need New Pioneers

But without the right kind of administrators, even the right kind of Point Four project is wrong. We need new pioneers. What a challenge for young Americans with an eye for adventure. They need the faith of missionaries- and the digestion of a boa constrictor.

Today our missions cluster in capital cities where people have already made up their minds. Communist propaganda has not been via airwaves or four color ads, but by Tammany Hall ward-heeling methods knocking on doors, person to person. Our new pioneers must knock on more doors.

Nixon Welcomed

Don't forget the magnificent reception to Vice President Nixon when he shook more humble hands in a few weeks than our diplomats had touched in years.

It's an error to create the impression we're anxious to finance everybody's opium pipe dream, including fresh sewers in Rangoon and stop lights in Jakarta.

English is the second tongue in most Asiatic countries- and not in spoken with an Oxford accent. For generations Chinese studied in the U.S. I recall a barren Korean hillside where two Columbia graduates- class of '49- held a reunion. One was a U.S. Lieutenant, the other a captured Red soldier.

Won No Popular Support

Realistic intelligence agents insist the war against our GIs won no popular Chinese support and desertions among U.S. or missionary schooled Chinese was massive. The total of those who refused repatriation is final proof.

Education in the U.S. is our best long-term investment, but we must give Asiatics a political motive as well as chemistry. It will help keep our white faces at home and let our young friends advertise America among their own.

Russia's greatest asset has been "war by remote control." She keeps her white face out of places like Korea and Indochina, working through stooges primed at Moscow's College of Communist Knowledge.

Asia is the future; Europe is the past. And the face of Asia is turned our way- hopefully and also fearfully.[13]

In his article, Spark maintained that U.S. hegemony until 1954 had been conjured up by the media propagation of its capitalist material plentitude, by humanitarian assistance employing its advanced medical science, and by the civilian contacts made by its businessmen and missionaries. While these signatures of U.S. hegemony set the United States apart from the Communists, Spark argued that the 1954 moment called for the United States to go further if it wanted to compete with the Communists who were making person to person contacts in rural villages. To counter them, Sparks exhorted that the United States should dispatch young U.S. persons abroad to work directly with the locals, and that it should also educate the locals to propagate the American political and religious ideals in their home coun-

[13] Fred Sparks, New York (NEA), "Free Asia Turns to U.S," New York Times. Also see Korea Republic, April 10, 1954, "We Must Consolidate Our Good Will Gains: Asia Turns Its Face Hopefully Toward America, but Fears Outcome at Geneva"; Times Daily, March 28, 1954; Chester Times, Wednesday, March 24, 1954, p. 2; Sarasota Journal, March 31, 1954, p. 16; the New York World-Telegram; Sun: El-Paso Herald Post, among other newspapers. Picture of three Asians: caption reads, "EXPECTANT- the coming Geneva parley means much to Asians like the three above, who have cast their lot with America." Ogden Standard Examiner, Monday March 29 1954 p. 3

tries. Not only would these two tactics enable the U.S. Cold War camp to win over the locals away from their Soviet counterparts, they would also establish U.S. hegemony as different from the ones by Asia's former European colonizers. Spark was not alone in thinking about the new direction in U.S. foreign policy, and the Voluntary Agency Program, Title III, of U.S. Public Law 480 reflected such consensus in the United States. In 1954, Fred Sparks was arguing that if the Soviets were running their empire by "remote control," he anticipated the Americans to counter the Communist one through civilian humanitarian assistance, self-help development programs, and by instigating material changes in the everyday life of the local people. My works demonstrates how all these were done by channeling U.S. surplus food abroad.

I conclude the introduction by going back to my earlier statement that in less than three decades, South Korea changed from receiving foreign food aids in the immediate Postwar era, to purchasing food in the global market in the 1960s, and to building domestic food industry by the mid-1970s. My dissertation ends at 1972 when Park Chung Hee declared Korea's food self-sufficiency in 1972, confident of Korea's successfully industrialization, and while appropriating the U.S. Food for Peace self-help programs into the New Village Movement. The occasion in 1972 was celebrated by abrogating the ban on brewing wine with rice (makkŏlli), which had been substituted with wheat flour for some time. However, it was not the erasure of the memory of U.S. food assistance from 1945 to 1972, of humanitarian food relief by U.S. civilian agencies nor of rural self-help programs with U.S. surplus grains. Instead, Instead of erasing the past stories, the state appropriated the memory, and private individuals' recollections and literary representations readily adapted the state's new interpreta-

tion. Now, the memory of U.S. food assistance was celebrated as part of the overcoming of the depredation of the wartime, in which Koreans had to depend on unappetizing foreign food and foreign occupations, and much of the overcoming and “catching-up” had specifically American origin.

Chapter 1.

IMPERIAL SURPLUS: POLITICIZED GRAIN, 1945-1950

: Receiving food was one thing, politics was another

> U.S. Senator: "First we've got to feed the people. We can't have them eating out of garbage dumps."
> An elder Republican: ”I'm all for feeding the people, but we've got to let them know where it's coming from."
> Leftist of the group: "If you send a hungry man a loaf of bread, it's democracy. If you leave the wrapper on, it's imperialism.”
> - (On the reconstruction of Berlin) in *A Foreign Affair*, Dir. Billy Wilder. 1948 Film

The U.S. military Lieutenant General Hodge’s XXIV’s corps landed in Korea in September 1945 to take over the administration south of the 38th degree north latitude from the defeated Japanese imperialists. The U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK, September 8, 1945- August 15, 1948)[1] was now in charge of food distribution in a divided country that had been depleted after years of Total Mobilization drive under the Japanese colonial rule, and the debacles of Japan’s imperial collapse and the liberation of Korea.[2] The shortage of food was severe in the winter and the spring of 1945 and 1946.

Starting in April 1946, USAMGIK imported foodstuffs for civilian feeding programs in Korea. Funds were provided by the Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) Program. The first shipment arrived in the form of 7,800 metric tons of wheat in May 1946, and

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[1] The U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was called Chaejosŏnmiyuggunsalyŏngbukunjŏngch’ŏng in Korean.

[2] For Japan’s total mobilization plan after 1938 towards the end of the Pacific War (Fifteen-Year War from 1931 to 1945), see Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941*. Cornell University Press, 1988, c.1987, pp. 96-102; For the chaos and hopes of the 1945-1948 period, see Bruce Cumings, *The Origin of the Korean War. Vol 1*. Princeton, 1981. pp. 267-444.

further 8,200 tons of wheat followed in June.[3] However, the first substantial shipment of food assistance did not arrive until July with 24,000 tons of wheat.[4] For the months of May through December 1946, the civilian feeding program in Korea received 163,477 tons of wheat and wheat flour, and 15,655 tons of corn from the United States. Thus, wheat and wheat flour composed 91.26% of the total 179,132 metric tons of food imports in 1946.[5] For the months of January through May 20, 1947, the percentage of wheat and wheat flour was reduced to 59.3% of the total food imports. For the months of May 1946 through August 1947, USAMGIK hauled over 19,455 tons of wheat and wheat flour in monthly average.[6] While machine-milled wheat flour had been introduced to the consumer market in the 1920s in colonial Korea, USAMGIK increased the consumption of wheat flour south of the 38th Parallel by 6.5 times in comparison to the peak consumption during the colonial period.[7]

Further, in the chapter, I argue that the main distribution channels of U.S. surplus wheat flour contributed to associating wheat flour with foreign relief and U.S. occupation. U.S. surplus wheat and wheat flour became familiar in the Korean daily life through general rationing and relief programs during the period from 1945 to 1950. In other words, wheat flour spread as a substitute for rice. Noteworthily, Koreans generally showed an aversion to wheat flour. However,

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[3] "Food Situation Import Program Shipment," 396; Staple Food- Korea, 1946-1950, #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. However, *Tong'a* reported that the first shipment of U.S food aid was 8,200 tons of wheat received in Pusan on May 24, 1946. *Tong'a*, January 11, 1947.

[4] *Ibid*.

[5] From Headquarters, USAMGIK, "Food Position Report for South Korea, December 1946-30 November 1947" dated 17 December 1947, 396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[6] Calculated from the figures given in *Kyŏnghyang,* October 18, 1947.

[7] The peak consumption during the colonial era which was in years from 1932 to 1936. "Yearly Results of Important Exports from Japan Proper to Korea in Different Categories," ref. 300-302; Foodstuff Import File, #6429; Economic and Scientific Section, UD 1733; SCAP, 1946-1951, RG 331, National Archives, College Park (NACP).

a vast majority of those who consumed wheat flour did so because they did not have access to rice and thus had no choice but to eat rationed wheat flour. Thus, wheat flour would not have spread as rapidly as it did in south Korea had a large quantity of it not been distributed for general rationing, and this has a consequence in our understanding of a process of globalization. The spread of wheat flour in south Korea - as an example of globalization - was not inevitable, but it depended on a series of historical coincidences. What if the U.S. Department of Agriculture had not had surplus wheat flour, what if it had sent potatoes or corns instead of wheat flour, or what if there had not been a shortage of rice in south Korea under U.S. occupation in 1945? An "if" would have changed the beginning of the mass circulation of wheat flour in south Korea.

In fact, wheat and wheat flour was not the prioritized substitute crop that Koreans anticipated to cope with hunger and the shortage of rice. It was potato. During the colonial period, agricultural scientists paid attention to the potential of potato as a crop that did not know bad harvests.[8] Also, in early 1946, which was before USAMGIK began importing wheat, *Nongmin Chubo*, USAMGIK's official gazette for farmers, emphasized potato as a good substitute crop.[9] In other words, the dramatic increase in the consumption of wheat flour was by no means an

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[8] Annual production of sweet and white potatoes averaged 395,000 tons per year in the southern zone of Korea, Foodstuff Requirement: Korea, 1946; 307; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. Potato had been encouraged as a substitute crop since 1938, the Total Mobilization period. Potato varieties in Korea and in Japan were those of Irish seeds that came through the United States. Potato as a crop did not know bad harvest since potato was not sensitive to weather conditions. For the importance of potato as a substitute crop during the colonial period, see *Tong'a,* August 26, 1939.

[9] During the month of hunger in the winter of 1945 and 1946, potato, instead of wheat, was encouraged as a substitute. In January 1946, the officially published Weekly News for Farmers, *Nongmin Chubo*, emphasized potato as a substitute. In April 1946, 280 tons of potato (maryŏngsŏ) seeds were imported from the United States. During the colonial period, the imported potato seeds had come from Hokkaido, Japan. However, after the demise of the empire, importing potato seeds from Japan was infeasible. *Nongmin Chubo,* May 4, 1946; Also, see throughout the January 1946 issues of *Nongmin Chubo*.

inevitable result, but it was a direct result of U.S. congress's funding and USAMGIK's importation of U.S. surplus wheat for civilian rationing in Korea.

Therefore, in larger framework, the spread of wheat flour in South Korea as part of globalization was historically specific to the transition from Japan's colonial rule to U.S. hegemony. Its popularization was not market demand-driven, nor industrial production-driven. Instead, the imperial transition had aggravated post-liberation poverty and the shortage of rice which compelled the Koreans to adapt to the habit of eating wheat flour. Further, since USAMGIK initiated and oversaw the general rationing of wheat flour, U.S. occupation and its continued hegemony in Korea was the crucial factor that ensured the familiarization of wheat flour in south Korea. By the same token, USAMGIK's relief distribution of wheat flour imparted to recipients the memory inseparable with the experiences of U.S. occupation, national division, UN Trusteeship, and the Cold War rivalry with the Communists, all of which were entangled with the interjection of this new food into a traditionally rice-eating culture. In these ways, the distribution channels of USAMGIK's rationing and relief programs changed the social and cultural meanings of wheat flour away from those of the 1920s and 1930s colonial period, which had been oriented towards the consumer market and modern industrial production.[10]

While wheat flour may have had more intense impacts on lower income groups such as the returnees from former Japanese empire, orphans, the unemployed and under-employed, and students from destitute families through specific relief programs, it also affected much broader sections of the Korean society through general rationing when over one third of the population received rationed food. The number of persons with ration cards progressively increased from

[10] For the cultural and social meanings of wheat flour during the Japanese colonial period, see the second section of this chapter [Meanings of Wheat Flour in Colonial Korea]

5.6 million in July 1946 to 8.9 million by January 1948 while the number of population approached 18 million in U.S. occupation zone.[11] In particular, general rationing affected people in urban areas where people did not self-cultivate crops. In May 1946, USAMGIK distributed ration food to 6.7 million persons. 3.96 million people had no means of self-supplying foodstuffs, and therefore, they were qualified for full rations, and 2,7 million people, who were partial self-suppliers, received half of the full ration. USAMGIK assumed that the rest two thirds of the population were self-cultivators, and therefore, they did not need rationed food. The number of people eligible for ration food was 7.4 million in December 1947, and 8.9 million in January 1948.[12] The numbers are significant as we consider that the beginning of familiarization of wheat flour in south Korea. The numbers which stayed consistently over a third of the total population signify the number of people who were subject to the involuntary consumption, as opposed to the consumption through market demand. Further, the consumption through rationing associated wheat flour with post-liberation poverty and U.S. occupation as people who obtain wheat flour from different distribution channels tended to use wheat flour differently, for example, by using different recipes.[13]

Then, a perplexing question is, why after giving large quantities of wheat flour and thereby

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[11] 403; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331; March 7, 1947, ref. 318 and January 13, 1948, ref. 387; #6428; Foodstuff import files, 1946-1951; SCAP, RG 331.

[12] Food position of South Korea as of May 1, 1946; 303-308; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. The relief ration for general population continued until 1955 when the U.S. Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul handed over rationing to the South Korea state, which practically dropped relief work from its state agenda except for some 56,000 inmates in institutions.

[13] Aside from free distribution as emergency relief by USAMGIK - and through the South Korean state after 1948-, wheat was also one of the commodities sold to local Korean buyers. The sales was designed to bring in local hwan currency for state spending, particularly pertaining to military expenditure. The portion of sales of wheat for the Counterpart Fund was insubstantial in the period from 1945 to 1950. However, it becomes crucial after 1955, and this will be dealt in chapter 5.

saving many Koreans from starvation, U.S. still failed to win over the hearts of the Korean masses in the Cold War rivalry? It was rather ironic that up to a third of the south Korean population fed on U.S. wheat flour, but they did not link the appreciation for food assistance to supporting the U.S. camp in the Cold War rivalry. Of course, USAMGIK was not without their firm supporters among Koreans, and the U.S. imperial motivation conspiracy was not shared by all. For example, Sasanggye, a magazine subsidized by USAMGIK, supported U.S. policies. However, both USAMGIK and Kim Il-sung, in pleading Stalin for a war in Korea, shared the prediction that if there would be a national election, which did not take place in the end, the socialists would receive the majority votes in the south. The same question was echoed in the letters that U.S. personnel in Korea wrote to their mothers, apparently. These Americans were perplexed that "Koreans" were ungrateful even after the United States freed them from the Japanese rule, and even after the United States saved them from starvation and disease by giving wheat flour and DDT. In August 1947, Tong'a editorial answered the question that the Koreans had complaints because the United States was not giving Koreans the independence.[14]

Following up on this insight, I argue in this chapter that what these U.S. personnel missed was the earlier history of U.S. occupational politics in Korea and USAMGIK's food policy *before* wheat flour was rationed out from August 1946. In that earlier period *before* the injection of wheat flour, it took a particular process, or steps of linkage, for agents like the *Chayu Sinmun* to turn both the shortage of food and foreign food into the metaphors of foreign occupations and U.S. imperial motivations. In other words, the process was more complicated than USAMGIK's rationing imparting the associations with national dependency and U.S. imperial motivations to

[14] Editorial, *Tong'a,* August 12, 1947. p.1

wheat flour.

To lead through the processes in which wheat flour was associated with the suspicions about U.S. imperial motivations, the chapter is divided into three sections: Section 1 focuses on the period *before* August 1946, U.S. wheat flour began to be rationed out throughout south Korea. came in. The section investigates the ways in which USAMGIK food policy was a failure in 1945 and 1946, and the ways in which its failure made the politicization of the food question possible to link it to U.S. imperial motivations. Section 2. explores the history and meanings of wheat flour during the colonial period. By comparison, this would bring out the continuities and shifts instigated by USAMGIK's rationing. Section 3. covers the rapid spread of U.S. surplus wheat flour during the period between May 1946 and June 1950. The section focuses on the changes instigated by the distribution channel of general rationing and relief programs.

In section 1, the question of grain was already politicized by newspapers such as the Chayu Sinmun that opposed the national division and UN Trusteeship. Grain was politicized in three steps in comparison to the communist north Korea. This politicization may have contributed to the causes why U.S. food assistance failed to win the hearts of the Korean masses such as in projected results of a national election. Firstly, before food policy, USAMGIK's involvement in national division and later UN Trusteeship had already failed to win over the Korean masses. Those Koreans who opposed UN trusteeship considered it to be a betrayal of the principle of "self-determination" in their misconstrued understanding of Wilson's historical Four Points. Secondly, USAMGIKs food policy for the winter and spring of 1945 and 1946 failed to

adequately feed Koreans, and the failure gave fodder to the South Korean newspapers like Chayu to politicize the question of grain.[15]

Thirdly, USAMGIK's limited success, or failure, in the civilian feeding program did not stand out favorably in comparison to the food situation in the Soviet occupation zone of north, which also had mixed outcomes with land reforms and collectivization.[16] When the food situation both in the south and the north were deemed to be equally incompetent, politically oppositional newspapers against trusteeship politicized the question of lack of grain by poking fun at the USAMGIK's failure to distinguish itself from the communists in the north. The indistinguishability of the imperial twins posed the question what would be a reason for the Korean people to choose U.S. administered democracy over communist managed one when both USAMGIK and the Soviets seemed to harbor same the imperial motivations as shown from the trusteeship issue.[17] In the case that north was excelling in its food management, the political question was even easier. Why would the Korean people choose the U.S. side to starve when the north has plentiful grain?

Importantly, I argue that the local interpretations of the food assistance of Wheat flour after August 1946 had already been shaped by the failures and resultant politicizations *before* August 1946. If USAMGIK harbored wishful thinking for U.S. food assistance to foster a goodwill

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[15] All parties involved - state officials under USAMGIK, newspapers, family consumers, and experts such as economists and medical doctors - assessed USAMGIK's initial grain policy to be a failure. *Kyŏnghyang*, October 7, 1946, p.3

[16] See for example, [Sisa Manhwa] in *Chayu Sinmun*, February 23, 1946, p. 1.

[17] Although not specifically on grain, foreign food was used as a metaphor. For example, on November 9, 1945, Chayu Sinmun published a cartoon with a prompt, "Which glass would you choose (between cocktail and wine)? Both cocktail and grape wine were foreign to Koreans. Not only were the two similarly foreign, the glasses also came espousing similar values such as patriotism, national heroes. A traditionally dress Korean man looks at the glasses with unappetizing expression.

among Korean recipients, it only scored limited success because wheat flour inherited USAMGIK's earlier failure which it tried to remedy.[18] By all means, wheat flour rations after August 1946 were also too little to give 375 grams of rationing, and the taste of wheat flour was unfamiliar and generally disliked by the Koreans.

The rationing of wheat flour did alleviate the food problem. However, the foreign imports also resulted in a different nature of politicization. The political accusation against U.S. imperialist motivations, which were formed *before* wheat flout, got infused with the physical (taste bud) dislike of wheat flour and cultural unfamiliarity. Personal dislike of the taste of wheat flour associated the dislike to the origin of wheat flour, which was U.S. surplus donated by U.S. government. Wheat and wheat flour imported to south Korea most entirely came from the United States, except a modicum amount from the Philippines, Manila, and Canada.[19] Freighters of GRIOA grains departed from the ports of Philadelphia, Baltimore, Mobile, Houston and New Orleans. The ports of Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles were also used to upload and dispatch grains for distribution in the Pacific theater, which included Japan, the Ryukyu Islands and Korea below the 38th parallel.[20] Since wheat flour was visible as a new insertion from the United States, wheat flour, rather than barley or rice, provided a suitable field to discuss U.S.

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[18] Among examples of failing to win the goodwill of the Koreans despite giving food and other material assistance, see *Tong'a*, July 13, 1947.

[19] For wheat flour imported from the Philippines, see June 15, 1947; 285-6; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. Also see 204 (Manila) and 194-204 (Philippines); #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. Also see Kim Hyŏng-su, Kang Yong-hui, U Ch'ang-myŏng, and Yi Sŏ-rae, "Kuksan wŏllyo rŭl sayonghan pokhap'pun kaebal e kwanhan yŏn'gu." *Han'guk Sikp'um Kwahak Chi*, No. 2, 1973. Also see, the Korea Bank statistics says ninety-nine to hundred percent wheat were American until 1970. The wheat imported from the Philippines and Canada were negotiated and administered by the United States on behalf of South Korea. Statistics by Korea Flour Mills Industrial Association (KOFMIA) and U.S. Wheat Association in Seoul has that in 1986 and 1987, of imported wheat, 88.2% was from the United States, 8.0% from Austria, 0.7% from Canada, and 3.1% from Argentina.

[20] In the Postwar (1945-55) Korea and Japan were linked as Pacific theater, and it was still under the War Department of the United States, September 8, 1950; 230; #6429; UD1733; RG 331

hegemony.[21]

Wheat and wheat flour took up a significant portion of the foodstuffs imported by USAMGIK. For the months of May 1946 through August 1947, wheat and wheat flour took up 64.8% of the total grain imports.[22] In 1947, when rationed food was planned to be all in grain and cereals, other rationed grain included barley, corn meal, and rice.[23] While wheat and wheat flour was mostly from the surplus stocks of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, USAMGIK imported other foodstuffs through international trade with other non-Communist nations, often bartering them with U.S. farm surpluses such as wheat. Thus, other foodstuffs such as "foreign" rice and sugar had less of an identification with the United States as their origin. Besides wheat, other farm commodities strongly connected with the United States were cotton and sugar. In addition, USAMGIK also occasionally rationed out other foreign foodstuffs such as butter, cheese, powdered skim milk, cotton seed oil and candies.[24]

From May 1946 to August 1947, USAMGIK imported a total of 480,134 tons of grain, and this makes up approximately 14% of the total grain consumption by civilian population in south

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[21] In the Postwar (1945-55) Korea and Japan were linked as Pacific theater, and it was still under the War Department of the United States, September 8, 1950; 230; #6429; UD1733; RG 331

[22] From May 1946 to August 1947 (16 months), USAMGIK imported total 480,134 tons of grain (30,008 tons per month). *Kyŏnghyang*, October 8, 1948; also see, 197, 201-2, 208, 212, 216, 318-9, 307, 309, 380, 386-7, 390, and 396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331.

[23] 194; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[24] For the distribution of candy, see 219 and 251; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

Korea.[25] This provided average 30,008 tons of imported grain monthly, of white rice, corn, pea, soybeans, corn, oats, barley, and wheat and wheat flour.[26] However, in order to ration 358-370 grams of grain per adult, USAMGIK needed to import 40,000 tons of gain monthly.[27] Therefore, imported 30,008 tons per month was 25% short of the grain import requirement for civilian feeding.[28] USAMGIK estimated 358 grams of grain to give 1,255 calories for an adult daily. Assuming that Koreans could procure 295 calories from unrationed food, the average calorie intake per day was set at 1,550 calories in 1947.[29] Although the rationed grain was only sufficient to provide some 941 calories per day, it is without doubt that the food imports from the United States prevented the food situation deteriorating to mass starvation.

Before we investigate the familiarization of wheat flour in south Korea, section 1 explores the ways in which the question of food was politicized. This first section examines the period *before* the shipments of wheat and wheat flour set roughly as August 1946 when wheat began to be rationed throughout the provinces. Since the shortage of rice in 1945 and 1946 provided the condition for the rationing of wheat, I start the section with the origins of the shortage of rice, and the failure of USAMGIK to handle the food question in 1945-1946. The indistinguishability

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[25] For indigenous grain and pulse production in Korea south of 38th degree north latitude, imports from Manchuria and export to Japan for years 1940-44, 1945, and estimated 1946, see Table 1, ref. 306; #6429; UD1733; RG 331. For the period from 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947, total estimated indigenous production of grain and pulses available for human consumption was 2,225,000 metric tons (185,417 metric tons per month), ref. 402. From May 1946 to August 1947 (16 months), USAMGIK imported total 480,134 tons of grain (30,008 tons per month). Out of total grain imports, wheat and wheat flour took up 64.8%. *Kyŏnghyang*, October 8, 1948; also see, 197, 201-2, 208, 212, 216, 318-9, 307, 309, 380, 386-7, 390, and 396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331.

[26] *Kyŏnghyang*, October 8, 1948

[27] 225, 384, and 391, Jan 6 1947; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[28] 225, 384, and 391, Jan 6 1947; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[29] 194; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

of USAMGIK's food policy from the Communist ones in the north made it possible for newspapers like Chayu Sinmun (Freedom Press) to politicize U.S. imperial motivations using food as a metaphor.

SECTION 1.

THE FAILURE OF USAMGIK'S FOOD POLICY, 1945-1946

This section looks at the politicization of the grain question before a large-scale injection of U.S. surplus wheat in late 1946. During the period between 1945 and 1950, USAMGIK provided wheat flour to Korean recipients as a substitute for rice. In other words, the reason why wheat flour was able to spread despite the general dislike of wheat flour amongst Koreans was that Koreans did not have rice, and at this historical juncture, USAMGIK supplied wheat flour for the civilian feeding in Korea. Thus, in order to understand the processes through which this unfamiliar food spread rapidly, we need to investigate the reasons for the shortage of food immediately after the liberation in 1945 and 1946. This first section focuses on the period from September 1945 to July 1946. It is a period *before* the entry of wheat flour in the daily Korean life as it was not until July that the first substantial sum of food assistance arrived from the United States in the form of 8,200 tons of wheat.[30] The historical context *before* wheat flour became relevant to the Korean daily life imparted crucial meanings to wheat flour when it entered the scene in south Korea.

In the winter and the spring of 1945 and 1946, following September 1945 when the XXIV

[30] 396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

Corps occupied Korea south of the 38th degree north latitude and established USAMGIK, the shortage of food had several causes. USAMGIK's food policy during the period from 1945 to 1948 was mostly improvised, which made a competent policy outcome unlikely. Lieutenant General Hodge's XXIV's corps of the U.S Army was extemporaneously diverted from the occupation of Japan and its dispatch to Korea in 1945 was unexpected. Thus, USAMGIK did not have time to consider a coherent food policy for the 15.5 million Koreans under its control. Further, the number of population was rapidly increasing. USAMGIK thus limited the goal of its food policy to prevention of mass starvation and resultant social unrests. However, the failure of USAMGIK's food policy was only the secondary cause of the shortage of rice. More important historical reasons were the consequences of the chaos after the demise of the Japanese empire, and the demographic changes caused by the influx of compatriots returning from the former empire and from Soviet occupation zone in the north.

The sudden breakdown of the Japanese empire contributed to the shortage of rice in U.S. occupation zone south of the 38th parallel for several reasons. Firstly, the bulk of food scheduled to be imported from Manchuria did not arrive after Manchukuo demised with the collapse of the Japanese empire. Bad weather in the summer of 1945 had stalled the grain harvest in Korea at only 36 percent of the average harvest of the period between 1940 and 1944. To prevent starvation, the Governor-General of Korea had planned to import 400,000 tons of grain and pulses from Manchuria for 1945. However, Korea only received a quarter of the scheduled imports before Japan surrendered, and the remaining shipments did not leave Manchuria.[31]

The Food Administrator, Lt. Col. Carroll Hill, of USAMGIK construed the impacts that the

[31] 394; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

sudden demise of the colonial administrative apparatus had on the food situation as follows,

The confusion and dislocation following the Japanese surrender resulted in rapid dissipation of most Government-held stocks, which totaled about 203,000 metric tons in south Korea on 1 August 1945. The Japanese distributed both paper currency and food in lavish fashion between their surrender in August and the American occupation in September and there was also considerable looting of food stocks by Koreans. The resulting temporary "abundance" plus the fact that the current rice crop to be a bumper one, tended to make the newly liberated Koreans and the occupying authorities overoptimistic about the food situation during the Fall of 1945. The Japanese in Korea stimulated this overoptimism by presenting the food situation in a most favorable light, perhaps in the hope of getting Korean rice for export to Japan. The American Military Government, which was faced with a tremendous administrative job with very limited personnel was not in a position to reestablish food control measures in the autumn of 1945 and a "free market" for rice and other foodstuffs was declared.[32]

However, liberation from the colonial rule had the most direct impact on the food situation by unleashing rapid influx of compatriots to U.S. occupation zone. Within a year and half, approximately 3 million Koreans returned from Japan, and formerly Japanese imperial and conflictual zones in Manchuria, North China, and South Asia, and also came down from north Korea. The rapid increase in population aggravated the shortage of rice. In the "Food Position Report for South Korea," USAMGIK informed Washington that the Korean population below the 38th parallel had doubled in the past thirty years. On May 1, 1944, the population south of the 38th parallel was 15.9 million. After the Japanese surrender, approximately half a million Japanese civilians were repatriated to Japan by the end of April 1946. However, this outflow was offset by much larger influx of population returning to Korea from abroad.[33] Headquarters of USAMGIK counted an increase of 2.1 million Koreans, repatriated from Japan, Manchuria, and South Asia, and also fleeing from Soviet occupation zone in the north from August 15, 1945 to

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[32] From Carroll V, Hill, Lt. Col. CE, National Food Administrator, Headquarters, USAMGIK, "The Food Position of South Korea as of 1 May 1946," 304; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[33] 304; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

December 1, 1946.[34] The increase of 2.1 million were broken down to 1.1 million persons repatriated from Japan; 390,250 persons taking refugee from north Korea in official counts; 368,555 returning from Manchuria and North China (Pukchi); and 33,667 repatriated from other areas. USAMGIK Headquarters also estimated the number of clandestine entries from North Korea at around 210,000 persons.[35] By January 1, 1947, the population below the 38th parallel increased to 18.8 million. Headquarters also expected an additional increase by 80,000 Koreans who would return to the homeland in 1947, bringing an estimated total to 19.2 million by the beginning of 1948. Interestingly, USAMGIK figures did not take account of the number of persons who crossed to north of the 38th parallel from the south. I could not find an official counting of this number, but the number could be as large as 2 million persons, and this would have offset the increase in population.[36]

Following the liberation, the question of returnees posed a serious social threat, and as a way of solution, relief works presented an increasing burden commensurate to the number of returnees. They needed to be fed, if only to curb possible social unrests in urban areas where the homeless and unemployed returnees tended to conglomerate. From some ports of exit, the returnees were permitted to bring only 1,000 yen, and with such limited resource, a substantial number of them were unable to find housing and employment.[37] In addition, the spectacle of the returnees in rags also disconcerted the moral of the existing urban dwellers. A large number of

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[34] "Food position report for South Korea, December 1946- 30 November 1947" Headquarters, U.S. Army Military Government in Korea, National Economic Board, Seoul, 393; #6429; Food Import File, UD 1733; SCAP 1946-1961, Economic and Scientific Section, RG 331

[35] 400; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[36] *Kyŏnghyang*, October 7, 1946. pp.3-4

[37] 304; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

returnees gathering around big train stations and forming shanty towns in run-down and deserted market places provided some observers with the source to visualize the sorry state that the capital had fallen into after liberation and U.S. occupation.[38]

For example, the *Chayu Sinmun* published a letter from a contributor who identified herself or himself as "a country person, who came to Seoul," on October 29, 1945. Its title was "(I) Cried When (I) Came to Seoul."[39] The contributor took the opportunity as the *Chayu Sinmun* solicited letters within the limit of three hundred characters on a topic of any choice. The letter gives a sense of debacle experienced after liberation.

> I am not sure if I should laugh with happiness, or cry with grief as I see the streets of Seoul, changed unrecognizably since August 15.[40] It is incredible that people in Seoul are still able to hold on to their sanity when the streets are covered with human excrements, trash, and dust while on the other side, rice broth, biscuits and household goods that Japanese evacuees had left behind are piled up like mountains. It is sufficiently a sorry picture that Seoul has risen rapidly as the city of consumption and the city of pleasure with cafés, bars and dance halls, which occupy every other house after another. Sorrier still is that, who would have even imagined that the hearts of people in Seoul would become so cold and cruel as they turn blind eyes to the returnees who are getting off at Kyŏngsŏng Station and Ch'ŏngryangri Station each day while they spend millions and hundred thousands of wŏn to build these amenities.[41]

Interestingly, the letter writer identifies Seoul as a city of consumption. Further, as she or he cites the frivolous commodities and cultures of which origin was the United States, she links the new consumption to the presence of U.S. troops and U.S. occupation.

In order to assuage the problem of hungry and unsettled returnees, conducive to social

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[38] The *Chayu Sinmun*, October 16, 1945; Also see the *Puin Sinmun*, January 28, 1950 (4283) and February 21, 1950 (4283)

[39] [Kamkwang P'an] "Sŏul wasŏ ulŏtta (Cried upon coming to Seoul)" written by Sŏul watdŏn sigol saram (A country man, who came to Seoul)." *Chayu Sinmun*, October 29, 1945.

[40] August 15, 1945 was the day of Liberation from the Japanese colonial rule.

[41] [Kamkwang P'an] "Sŏul wasŏ ulŏtta (Cried upon coming to Seoul)" written by Sŏul watdŏn sigol saram (A country man, who came to Seoul)." *Chayu Sinmun*, October 29, 1945.

despair and instability, USAMGIK prioritized the refugees and returnees in the lists for the distribution of relief food. This also meant that the impacts of relief rationing was especially large on the returnees. Returning bare-handed and lacking means to procure other foodstuffs, they tended to depend on what was given to them in rations and in refugee camps. From March 1946, the Bureau of Social Affairs of Seoul distributed 75 grams of barley and 75 grams of wheat flour daily to returnees and refugees in the city. 150 grams of grain would only give about 500 calories for an average adult. The ration was supplemented by an additional supply of bread, canned vegetables, salt, sugar and beans.[42] Although small in scale, returnees and refugees were the first group to receive U.S. wheat flour and barley since the general rationing of wheat flour did not start until the end of July 1946.

Next year, in April 1947, USAMGIK set up more refugee camps near the 38th parallel for the refugee from the northern regions (ibuk ijae tongp'o suyong'so) in the cites of Ch'ŏngdan, T'osŏng, Kaesŏng, Tongdu-ch'ŏn, Ŭichŏng-pu, Chumun-chin, Ch'unch'ŏn, and P'och'ŏn. For the three month period from April to June 1947, these camps accommodated 92,584 refugees while a similar number of northerners were estimated to have crossed the 38th parallel without going through the camps.[43] U.S. Military provided tents for these camps. For example, Ŭichŏng-pu camp had 68 U.S. military tents, each putting up 50 refugees, and Tongdu-ch'ŏn camp had 20. At the camps, refugees received breakfast and dinner each day, which were approximately 345 grams of either wheat or wheat flour, and some canned food.[44] On the other hand, the sick were

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[42] In terms of approximate weight. 1 hop= 150 grams, 1 jak= 15 grams. In terms of the volume of grains, 1 jak= 18ml. Thus, 5 jak=90ml, *Tong'a*, March 17, 1946.

[43] *Tong'a*, August 7, 1947. p.2

[44] 2 hop and 3 jak is approximately 345 grams.

given a preference treatment with rice, and rice gruel. Refugees usually stayed at the camps for any period between three to seven days before USAMGIK transferred them to more permanent settlement centers in the provinces, with an exception of Seoul.[45] In 1947, USAMGIK reported that 163,000 refugees passed through the collection stations, and estimated that a number larger that this likely had bypassed them. The refugees from the north in 1948 was not any less than the number in 1947.[46]

Figure 1.1 [Hyŏngmaeng'a] by Lim, Tong-ŭn in the *Chayu Sinmun*, December 17, 1945

On the other hand, conditions of the shortage of rice and the influx of population alone did not provide sufficient fodder to turn the question of food into a political metaphor and parody. Newspapers like the *Chayu Sinmun* (*Freedom Press*) employed certain techniques to turn the question of food into a metaphor of U.S. imperial motivations suspected in its support for national division and U.N. trusteeship. In particular, the *Chayu Sinmun* often juxtaposed an image of the refugees with an image of the post-liberation "decadence." The *Chayu Sinmun* was a newspaper born out of the fervor of the People's Committees immediately after the liberation and which supported the Provisional Government, of the independence fighters mainly exiled in

[45] *Tong'a*, August 8, 1947.

[46] 315; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

Manchuria.[47] When the newspaper opposed national division and U.N. Trusteeship, it exploited the shortage of rice by making it into a topic of political satire and sarcasm.

Noteworthily, the adjective, "decadent (t'oep'ye chŏk)" was frequently invoked to condemn the changes in consumption patterns, perceived to be influenced by U.S. occupation and the presence of a large scale U.S. military contingents. Decadence was visualized in images of cabaret (dance halls), bars and café culture.[48] Produced in U.S. food commodities such as coffee, whiskey and beer were assumed to be from the U.S. military camps since they were not officially imported to Korea. Thus, their massive availability was believed to be the results of illegal transfers from U.S. military provisions for black market trading.

Figure 1.2 Eradication of women who shame the nation (kukch'iryang ŭi ilso) in the *Chayu Sinmun*, October 23, 1945

Secondly, the adjective "decadent (t'oep'ye chŏk)" described the disapproval of changing sexual mores, appeared from the Korean women who fraternized with U.S. soldiers. An article in the *Chayu Sinmun* criticized them as "women who bring shame to the nation (kukch'iryang)."[49] It exhorted, "The citizens of Seoul are outraged by

[47] *Chayu Sinmun*, see especially October 5 issues, from October 5, 1945.

[48] In addition to the two excerpts, also see Figure 1.1 [Hyŏngmaeng'a] by Lim Tong-ŭn, in *Chayu Sinmun*, December 17, 1945.

[49] See [Eradication of women who shame our nation (kukch'iryang ŭi ilso) in *Chayu Sinmun*, October 23, 1945, p.1, The article was published together with the above Figure 1.2.

the bizarre women, with hairdo and make-up, who are appearing under the beautiful pretext of welcoming the troops of the United Nations. Did these women confuse ethnic-national liberation with the liberation of public mores and took it as a liberation from chastity?"[50] The women were also associated with the consumption in cabaret, bars and cafes.

In other words, the *Chayu Sinmun* obliquely criticized U.S. occupation by criticizing the local adaptations of the culture from U.S. military camps. The newspaper transformed the change in culture to a political criticism by juxtaposing the contrasting pictures of miserable returnees and the shortage of rice with the conspicuous consumption influenced by U.S. occupation and culture seeping through the camp towns. Thus, it doubly attacked U.S. occupation not only by disapproving U.S. cultural influence, but also by doing it in the way of emphasizing the shortage of rice, which was also considered to be a failure by USAMGIK. The *Chayu Sinmun* published the following article on October 27, 1945.[51] Two months after liberation in October 1945, USAMGIK reported that 141,392 Koreans were repatriated from Japan alone.

Each day, five thousand compatriots are returning to the homeland from Japan and from Manchuria. They had left the homeland with a dream of returning in glory. However, after escaping death by a narrow margin, they now set feet in Seoul in miserably shabby clothing while leading the old and carrying their young. How are the citizens of Seoul greeting them? … A countless number of rice-broth houses and drinking houses under sun screens have sprung up. There are people who prodigally spend hundred thousand wŏn (local currency) and a million wŏn at dance halls, cabarets, bars, and cafes, which appear like mushrooms in the flood season. What would our returning compatriots, which number five thousand on average daily, view these sites? It became a phenomenon that facilities like these excite decadent pleasure-seeking, and it is a very critical social problem when they cover the center of Seoul. Moreover, a few days ago I observed a returnee's camp in the city that accommodated two thousand returnees a day. The returnees were put up in the first floor through to the fifth floor, and they looked utterly miserable. However, the largest room on the ground floor was made into a cafe, and people were

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[50] *Ibid*.

[51] The numbers were provided by U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), *Chayu Sinmun*. October 27, 1945.

eating and playing there boisterously. The returnees got extremely resentful at this site. Together with the problem of unemployment, the problem of returning compatriots has become the focus of social instability.[52]

The article emphasized that five thousand compatriots were returning from Japan and Manchuria each day in a miserable state. It laments that the citizens of Seoul are indifferent to the suffering of their compatriots, and at the same time, they unhesitatingly display their "decadence" in front of the returnees who needed food and housing for survival.[53]

Facing such social tensions, the City Government of Seoul under USAMGIK made a gesture to remedy the problem of hunger. In January 1946, the City Government attempted to provide general rations for the families holding the City-issued "Rice Accounts (Ssal T'ongjang)." Rice Accounts permitted the families to purchase designated amounts of grain at ration stations, where grains were sold at much lower prices than in the (black) market. Heads of households without Rice Accounts were required to procure them from the Neighborhood Association Chiefs (panjang). Neighborhood Association was a structure inherited from the Total Mobilization Drive towards the end of the Pacific War (1938-1945) to control and co-opt the civilian population under the state.[54] However, the City's ration plan was little more than a gesture doomed to failure when USAMGIK had managed to collect less than half of the 1945 rice collection requirements from the Korean farmers. The City did not have much grain to offer from the beginning.

The reason for the failure of rationing was because USAMGIK only managed to collect half

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[52] *Ibid*.

[53] *Chayu Sinmun*, October 16, 1945.

[54] *Chayu Sinmun*, January 8, 1946. The government also maintained a registrar of "general needy households" under an income levy cutline, and certain food items, for example, biscuits, were only distributed to these "general needy households."

of the grain collection requirement.[55] Overall, free rice market was not a wise policy call when the government stocks of grain had dissipated during the chaos of the Japanese withdrawal. As mentioned early in Carroll Hill's report, USAMGIK declared a free rice market on October 5, 1945. Hill apologizes for the free rice market by saying that USAMGIK did not the administrative ability to oversee the rice collection in the fall of 1945. USAMGIK completed the occupation in mid-November, and by then, it was too late to control the 1945 rice crop collection. In addition, a free rice market seemed reasonable based on the prediction of a rice surplus in Korea when Korea no longer had to export rice to Japan. the reason for failure was because USAMGIK could only collect half of rice collections of 1945.[56] In December and January, USAMGIK tried to give farmers incentive goods such as tobacco and rubber shoes in exchange for rice, but it was not successful mainly because of the shortage of incentive goods.[57] Even when the price of rice jumped ten times from 38 wŏn to 380 wŏn, the rice stores did not have rice to sell.[58] When rice price went up, the government had to release its grain stocks to balance the market price. the rice price skyrocketed and the rice market was fraught with hoarding and speculation. *Chayu Sinmun* gives a picture of rice shortage, "Go to the Seoul Station today and see what is going on. When people see a person who has brought one or two sacks of rice to give to his relatives in the city, ten or twenty people surround him and shout to

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[57] From Headquarters, USAMGIK, National Economic Board, Seoul, Korea, "Food Position Report for South Korea, December 1946- November 1947, dated December 17, 1947, ref. 395; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[58] In particular, see March 1946 issues of the *Chayu Sinmun*.

Figure 1.3 [Chayu Manhwa] "Now, give (me) food rather than medicine." *Chayu Sinmun*, March 11, 1946

sell it whatever the price is."[59]

In the midst of the outcry for rice on March 11, 1946, the *Chayu Sinmun (Freedom Press)* expressed its interpretation of the current food situation in relation to the Cold War ideological conflicts. Pertinent to having U.S. occupation zone in the south and Soviet occupation zone in the north, *Chayu* featured a caricature of a crying boy and two male adults, one each side of the boy. The adults try to soothe the boy by offering medicine. The man on the left holds out a bottle written with "the communist (medicine) pills" and the man on the right tempts the boy with a spoonful from a bottle labeled, "the democratic drug." However, the boy has had enough of medicine until now, and this time he is not appeased by neither of the prescriptions. His stance is represented in the caption below, "By now, give (me) meal rather than medicine."[60] Ironically, however, while the boy is refusing to participate in the Cold War ideological rivalry, the caricature points out that the boy is still dependent on either of the two to receive his meal.

Thus, through the caricature of twin guardians, *Chayu* portrays USAMGIK as having imperialist motivations and being no less domineering than the communists in the north. It captures an unmistakable moment of indistinguishability as the satire in the caricature show them

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[59] *Chayu Sinmun*, February 18, 1946.

[60] See Figure 1.3 on this page. [Chayu Manhwa] in the *Chayu Sinmun*, March 11, 1946.

like twins. The two occupiers demand the Koreans to choose one between a U.S. democracy and a communist democracy. Ironically, however, Koreans did not see a difference between the two. Both USAMGIK in the south, and the Soviets and Korean communists in the north were playing guardians when Korean people desired to be independent. Moreover, in the caricature, neither gave food, and therefore, the Koreans represented by Chayu did not a base to make a political choice between the two.

In other words, the *Chayu Sinmun* was able to turn the question of food into a political issue by satirizing both the U.S. and the Soviets looking equally imperial and foreign. Following this logic, politicization of the food question was only possible because USAMGIK failed to feed Koreans adequately for the period between 1945 and 1947.

The *Chayu Sinmun* was particularly creative in using the grain question as a metaphor to satirize USAMGIK's pretense to be morally and economically superior to the communists both in the north and the south.[61] For example, on February 23, 1946, the newspaper presented a caricature showing women and children in the south queuing up for grain when all the grain was stocked up in the north. In this caricature, the Chayu

Figure 1.4 [Sisa Manhwa] "Is the fair rice price the 38th degree, or 38 *wŏn*?" *Chayu Sinmun*, February 23, 1946

[61] See Figure 1.4 on this page. [Sisa Manhwa] *Chayu Sinmun*, February 23, 1946, p.1.

Sinmun was more overtly critical of USAMGIK, intimating that north is doing better than south USAMGIK. The caricature showed that if these people wanted grain -presumably rice-, USAMGIK in the south was not the right choice to make. People are queuing up for grain on the left (below south) while all the rice sacks were stocked over the wall in the north (right). A huge wall in the middle blocks their access to the plentiful grain on the other side, but the wall also has a dog hole through which people can peep. The message was made clear in the caption, "Is the fair rice price on the 38th Degree (North Latitude, which was the national division line), or 38 *wŏn* (local currency unit)?"[62] The local currency unit, 38 wŏn, was a reference to the "fair rice price" USAMGIK set per each sack. In March, the same portion of rice was selling at 380 wŏn in the black market and in December, it went up to 760 wŏn.[63] However, even one had money, the plentiful rice in the north was only as good as a picture and was not available to families in the south. As such, these caricatures played on a thin line between politics and the everyday concerns. Thus, they brought out politics more prominently by making it into a vital concern in the everyday life.[64]

Secondly, when the national division was blamed for the poor harvest, U.S. which supported national division and occupied half of Korea was blamed for the crop failure. into Soviet occupied north and U.S. occupied south cut the supply of chemical fertilizers for the southern

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[62] See Figure 1.1 on p.30. [Sisa Manhwa] in the *Chayu Sinmun*, February 23, 1946.

[63] See throughout March 1946 issues of *Chayu Sinmun*. For December figure, see the 23rd Joint Korean-American Conference on 2 December, 1946.

[64] Rising rice price was a huge issue not only in Chayu, but in many other newspapers. The everyday concern in *Kajŏng Sinmun* was the price of rice. Wheat flour was not visibly present neither before July 1946 when USAMGIK started shipping over large quantities of U.S. surplus wheat nor afterwards. When the *Kajŏng Sinmun* mentioned wheat in this period, wheat was used for women's skin care and hair pack, in which case wheat flour mixed with egg and cucumber and was applied to skin. See, for example, July 1946 issues of the *Kajŏng Sinmun*.

farmers, which according to an USAMGIK report caused, "almost total lack of chemical fertilizers" for 1945 crop.[65] The developmental blue print of Japan's Chosŏn-Manchuria vision had more industries concentrated in northern provinces close to the Manchurian border. Thus, major fertilizer plants fell under Soviet control in 1945. For example, Hamhŭng had the second largest nitrogen fertilizer plant in the world.[66] The national division made the supply from these plants no longer available for the southern farmers, and this hindered the agricultural productivity in 1946. Although USAMGIK addressed the problem by prioritizing the importation of agricultural fertilizers over fuel and food for the 1947 harvest, the damage had already been done.[67]

In intimating USAMGIK's incompetence, one of the things Chayu showed interest was the question of land reform in the north. The Communist Party in the Soviet zone had already carried out land reforms in 1945.[68] The news of swift and thorough Land Reforms in 1945 by the communists north of the 38th parallel seemed to substantiate the communists' commitment to equalitarian and revolution from the ground.[69] By comparison, the shortage of rice in the south could be politically dangerous. In the south, land reform was still at a preparatory stage when the

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[65] 305; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[66] The factory was bombarded during the American Christmas operation in 1952, but had since been re-built after the armistice. See Charles Armstrong."'Fraternal Socialism': The International Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-62." *Cold War History*, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 2006, p.176

[67] Rice production increased after 1947 due to American agricultural technology. Control measures such as stem-borer and rice blast reduced the loss of crop by plant diseases and insects. Pesticides imported from the U.S. to be sprayed on the field and in storage also helped. The education of American agricultural technology had lasting impacts. In 1954 after the war, rice harvest was good, and in 1955, per capita consumption of rice reached 143kg. 52, 1347

[68] See Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes. 1945-1947*, Princeton University Press, 1981. pp.414-425

[69] Charles K. Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950*. Cornell University Press, 2003. pp.74-81

Korean War broke out in June 1950. Two weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War, the fledging South Korean state announced the completion of the registration of landlords. The state was now ready to negotiate with the landlords about due compensations, and confirmed that the landlords have the priorities to invest in the industrial assets left by the Japanese.[70]

The first shipment of wheat was shipped from a U.S. port in April and arrived in Korea in May 1946. Anticipating the shipments of wheat, the City and USAMGIK advised the citizens to be prepared to substitute rice with wheat flour when rice was not available for rationing.[71] However, wheat flour was not readily available before August 1946, either. Until August, non-cultivating population was receiving 150 grams of rationed grain, estimated to give 525 calories. USAMGIK had imported 7,800 tons of wheat in May, and 8,200 tons of wheat in June. However, when the grain import requirement per month was calculated at 40,000 tons to be able to provide 345-375 grams of grain ration a day, 7,800 tons and 8,200 tons per month were not sufficient.[72] Thus, until July 1946 when USAMGIK imported 24,000 tons of wheat, and began rationing it throughout U.S. occupation zone in August, very few families actually benefited from City's earlier gesture of general rationing.[73]

The shortage of rice reached a peak in February and March 1946. Everyday, national and local newspapers deplored about rice stores not having any rice to sell in cities.[74] A remonstration

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[70] *Chayu Sinmun*, May 3, 1950; June 14, 1950

[71] *Chayu Sinmun,* March 14, 1946.

[72] 2.3 to 2.5 hops were converted to 345-375 grams of grain.

[73] More is discussion in the later section, "U.S. Food Assistance and Changing Meanings of Wheat Four in South Korea," in this chapter. Headquarters, USAMGIK, "Food Position Reports for South Korea, December 1946-30 November, 1947," dated 17 December, 1947, ref.396, #6429; UD 1733; RG 331.

[74] See, for example, February and March issues of the *Chayu Sinmun*.

of young factory workers in March 1946 showed that rice was scarce not only for the returnees and refugees, but also for urban laborers. On March 28, 1946, three hundred factory workers - two hundred young male workers and one hundred young female workers- of Song-ha Electronics, Aechisa Printing, and Pyŏngsang Apparel conglomerated in front of the USAMGIK building in Seoul. They appealed their dire condition to USAMGIK and asked for rice. However, the young workers only succeeded in hearing that USAMGIK was not in charge of the food policy, but the City Government of Seoul was. The protesters moved their venue to the Seoul City Hall and continued their protest.[75]

On the other hand, despite the politicization of the food question, in May 1946, USAMGIK reported to Washington that while hunger was a noticeable problem especially among specific sectors of the population such as the returnees and refugees, the food situation in south Korea did not fall below a starvation-level.[76] The report recognized severe malnutrition and hunger among people, but this was described as "chronic hunger" that Koreans were used to experiencing. When the objectives of the civilian feeding program was in preventing social unrests and instability, "chronic" hunger was not a likely cause for riots to pose political threats to USAMGIK. USAMGIK was not likely to be blamed for a chronic situation that was part of a "normal" Korean life. Therefore, the report implied that USAMGIK need not commit to ameliorate the chronic hunger in Korea, and that the current food policy adequately provided for the population in spring 1946. Whether one judges the main causes of the riots in late 1946 to be

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[75] *Chayu Sinmun*, March 28, 1946.

[76] 303-308, May 1, 1946; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331; also see, Political Advisor Office to State Department, 790.00119 Control Korea, Dispatch No. 88, dated 14 May 1945, on Kangwŏn Province; RG 59. The situation of chronic hunger in south Korea continued to be a problem well into the 1960s.

more due to social discontents, such by the shortage of food, or more due to socialist-instigations, there were a series of riots throughout U.S. occupation zone in Korea, especially in November.

From November 7 to 14, 1946, the situation was critical with the riots in Taegu, Yongsan, Masan, and Pusan. Although U.S wheat began to be rationed from August 1946, it was not sufficient and food was still scarce. At the 23rd Joint Korean-American Conference at Tŏksu Palace on December 2, 1946, Korean representatives argued that the failure of USAMGIK's food policy was the single largest cause of the riots throughout 1946.[77] The Korean representatives attributed this insight to consulting with the cities' renowned personalities and with the arrested and detained rioters who plotted the stirrings. Whether the riots were caused by, what combinations of, the shortage of rice, by the capitalist-communist ideological conflicts, by foreign occupation of U.N. Trusteeship, or by national division, the consensus in the Joint U.S. and Korean Conference was that the most practical solution they could mill out to prevent further riots was to give food. If dire food situation could lead to mass riots, rendering urban dwellers especially vulnerable to socialist instigations, giving foods could dissolve political discontents. Thus, at the same conference, they moves on to discuss ration programs for 1947.

The key to the success of rationing of 1947 laid in the success of rice collection from the Korean farmers. USAMGIK made an effort to induce farmers to exchange rice with rubber shoes and cotton clothes. Also, in December 1946, it offered 338,354 pounds of cookies and 2,500 boxes of matches in exchange for the rice.[78] However, farmers could command much higher

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[77] Minutes, 23rd meeting of the Joint Korean-American Conference at Tŏksu Palace, December 2, 1946; Control-Korea; G-2 Section, USAFIK; RG 59

[78] *Nongmin Chubo,* December 1, 1946

prices in the black market, and this policy of battering was not effective.

After two bad winters, the City Government of Seoul tried rationing again in April 1947 by issuing a new Rice Account (Ssal T'ongjang) now per each person, and not per family. In order to obtain rations, recipient ripped off a voucher from her Rice Account and submitted it to one of the 194 ration stations in the city.[79] The ration was provided every ten days, and it was not only for grains, but also included clothes, laundry soap, rubber shoes and other everyday necessities.[80]

An emotional issue in rationing was how much of it was "rice" as versus to wheat and other grains. Even after the importation of wheat began in July 1946, at the above conference, the U.S. and Korean representatives agreed to keep the percentage of rice to 30-50 percents. The percentage of wheat was the highest at over 64 percent in 1947 because the Food Administration in USAMGIK was sensitive to prices. The rest was mostly filled with "foreign" rice (oe-mi) and barley. Although the office was aware that Koreans preferred rice and barley, wheat and wheat flour was more economical cost-wise per calorie than rice and barley.[81] It was also under pressure from Washington to purchase U.S. farm surpluses before turning to the international market for rice and other grains. It was not a coincidence then that wheat was by far the largest surplus stock of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

On the other hand, the Food Administration of USAMGIK tried to accommodate the Korean cultural preference for rice by importing "foreign" rice (oe-mi). The office purchased rice from Burma, Egypt, Brazil, and Mexico as well as the United States. In December 6, 1945,

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[79] *Tong'a,* March 13, 1947

[80] *Tong'a,* March 26, 1947.

[81] September 13, 1947, ref.382; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

USAMGIK brought in 19,000 tons of white rice from California to Inchŏn.[82] It also had a small amount of 200 metric tons of rice shipped to Korea from San Francisco and New Orleans.[83] During the particularly severe famine in 1947, the Food Administration of USAMGIK purchased 6,000 tons of rice from Rangoon, Burma, through the British Ministry of Food. Again in 1948, the US Department of State allocated 22,471 tons of Siamese (Bangkok, Thailand) and Egyptian Asian rice to Korea.[84] The Department of State organized the imports by bartering their "foreign" rice with U.S. agricultural surpluses. Siam was interested in U.S. surplus seeds oil, and Egypt asked for U.S. surplus wheat flour. In particular, Egypt offered the trade ratio of 1:1 between U.S. wheat flour and Egyptian rice, which was a much more favorable rate than for domestic Korean rice.[85] True, when the grain import requirement was 40,000 tons per month in 1947, such amounts of rice imports were not substantial. However, the trades show that at the early stage in 1947 and 1948, U.S. agricultural surpluses were not the only source for civilian feeding assistance in Korea, which later became the case with U.S. Public Law 480 in 1954. The Food Administration did import grains other than wheat from other foreign countries often by bartering their produce with U.S. surplus wheat.

However, "foreign" rice, called "oe-mi" by Koreans, was different from the indigenous rice in Korea, and Koreans considered foreign rice to be inferior to the Korean rice. Indigenous rice crop in Korea was "short-grain white" with a particular level of glutinous quality. Foreign rice was often of long-grain and it was also difficult to find foreign rice with the comparable

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[82] *Chayu Sinmun,* December 6, 1945.

[83] 196-207 metric tons; hardcopy no.138-168; RG 469

[84] hardcopy no. 274-295; RG 469

[85] January 13, 1948; 285-286; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

glutinous quality as the Korean breeds. The new South Korean state displayed sensitivity towards the differences among the foreign rices, and even preferred foreign rice from certain regions. For example, in 1948, at the suggestion of U.S. Major O'Hara, stationed in Manila, the U.S. Department of Defense had devised a plan to increase the volume of rice imports to Korea by bartering 8,000 tons of initially planned Siamese rice with 10,000 tons of Mexican rice. However, the South Korean state was newly established on August 15, 1948, and by October 4, 1948, it clearly communicated its refusal of the Mexican rice to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces.[86]

When USAMGIK imported foreign rice, it made sure that it was used for meals. In February 1947, USAMGIK banned importing rice from the International Emergency Food Council (IEFC from 1946-1948, and subordinate to FAO in 1948) if rice was to be used in brewing alcohol.[87] USAMGIK explained the ban as part of its efforts to save rice. Thus, Koreans brewed wine with wheat flour instead of their traditional rice wine.

In this section, I explored the story before the rationing of wheat flour became prevalent after late 1946 and 1947. In the midst of the rice shortage and political commotion, grain became politicized. The initial food policy by USAMGIK failed in 1945-1946. This failure by USAMGIK provided a fodder for its political opponents to criticize USAMGIK for its participation in the national division and U.N. Trusteeship, which were extremely unpopular among many sectors of the Korean society.[88] For example, the *Chayu Sinmun* intimated that

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[86] Rice: Ryukyu and Korea, 1948; 269, 270, 272, 280, 281; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[87] February, 1947; 358; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[88] Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, New York: Norton, 1998. pp.185-298 reference Cumings, *Origins of the Korean War Vol. 2*. pp.

when USAMGIK failed its food policy and also at the same time instigated the national division and trusteeship, USAMGIK was as imperial as the communists in the north, or that in certain aspects such in land reforms, the communists were doing better. Now, before discussing the spread of wheat and wheat flour in south Korea, next section goes to the uses and meanings of wheat flour during the colonial period. This earlier history of wheat flour will be used in the last section to show the ways in which the market and industry of wheat flour that began in the 1920s was taken up again and also shifted by a large scale shipments of U.S. surplus wheat after May 1946.

SECTION 2.
MEANINGS OF WHEAT DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD
: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL

While occasional use of wheat flour in both festive and indigent food had been recorded during the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392-1910), the machine-milling wheat flour industry and flour consumption in the market were established in the 1920s and the 1930s. During the colonial era (1910-1945), large machine milling factories and their increasing sales figures associated wheat flour with new style (sin-sik) cooking, industrialization in the production of consumer commodities, and the international trade of Canadian and Australian wheat. The machine milling wheat flour industry was hailed as an achievement of colonial Korea's increasing

industrialization along with the coal briquette, rubber, and cotton spinning industries.[89] Furthermore, after 1935, large Japanese wheat milling companies were operating factories in northern regions of Korea in order to export to the Manchurian market by taking advantage of the regions' proximity to it.[90]

This association was despite the fact that indigenously cultivated wheat was mostly consumed within the farm houses. In 1924, the self-supply of 44,400 tons of wheat took up more than half of the total wheat consumption in Korea, which was estimated at 81,400 tons a year.[91] Until 1935, industrially processed wheat flour sold in the Korean market was mostly milled from wheat imported from Canada, Australia and the U.S. However, Japan's aggressive war in China and the annulment of tax exception on foreign wheat made importing of foreign wheat increasingly difficult after 1935. By increasing the local cultivation of wheat and channeling it to the market, in 1938, half of the wheat flour consumed in Korea was made from indigenous wheat while wheat for the other half was imported from Manchuria and Japan.[92]

In the section, I emphasize that the spread of wheat flour during the colonial period was through the market economy. The industry did take advantage of the market made accessible by Japan's incursion into Manchuria and North China, and it also experienced constraints under the close trade control of the wartime Japanese state. Yet. its supply and demand was overall managed within the market. I emphasis distribution channels of the market economy in order to contrast them to the later change in the channels of distribution in post-1945 south Korea to

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[89] See [Kongjang Sullye] 1-24 in *Tong'a* from August 7, 1939 to September 9, 1939, All on p. 5

[90] Among others see *Tong'a*, January 15 and 16, 1935; *Tong'a*, June 30, 1938. p. 5, and *Tong'a*, September 7, 1938.

[91] *Tong'a*, January 7, 1925

[92] *Tong'a*, September 7, 1938. p. 5

ration and relief programs. These functioned outside the market economy. Wheat flour also continued to be sold in the market during the period from 1945 to 1950, but the amount was insubstantial compared to the rationed wheat and wheat flour.

During the colonial period, the market for wheat flour was roughly divided into two socio-culturally different locations. The two had different supply lines, different cooking recipes, and different customer base. Wheat flour from Manchurian (Chinese) and domestic Korean wheat was used differently from the flour milled from Australian, Canadian, and U.S. wheat. Firstly, when wheat flour was used as relief food, it was substituting for rice for the poor who could not afford rice.[93] Relief wheat flour tended to be Manchurian or domestic wheat flour. Secondly, machine milled flour made with Canadian, Australian and U.S. wheat was associated with new-style cooking, using the recipes translated through Japan. In addition, the print media often identified wheat flour as a staple food of the Chinese people.[94]

Firstly, from the early colonial period, wheat flour was used as relief food. In the 1920s, refugees in flooded and draught inflicted areas received wheat flour as emergency food aid.[95] When rice was not available, relief recipients and the poor resorted to wheat flour. In their recipes, wheat flour was the main ingredient. When they could not afford rice, it was not likely that they could use meat (for don katsu), vegetables (for tempura), butter, nor eggs in their cooking. These families turned Manchurian wheat flour into wheat flour gruel, which contained only wheat flour and salt. Another popular recipe for wheat flour was “sujebi” or “sujŏp’i,”

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[93] Among many examples, see *Tong’a,* April 27, 1920; *Tong’a,* August 18, 1923; *Tong’a,* February 10, 1925; *Tong’a*, September 10, 1928; *Tong’a*, December 14, 1928; *Tong’a*, January 5, 1935; *Tong’a*, September 6, 1935

[94] For example, see *Tong’a,* May 25, 1934; *Tong’a*, March 25, 1939.

[95] For example, see August 18, 1923, p.3 and other places.

deriving from “hand (su)” and “folding (jŏp’i)” of wheat flour dough. To make sujebi, you kneaded flour with water and salt, and after hand-separating the dough into bitable sizes, you boil them in water. You could add available vegetables and potato, if you had them. Because sujebi was mostly just boiled dough, eating sujebi was used as a descriptive metaphor for extreme poverty.[96]

The mainstream newspapers such as *Kyŏnghyang* and *Tong’a* construed wheat flour gruel as the last resort for the poor. When even wheat flour was beyond their means, the poor had to turn to steamed red bean leaves and mugwort, mixed with some buckwheat flour.[97] The feeling that wheat flour added to the sense of poverty and desperation could be glimpsed in the following excerpt. This was a letter submitted to *Tong’a Ilbo* for a section, “The Famous Attraction of My Village.” The letter is titled, “*Pongrae Chŏng, the Cave of the Poor,*” and was submitted by a resident of Pongrae Chŏng by the name of Hong Sŏng-in. In his letter, Hong mentions that wheat flour is food that the poor would not miss once they become able to afford rice. They ate wheat flour only because they did not have any other food. In his letter, the description of eating wheat flour was expected to induce empathy from the readers on the predicament of the people in poverty.

> Since you say that you know, and indeed that you do know, across the bridge of Yŏmchŏn, there are twenty some houses of the same shape. Their monthly rent is thirty wŏn. The owner who built them is a rich man in Kyŏngsŏng, and the people who rent them are mostly poor people. Do you know what it is? I know. I do know. It is the cave of the poor people in Pongrae Chŏng.
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> Do not assume that everyone here is equally poor among themselves just because people habitually call it “the cave of the poor people.” The cave of the poor people! There is a man here who earns seventy to eighty wŏn each month. Then, thinking about it again, what’s so grand

[96] For example, see *Tong’a*, January 5, p7

[97] For example, see *Tong’a*, May 4, 1929.

about earning seventy to eighty wŏn? He is still a poor man. But there are those who barely have an income of nine wŏn. Since the title of the poor evolves around this sort of people, it is difficult to see the guy who earns seventy eighty wŏn as a poor man in this village.

Surely you have heard the rumor that a family of three lived on nine wŏn for a month and had a little over ten chŏn left. No matter how much you think about it, you won't be able to understand how they survived. When you ask him, he would say that our living is not living. One meal of rice is beyond dream, so a couple handful of Chinese wheat flour raises smoke under the pot. Actually these people who go through all these hardship are the people who try the hardest.

Hardship is hardship. Yet, these people would not have shame looking up at heaven, and no shame looking down on earth.[98]

Hong's letter emphasizes the flour as "Chinese wheat flour," which had different meaning from the flour made from Canadian and Australian wheat. Wheat as a substitute and as relief food meant that "for sure when the price of rice goes down, people who fed on wheat flour will return to rice."[99]

Secondly, during the colonial period, the flour made from Canadian and Australian wheat was mostly used by large milling companies producing for the commercial market. The market share was divided among three to four Japanese companies. Funded by Japanese zaibatsu (conglomerate) and equipped with machines ordered in from England and the U.S., the wheat flour milling factories imparted an image of a modern industry.[100] In particular, newspaper reports on the industry presented an imaginary map of suppliers and buyers on the international scale. In the 1920s and early 1930s, except a small percentage of wheat from Manchuria, these Japanese companies operating in Korea imported most of their source wheat via Japan from Canada, Australia and U.S.A.[101] As a result, the milling industry was also influenced by wheat

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[98] This piece was submitted for a section called, [My Village]. *Tong'a,* July 31, 1923.

[99] For example, see *Tong'a*, October 7, 1930.

[100] *Tong'a,* January 18, 1935; *Tong'a*, January 31, 1939

[101] *Tong'a*, September 27, 1923, p. 2.

crop failures in South America in 1925 and the dumping practice of the U.S. wheat companies in 1932.[102] Further, as the Japanese army infiltrated and controlled parts of China, the same companies took over old and built new factories in northern regions of Korea to sell in the markets in Manchuria and North China.

After Manchu Chebun, of Japanese capital, established the first wheat milling factory in Korea in Chinnamp'o in 1919, the machine milling flour industry expanded at rates exceeding 10% a year between 1919 and 1925.[103] The second wheat milling factory in Korea was P'ung'guk Chebun's factory in Kyŏngjŏng-dong in Yongsan area of Seoul in 1921.[104] 1924 was a particularly good year in terms of market sales. P'ungkuk and Manchu together sold approximately 15,540 tons of machine-milled wheat flour in the Korean market.[105] The Korean market also absorbed 22,200 tons of wheat flour of Ilbon Chebun, located in Japan.[106] Thus, a total of 37,740 tons of machine-milled wheat flour was sold in 1924.[107] In addition, local farms produced approximately 44,400 metric tons of wheat and consumed it within farm houses, and thus, this sum was not available in the market.[108]

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[102] *Tong'a*, November 28, 1925; *Tong'a*, March 23, 1932.

[103] *Tong'a*, December 3, 1925

[104] [Sanŏp Inmaek: Chebun Ŏp (1)] in *Maeil Kyŏngje*, September 24, 1972; *Tong'a*, November 28, 1921. P'ungkuk, a Japanese firm, Toyokuni, from Kumamoto City (Hyŏn), Japan, *Pusan Ilbo*, September 30, 1936; November 22, 1924.

[105] 1 dae was taken as 37 kŭn. 1 kŭn= 0.6kg. 1 dae= 22.2kg. Thus 3,700,000 dae was approximately 82,140,000kg a year. See *Tong'a*, February 4, 1927. 700,000 dae is converted to 15,540 tons. *Tong'a,* January 7, 1925.

[106] 1,000,000 dae is converted to 22,299 tons. *Ibid*.

[107] 1,700,000 dae is converted to 37,740 tons. *Ibid*.

[108] 2,000,000 dae (sack) is converted to 44,000 tons. *Ibid*.

During the colonial period, the Korean market was quite integrated with the Japanese production. In November 1924, P'ungkuk factory was burnt down in fire. The factory was supplying over eighty percent of wheat flour consumed in Kyŏngsŏng, the capital of colonial Korea, and its vicinities.[109] When P'ungkuk stopped was producing, consumers in Kyŏngsŏng purchased wheat flour imported from Japan, which was about ten percent more expensive than domestically produced wheat flour. In such a way, Ilbon Chebun, which did not have a factory in Korea until August 1935, was selling 44,400 tons of wheat flour in the Korean market in January 1935.[110]

Local bakeries were one of the venues that the machine milled wheat flour was channeled to. In 1925, 150 small-scale professional bakeries were operating. 120 of them were Japanese-owned, and Koreans owned the rest, 30. However, even the Korean-owned shops used shop names ending with "*tang," "sil,"* or "*ok,"* reflecting that they learnt and adapted the baking industry from Japanese practitioners.[111]

In addition, the availability of reasonably priced machine milled wheat flour changed part of the home cooking practice in Korea. Magazines and newspapers often introduced wheat flour in the recipes of the "new-style" cooking, as was mediated through Japan. In 1931, *Tong'a Ilbo* ran a section, "Boastful Cooking Skills," which frequently couched the readers to incorporate wheat flour in home cooking.[112] The section informed readers that "It tastes better if you use the new-

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[109] *Tong'a*, November 22, 1924.

[110] Ilbon Chebun sold 2 million dae (=) Tong'a, January 16, 1935; *Tong'a*, August 16, 1935

[111] Kim Tong-ho, "Han'guk Chekwa Cheppang Sanŏp ŭi Hyŏnhwang kwa Chŏnmang." *Han'guk Chori Hakhoechi*. 1995. pp. 128-130

[112] For example see *Tong'a*, January 24, 30, and 31; February 21, 22, and 25; March 3 and 13; April 26 and 28, 1931.

style of plastering the rib in wheat flour and panfry it in oil."[113] Thus, wheat flour became a key ingredient in "new-style" cooking, and the author considered it a fashionable change to plaster red meat and fish in wheat flour, and fry it in "salad" oil.[114] In 1934, Tong'a also featured a regular section titled, "Housewife (kajŏng puin)," which continued to provide recipes using wheat flour and oil frying such for tempura (Japanese-style fried vegetables and sea food) and Japanese-style croquette.[115] Don katsu, which was pork fried with wheat flour plaster was pork schnitzel as adapted in Japan in the early 20th century, and it was one of the recipes that became popular in Korea since the colonial period.

However, while the magazines and newspapers raved over the recipes for baking bread, cookies, cakes and donuts, shrouding them with an aura of adeptness to the modern lifestyle, most Korean kitchens were not equipped with baking facilities. In order to participate in the new style cooking without an oven, *Tong'a* also shared a tip to make "bread (ppang)" in rice steaming pots. The article directed the readers to knead wheat flour with baking powder, and simply steam it in the pot for about 20 minutes. The end-product was announced as bread.[116]

In addition to recipes, newspapers and magazines also provided scientific knowledge and rational explanation about wheat flour. Scientific knowledge helped to facilitate the familiarization of wheat flour. For example, in 1933, *Tong'a* informed its readers to distinguish

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[113] *Tong'a*, January 30, 1931.

[114] Salad oil referred to vegetable oil or olive oil.

[115] See, for example, *Tong'a* through January to April Issues; Also, *Tong'a,* March 8, 1930; *Tong'a*, Mary 25, 1934; and elsewhere.

[116] *Tong'a*, September 6, 1935; *Tong'a*, March 25, 1940

wheat flour between the ones suitable for baking and the ones suitable for frying tempura.[117] The article used scientific language, explaining that after being milled, each variety of wheat produced different level of glutinousness, and that this determined which wheat flour is suitable for which recipes.

In the mid-1930s, the wheat milling industry accelerated its participation in the imperial projects by the Japanese military in China. When the military infiltrated and expanded its control over Manchuria and North China (Pukchi), the industry expanded their sales in the regions.[118] The first Shanghai Incidents in January 1932 and again the second Shanghai-Manchurian Incident in July 1937 provided opportunities in the markets.[119] In 1934, Aiming for the Manchurian market, Manchu Chebun made a decision to pipeline all products from its Chinnamp'o factory in P'yŏng'an Namdo to Manchuria in 1934. It built a new factory in Sariwŏn to supply for the Korean market.[120] P'ungkuk also expanded its production by building a new factory in Inch'ŏn in 1935.[121] In 1936, the company went local by establishing a factory in Fengtian, China.[122] In the mid-1930s, the market in Japan was showing the signs of saturation.[123]

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[117] *Tong'a*, August 5, 1933

[118] For the companies' expansion to Manchuria, see *Tong'a*, August 1, 1933.

[119] Armed conflict between Chinese and Japanese armies as a response to September 1, 1931 Manchurian Incident. For the 1st Shanghai Incident, see Tong'a, February 5, 1932, p. 1. The 2nd Shanghai Incident refers to armed conflicts starting in July 1937 in Fengtian, spreading to Shanghai. Later in August, the conflict spread to Nanjing and became the pretext for the Chinese-Japanese War. For the 2nd Shanghai Incident, see *Tong'a*, August 19, 1938, pp. 1-3.

[120] *Tong'a*, January 16, 1934; *Tong'a*, February 5, 1935 p.6

[121] *Tong'a*, June 28, 1935, p. 4.

[122] The city was known as Bongch'ŏn to Koreans. Its Manchu name was Mukden and currently it is known as Shenyang of Liaoning Province. *Pusan Ilbo*, October 4, 1932.

[123] *Tong'a*, January 15, 1935.

Thus, in order to diversify its market to Manchuria, Ilbon Chebun took over a factory from Manchu Chebun in Chinnamp'o in addition to building a factory in Inch'ŏn in 1935.[124] Il-ch'ŏng Chebun -under the name Chosŏn Chebun- built a factory in Chinnamp'o in 1937, in Yŏngdŭngp'o in 1938, and in Haeju in 1939.[125] By 1940, colonial Korea had 15 wheat milling factories in total.

On the other hand, starting from 1935, the vicissitude of the Japanese empire adversely impacted the wheat milling industry by restricting the importation of foreign wheat from Canada and Australia. 1935 was also the year that the consumption of machine milled wheat flour peaked during colonial Korea with 55,500 tons produced annually.[126] In 1935, *Tong'a* explained that the recent restrictions on the importation made foreign wheat scarce, and therefore, foreign wheat had to be substituted with domestically produced wheat in Korea. The article further explained that the taste of bread was largely decided by the quality of wheat flour. However, flour milled of Korean wheat had an obvious advantage compared to flour milled of foreign wheat. Korean wheat flour did not make the dough to swell sufficiently. As a result of using domestically produced wheat for baking bread, it became difficult to procure quality bread in the city. However, the article suggested that instead of being deterred from purchasing bread, the

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[124] *Tong'a*, January 16, 1935.

[125] *Tong'a*, October 7, 1937; *Tong'a* Feb 17 1938; *Tong'a*, September 15, 1939. p. 4.

[126] 2,500,000 dae is converted to 55,500 tons. *Tong'a*, January 16, 1935; Tong'a, June 28, 1935. p. 4. However, according to one USAMGIK report, from 1932 to 1936, the consumption of wheat (not wheat flour) was 10.4kg per capita per year, rice was 55.8kg; barley was 39.5kg; millet was 38.1kg, and other grains were 10.9kg in the average calorie intake of 2,077 calories. It is likely that these figures were mis-represented. For example, in my rough calculation, 10.4kg x 22 million people (total population) = 228,800 tons per year. Assuming approximately half of wheat consumption was machine milled (and the rest as self-supply and consumption within farm houses) gives the consumption of wheat flour, 114,400 tons per year, and 9,533 tons monthly. Thus, I find these figures not convincing. 394; #6429; UD 1733: RG 331

consumers should opt for smaller loafs of bread and avoid big loafs that were more affected by the swelling of the dough.[127] At the same time, the colonial state encouraged increasing the local cultivation of wheat in Korea in order to attain self-sufficiency.

Further in 1938 and 1939, the state strictly banned the importation of wheat from Canada and Australia. Part of the reason was to save foreign currency. Thus, the machine-milling factories had to resort to either Manchurian or local Korean wheat. Even when their quality was not considered as nearly high as Canadian and Australian wheat, their prices doubled from the ones of the previous year since foreign wheat was not available.[128] As the Pacific War (1931-1945) was entering its last phase, Manchukuo also banned the exports of wheat flour in 1939.[129] Therefore, the only choice available for the industry was to use domestically produced wheat, and companies experimented to make it suitable for factory production.[130]

It is true that starting in 1940, the Governor-General of Korea included wheat flour in the list of rationed food.[131] However, wheat flour only made up a very small part of the rationed food. Throughout the colonial period, Korea exported rice to Japan, and it imported wheat, millet and beans from Manchuria and "foreign" rice (oe-mi) from other countries. However, from June 1940, under the duress of the war, it was no longer feasible for Korea to import foreign rice. Thus, wheat flour was chosen as one of the substitute crops for rice.[132] However, out of the

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[127] *Tong'a*, December 12, 1935.

[128] *Tong'a*, May 24, 1938.

[129] *Tong'a*, June 30, 1939. p.6

[130] *Ibid*.

[131] *Tong'a*, February 22, 1940.

[132] *Tong'a*, June 12, 1940; *Tong'a,* July 24, 1940, p. 4.

intended 345 grams of rationed grain daily, one third was planned to be rice and the remainder was mostly composed of barley, beak cakes, millet, broom corn, buckwheat, corn and sugar.[133] Wheat flour did not play any substantial role in rations. Nevertheless, Wheat flour as a substitute for rice had a different meaning from using wheat flour in the new style cooking such as in don katsu and tempura. It was not by choice, but by necessity.

Despite its inclusion in the rationed food, the overall consumption of wheat flour considerably decreased in the last years of the Pacific War. The importation of wheat flour from Japan to Korea was 23,334 tons of wheat flour in 1941; 21,780 tons in 1942; and 3,434 tons in 1943.[134] From 1940, The wheat imports from Manchuria resumed in 1940 after the supply channel had been disrupted.[135]

The annual wheat production in Korea south of the 38 degree north latitude that was for human consumption was 59,000 tons annually for the period between 1940 and 1944. Total wheat production including animal feed was 93,000 tons annually.[136] In 1945, wheat production for human consumption was 43,000 tons, and in 1946, it was estimated to be approximately

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[133] 2.3 *hops* are converted to 345 grams. *Tong'a*, June 12, 1940; *Tong'a,* July 24, 1940, p. 4. See 394; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[134] From 1941 to 1943, the weight of Japanese exports to Korea, incl. wheat flour, starch, sake, onion, pickles, orange, tea, soy fish, etc. Wheat flour imported to Korea from Japan were 388,902 picul in 1941; 362,997 picul in 1942; and 57,227 picul in 1943. 1 picul ("tan") = "a shoulder load of how much a man can carry," approx. 60kg. 388,902x60= 23334,120kg= 23,334 metric tons. "Yearly Results of Important Exports from Japan Proper to Korea in Different Categories," 300-302; #6429, Foodstuff Import File; UD 1733, Economic and Scientific Section; SCAP 1946-51, RG 331

[135] *Tong'a*, May 25, 1940

[136] Although total wheat cultivation was 93,000 tons, only 59,000 tons were used for human consumption, 401-2; #6429; UD 1733; RG331

48,000 tons.[137] However, it was difficult to trace how much of domestic wheat was channeled to machine milling industry for commercial sales, and how much was consumed by the farmers themselves during this period. However, we know that after 1935, the colonial state successfully increased the production of domestic wheat in Korea. Thus, it seems likely that whereas in 1924, almost all domestic wheat was consumed by the farm families themselves, after 1935, more wheat was cultivated in Korea and an increasing percentages of it was being channeled to the milling factories like P'ungkuk and Ilbon Chebun.

After liberation in 1945, four flour milling factories, including P'ungkuk, Ilbon, Chosŏn, were left in the U.S. occupation zone of Korea while the large factories in Chinnamp'o and Haeju fell to the northern zone. The industrial milling capacity in Korea was further reduced by 7,770 tons annually when the whole four floors of the P'ungkuk building in Mansŏk-dong got burnt down by fire on December 20, 1945.[138] Noteworthily, Koreans now took over the milling industry from the enemy assets left by the Japanese.[139] For example, Yun Sŏk-jun was the first Korean floor manager at Chosŏn Chebun during the colonial period, and with liberation in 1945, he took over the company.[140]

With liberation and U.S. occupation south of the 38th parallel, the association of wheat flour radically changed. During the colonial period, it was associated with large-scale modern factories

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[137] Table No 1. Grain and Pulse Production in Korea South of 38 Degree North Latitude, 306; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. As late as 1956, although Koreans cultivated wheat, not much was released for market consumption. USAMGIK reported to Washington that domestically cultivated wheat in Korea ranged from 172,000 to 180,000 tons annually. February 2, 1956, 1301; #49; UD 422; RG 469

[138] 350,000 dae x 22.2= 7,770,000kg= 7,770 tons. *Inch'ŏn Ilbo*, December 20, 2000.

[139] *Tong'a,* March 1, 1946*; Tong'a*, March 20, 1946.

[140] *Maeil Kyŏngje*, September 24, 1973, p.4

with cutting edge technology, intricate trading networks of international imports and exports, and its partnership with the Japanese imperial army in infiltrating the land and market of China. However, in the post-1945 period, its association with the market was overwritten by a large-scale foreign food relief of the U.S. government that hauled over about 300,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour to Korea in warships.

SECTION 3.

POST-1945 U.S. FOOD ASSISTANCE: SHIFTS IN THE MEANING OF WHEAT FLOUR

The first shipment of USAMGIK's food import landed at the port of Pusan on May 24, 1946, carrying 8,200 tons of U.S. surplus wheat for general rationing in Korea. However, food supply was meager until July when the first substantial sum of 24,000 tons of wheat arrived, and this began to be rationed in late July and in August.[141] A large-scale shipments of U.S. surplus wheat for general rationing shifted the association of wheat flour away from the market consumption and industrialization of the colonial period. It became more associated with the contexts of rationing which was post-liberation poverty and a material policy outcome of U.S. occupation. This shift was caused by the change of its main distribution channel from a consumer market to ration and relief programs. The reason for the spread through this new main distribution channel is significant is because it changes our focus on globalization from a market result to historical

[141] 396; #6429; UD1733; RG 331

and political processes prior to the formation of a market, which had a different and much broader consumer base from the earlier colonial market.

The dramatic increase in the consumption of wheat flour after August 1946 resulted not as a function of the commercial market, but through the involuntary consumption of rationing and relief programs. Immediately after USAMGIK began overhauling foodstuffs for rationing, the consumption of wheat and wheat flour increased 6.5 times in comparison to that of 1934, when its sales recorded the peak in the colonial period.[142] In 1924, the Korean market absorbed 2,031 tons of machine milled wheat flour monthly,[143] and the sales rose to 2,987 tons monthly in 1934, after which the supply of Canadian and Australian wheat was interrupted by the imposition of a new taxation on foreign imports and Japan's war drive in Asia.[144] In comparison, from May 1946 to October 1947, USAMGIK imported approximately 17,337 tons of wheat and wheat flour

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[142] In south Korea only, 1934 estimated average was 2,987 tons per month, and 1946-7 average was 19,455 tons per month. Both colonial and USAMGIK consumption figures do not include the self-cultivation and consumption within farmhouses, which did not enter the commercial and rationing networks. However, according to USAMGIK report, from 1932 to 1936, the years which peaked in wheat consumption during the colonial period, per capita consumption of wheat in Korea was 10.4kg per capita per year and rice was 55.8kg in average calorie intake of 2,077 calories. Barley was 39.5kg; millet 38.1kg, and other grains 10.9kg. 394; #6429; UD 1733: RG 331. I discounted the latter USAMGIK figures upon close cross examination.

[143] Total wheat flour consumption was 37,740 tons (in south, approximately 24,374 tons). 24,374/12=2,031 *Tong'a*, January 7, 1925

[144] In 1934, the sales of industrial machine milled meal in Korea was at max 59,000 tons both domestically produced and imported from Japan (southern zone= 35,844 tons). 35,844/12= 2,987 tons per month (~3,175 tons per month). Sales of industrial wheat in Korea in 1935 was 2,500,000 dae x 22.2= 59,940,000kg= 59,940 tons (1 dae= 27 kun, 1 kun= 0.6kg, therefore 1 dae- 22.2kg) *Tong'a*, June 28, 1935. p. 4. From 1941 to 1943, Japanese export to Korea, of wheat flour, starch, sake, onion, pickles, orange, tea, soy fish, etc. Wheat flour imported to Korea from Japan were 388,902 picul in 1941; 362,997 picul in 1942; and 57,227 picul in 1943. 1 picul ("tan") = "a shoulder load of how much a man can carry," approx. 60kg. 388,902x60= 23334,120kg= 23,334 metric tons. "Yearly Results of Important Exports from Japan Proper to Korea in Different Categories," 300-302; #6429; UD1733; RG 331

monthly.[145] From August to October 1947, it imported 28,807 tons monthly.[146] USAMGIK received 34,256 tons of wheat in November and 38,518 tons in December 1947.[147] After a reduction in their supply in early 1948, the imports of wheat and wheat flour picked up and maintained 20,500 tons of monthly average from July to October 1948.[148]

Firstly, through rationing, wheat flour became part of everyday food for those who were on the ration, which by their number was over a third of the population. Importantly, when most of the wheat came from U.S. Department of Agriculture's surplus stocks and it was given by USAMGIK, wheat flour attained a strong association with the United States. More importantly, rationing of wheat appeared as USAMGIK's remedy for its earlier failures in order to tackle the suspicion about U.S. imperial motivations, discussed in section 1. The failure of USAMGIK's 1945-1946 food policy and the ensuing politicization of the shortage of rice happened before the arrival of wheat, and thus they were not caused by wheat. Nevertheless, taking up a major portion of food ration, wheat became historically associated with USAMGIK. Koreans took wheat flour to be particularly American, singling it out among several other relief grains such as barley and cornmeal. Moreover, the expression of unfamiliarity with wheat flour was infused with the expressing of their unfamiliarity with U.S. occupiers.

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[145]*Kyŏnghyang Sinmun* reported USAMGIK importing 227,615 tons of wheat and 83,666 tons of wheat flour to its zone from May 1946 to August 1947. The average monthly imports of wheat and wheat flour was 19,455.1 tons. When converted to flour equivalent, calculated at the rate of 0.7 tons of flour out of milling 1 ton of wheat (although the rate could be as high as 90%), over the 16 month period from May 1946 to August 1947, average wheat flour import per month is calculated at 15,187 tons. *Kyŏnghyang*, October 18, 1947; Also see 396; #6429; UD1733; RG 331

[146] 197; #6429; UD1733; RG 331

[147] November (380); December (316), dated February 19, 1948, 318-319, 387, and 390; # 6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[148] 309; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. For April 1947 figures, see 216; for May 1947, see 212; for June 1947, see 202 and 386; for September 1947, see 208; for May 1948, see 309.

Secondly, rationing much established wheat flour as an inferior substitute for rice because recipients received rations when they could not obtain rice. That meant that those who ate wheat flour would sooner convert to rice when rice became available. Although wheat flour was also used as relief food during the colonial period, it had been visible more as an industrial and new "modern" food. However, its connection with the market and the "modern" was weakened with an influx of unprecedented amount of cheap and free wheat flour from the United States. Since its main channel of distribution was rationing, it influenced specific sectors of the population, who were ration recipients. Whereas it was only the poorest sector of the population who consumed wheat flour as a substitute emergency food during the colonial period, USAMGIK's rationing affected all of non-agricultural people which took up approximately a third of the population, especially concentrated in urban areas.[149] Since July 1946, the number of ration card holders did not fall below 5.6 million, peaking in December 1947 with 8.9 million recipients.[150] Thus, the large numbers of ration recipients not only reflected an exponential increase in the number of people who consumed wheat flour, but it also instigated a change in the context of their contact with the food from the market consumption of the colonial period to foreign food assistance.

Wheat and wheat flour composed a major portion of USAMGIK's ration food. In 1946 and 1947, USAMGIK's food ration was grain only, with occasional exceptions of U.S. military getting rid of its surplus food provisions to Korean civilians. In 1946, wheat and wheat flour took up 91.25% of the total food imports. From April to December 1946, USAMGIK imported a total

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[149] For example, see *Tong'a*, July 13, 1946, p.2.

[150] 403; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

of 179,132 metric tons of grain, of which 163,477 tons was wheat and wheat flour. The remaining 15,655 tons was corn.[151] From January 1 to May 20, 1947, USAMGIK imported a total of 154,000 tons of grain, which included 64,585 tons of wheat and 27,987 tons of wheat flour. Thus, wheat and wheat flour made up 59.3% of total grain imports.[152] In February 1947, 30,176 tons of wheat was imported, taking up 74.2% of total 40,688 grain imports for 7.1 million ration card holders.[153] In April 1947, out of 36,883 tons of total imported foodstuffs, wheat and wheat flour took up 44.4%.[154] For November 1947, the amount of wheat scheduled for shipments to Korea was between 36,000 tons and 44,500 tons, making up between 58.8% and 72.6% of the total.[155] In December 1947, wheat was 38,518 tons out of 52,130 tons of grain imports, making up 74% of the total of ration food distributed to 8.9 million ration card holders in Korea.[156]

Under much pressure to import U.S. surplus food stocks from the Department of Agriculture, of which availability changed depending on U.S. domestic market conditions, in 1948, USAMGIK introduced sugar and powdered milk as grain substitutes. The policy guide for 1948 Korean program suggested 30% rice, 10% barley, 30% wheat flour and 30% wheat in an

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[151] Headquarters, USAMGIK, "Food Position Report for South Korea, December 1946 - 30 November 1947" dated 17 December 1947, 396; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. From May 1946 to August 1947, average wheat flour import per month was 15,187 tons, and 64.8% of the imported foodstuffs were wheat and wheat flour. *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun* reported USAMGIK importing 227,615 tons of wheat and 83,666 tons of wheat flour to its zone from May 1946 to August 1947. Calculating that 0.7 tons of flour comes out of milling 1 ton of wheat (although the rate could be as high as 90%), over the 16 month period from May 1946 to August 1947, average wheat flour import per month is calculated to be 15,187 tons. *Kyŏnghyang*, October 18, 1947.

[152] 201; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[153] 307; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[154] 16,207 tons of barley; 4,311 tons of rice; 8,600 tons of wheat; and 7,765 tons of wheat flour were imported, dated 13 May, 1947, 216; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[155] 380; #6429; UD1733; RG 331

[156] 13,612 tons of barley was imported, too. 316, February 19, 1948, 318-319, 387, and 390; # 6429; UD 1733; RG 331

attempted amount of 2.5 hop (355 grams) per person per day, but the composition of ration food varied on each food's availability at U.S. ports.[157] Scheduled for delivery from July to October 1948 for four months were 66,000 tons of wheat flour, 16,000 tons of wheat, and 70,000 tons of rice. Thus, wheat and wheat flour made up 50.8% of the total grain imports of 152,000 tons.[158]

At a conference hosted by *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun* in October 1946, O Yu-hŭi, a housewife in Seoul, expressed her discontent with the high percentage of wheat, which took up over 91% of ration food that year.

> I don't know how to manage (the household economy) from now. Recently, each person received a ration of 120 grams of wheat flour, a half hop (approx. 75 grams) of wheat, and a half hope of barley (approx. 75 grams) per day. But wheat flour gets used up fast, and wheat loses half of its volume after winnowing. The ration is supposed to last for ten days, but it is only enough for five days. So, no matter how hard you figure it, there is no other way than buying food in the black market. Besides, when you continue to eat wheat and wheat flour, you can't avoid having stomachache. Medicine costs multiple times more than the cost of wheat. When you feed children with wheat, you see that children don't digest wheat well. Wheat comes out from their bottoms without having been broken down. Needless to say, I hope we get rationed 2 hop and 5 jak of rice like before.[159]

To O Yu-hŭi, wheat flour was not a satisfactory substitute for rice, and the amount of ration her family was getting was not sufficient.

For housewives like O Yu-hŭi who disliked wheat and wheat flour, food experts offered suggestions on home cooking recipe for wheat. Hong Sŏn-pyo, Director of Chosŏn Food Research, published an advice below, titled "Home Cooking: A recipe to use wheat," in Kyŏnghyang in November 1946.

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[157] For example, 221; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[158] 309; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331. For April 1947 figures, see 216; for May 1947, see 212; for June 1947, see 202 and 386; for September 1947, see 208; for May 1948, see 309.

[159] *Kyŏnghyang*, October 7, 1946.

Families invariably make sujebi, steamed cake (kae ttŏk), and noodles with wheat flour, [. . .] (However) If you mix whole wheat with rice, the dish tastes soft, and it tastes better than barley dish. Usually, people use wheat in flour form, but that is not the only way to eat wheat. Soak whole wheat in water for a while, crush it until wheat takes white color, and then soak it in water again. Steam it together with rice. Be careful to let the dish settle in steam longer than you are used to with rice.[160]

In another effort to making the consumption of rationed wheat flour even easier, the City Government of Seoul and foreign charity organizations like the YWCA tried to distribute it as noodles instead of flour form. Noodle was easier to cook at home without the need to knead and cut the dough for noodle.[161]

When much of U.S. relief wheat came in unmilled form to be locally milled in 1946 and 1947, the milling capacity in Korea ran far short of the amount of wheat that USAMGIK brought in. At the time of liberation in 1945, only four milling factories remained and continue their operation in south Korea. This and when the P'ungkuk factory was burnt down in fire in December in 1945, the commercial wheat milling capacity in U.S. zone in December 1947 was limited to 135,000 tons.[162] This fell far below the amount of wheat that USAMGIK was importing, and thus, USAMGIK recommended Washington that "Korea's limited wheat milling facilities makes it essential that as large a portion as possible of grain imports be rice, flour, and barley."[163]

Taking advantage of the need for wheat milling, small entrepreneurs in Korea began to enter the industry. During the colonial period, three Japanese companies, located both in Korea and in

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[160] *Kyŏnghyang,* November 3, 1946

[161] *Kyŏnghyang*, November 20, 1946.

[162] 398; #6429; UD 1733; RG 331

[163] CG XXIV Corps to CG 8th Army, SCAP, January 4, 1947, ref. 224; #6429; Foodstuff Import File, UD 1733; SCAP, 1946-1951 Economic and Scientific Section, RG 331

Japan, mostly divided the market for themselves for industrially milled wheat flour in Korea. Koreans ran small-scale milling shops, but they mostly milled buckwheat, not wheat.[164] However, a year after USAMGIK began rationing wheat, Seoul had 185 wheat milling shops in June 1947. The number of wheat milling shops were the most numerous among 908 businesses registered in the city for using more than three horsepower engines and employing more than ten workers. Rice refining shops followed the rank with 146 workshops.[165]

At a Women's Conference in 1948, Yi Eŭn pointed out the shift in the use of wheat brought about by a large-scale supply of wheat as ration food. In the shift from that of market consumption to substitute and involuntary consumption, she explained why she did not like wheat ration as a tension between the way that she wanted to use wheat flour -cooked with meat and vegetables- and how her strained economic situation limited the use of it only as a substitute for rice.

> We receive wheat flour rations. To eat wheat flour like the westerners or the Chinese, by baking bread, you also need to eat meat and vegetables with it. Meat and vegetables cost multiple times more than the cost of wheat flour. So, given our circumstances, we usually end up making noodles or sujebi with wheat flour.[166]

Yi pointed out that many could not afford to buy meat and vegetables. Wheat as the main in dishes such as "sujebi" in which wheat flour was the main and possibly the only ingredient for the meal did not give enough nutrition.

However, USAMGIK perceived and used wheat flour as much more than just a substitute for rice, and a different way of familiarizing Koreans with wheat flour was by rationing children

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[164] *Tong'a*, October 1, 1938.

[165] *Tong'a*, June 13, 1947.

[166] *Kyŏnghyang*, January 4, 1948.

special treats like biscuits and bread. In 1946, USAMGIK made biscuits available for school children at 30 *wŏn*, which was set much below the market price. It also distributed bread to school children made of wheat flour. In 1947, the Economics Division of the Seoul City offered children under thirteen to purchase 750 grams (200 monme) of bread at 50 *wŏn*. Children needed to show their "Rice Accounts (Ssal T'ongjang) and personal seals to receive bread at ration stations.[167] Although not of wheat flour, the Seoul city also distributed candies to children between five and seven of age.[168] Once the City made a special provision for children from lower-income households in low tax categories. Families that paid below the 15th level in income tax could obtain certifications from Neighborhood Association Chiefs (T'ongjang) to purchase two boxes of biscuit at 80 *wŏn* at Hwasin and Haesin Trade Companies at Kukyo-dong in Seoul.[169]

Even more severely affected by ration mostly of wheat and wheat flour were the persons under care of welfare institutions. The diet of children in orphanages, for example, heavily relied on the free distribution of relief food. On January 21, 1947, Welfare Office of USAMGIK and the *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun* co-hosted a roundtable discussion with administrators of eight orphanages in the Welfare Office building. Chang Un-yong of Welfare Institution (Husaeng Hakwŏn) expressed a concern about food ration from the City that were composed solely of wheat and wheat flour. Chang said that the City provided a ration of approximately 630ml (3 hop 5 jak) of wheat and wheat flour, but he hoped that the City would re-introduce rice to ration food,

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[167] 1 monme as weight = 3.75g; *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun*, March 12, 1947.

[168] *Kyŏnghyang*, September 2, 1948

[169] *Kyŏnghyang*. November 11, 1946.

which used to be available before. Chang beseeched to have sympathy for the orphans who were morning and night fed with "sujebi," which was not conducive to their health.[170]

For the partially employed urban laborers and destitute students, the City Government of Seoul provided another space where they could cheaply obtain food made with wheat flour. The Bureau of Welfare of the Seoul City administered the City-ordained Public Eating House (Siryŏng Taejung Siktang) from July 1946.[171] The City-ordained Public Eating Houses were administered by the City as semi-relief establishments. They initially sold rice and broth at an affordable price of 3 *wŏn* in July 1946, but by January 1947, they increasingly turned to wheat flour by selling noodles and bread.[172] In 1947, City's Bureau of Welfare ran seven City-ordained Public Eating Houses, and one more was added in 1949.[173] In March 1949, the Seoul City partially privatized it by allowing private businesses to obtain the license to open Public Eating Houses and by giving them ration food at subsidized prices. Therefore, when the City experienced a shortage of ration food and temporarily close down seventy eight of its Public Eating Houses in June 1949, *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun* deplored that many of the City's poor laborers and students were deprived of their only access to food. It reported that Public Eating Houses

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[170] *Kyŏnghyang*, February 2, 1947.

[171] "Taejung" can also be translated as "mass," but in this case, translating it as "(general) public" is more suitable given the intention of the use of the term. The City-ordained Public Eating House was different from "taejung siktang" generically referring to any cheap commercial dining establishment. The term, "taejung," which can be translated either as public or mass, was probably used since dining at these establishments was cheap, and therefore they were available to a large number of people. For the beginning of the City-ordered Public Eating House, see *Tong'a,* July 16, 1946.

[172] *Tong'a*, May 15, and July 16, 1946; *Kyŏnghyang*, January 17, 1947.

[173] *Kyŏnghyang*, January 17, 1947; *Kyŏnghyang*, March 8, 1949.

catered from 40,000 to 80,000 underemployed urban laborers and destitute students daily, and made wheat flour available to those who could not afford food otherwise in Seoul.[174]

The distribution channels of wheat flour such as general rationing, relief programs, and cheap City-run eating houses established wheat flour as an inferior substitute for rice during the period from 1945 to 1950. This meant that wheat flour spread in post-1945 south Korea mainly because there was not enough rice and that the consumption of wheat flour would shrink back rice became more available. Food Administration of USAMGIK was aware of this, and reported to Washington,

> Of all imported cereals, rice is the most desirable. Since the commercial wheat milling capacity of South Korea is 135,000 tons per annum, imports of wheat in the grain above that figure do not permit the most efficient processing. Most Koreans prefer barley to any other grain except rice, and their kitchen facilities are such that they could utilize it effectively, since they cook it as they do rice. On the other hand, they are not equipped to utilize large amounts of wheat flour effectively, since most Koreans have no baking facilities. For that reason, it is hoped that a substantial part of the projected imports can be rice and barley.[175]

The Save Rice Campaign (Chŏlmi Undong) by the Rhee Syngman regime, inaugurated on August 15, 1948, also marked wheat flour as an inferior substitute for rice. In the Save Rice Campaign, eating wheat flour was one of the means to save rice. The South Korean state suggested eating "mixed meal," meaning mixed with non-white rice, in 1950. The campaign exhorted citizens to substitute one third of their meals with non-white rice such as barley and wheat flour.[176] It suggested having buckwheat noodle, Japanese u-dong (noodle), and bread for lunch instead of having a rice meal.

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[174] *Kyŏnghyang*, June 2, and June 22, 1949; *Tong'a*, November 23, 1950.

[175] Dated December 17, 1947, 398; #6429; UD 1733 RG 331

[176] *Tong'a*, January 14, 1950.

Thus, the campaign attempted to instigate a move from involuntary consumption of general rations to voluntary consumption. However, this consumption was understood as a sacrifice that citizens would voluntarily make in order to save rice for the nation. Also, it attempted to widen the consumption base from ration card holders to all citizens, and to instill the desire for consumption as political indoctrination. It is not clear how effectively this campaign was practiced at home, but the state was able to give some threats to the businesses that would not follow the campaign.

In order to induce conformity of the foodservice industry, the state introduced legal penalty. In January 1950, the joint national committee of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Law, issued a statement to support the Save Rice Campaign. The committee banned serving of meals of white rice at diners and restaurants, using rice to manufacture cakes and sweets, and clandestinely brewing alcohol and selling it.[177] The City offered by a way of persuasion that wine brewing alone used up approximately 14,235 bushels of rice daily in Seoul.[178] Food establishments that did not abide by the ban risked having their licenses cancelled. Inns and upscale Korean restaurants (yojŏng) were no longer permitted to serve rice meals. While the state did not strictly enforce the ban beyond punishing a few unlucky restaurants, the ban clearly showed that the state considered wheat flour as a substitute for rice.

Eating wheat flour to support the Save Rice Campaign becomes important in comparison to later developments in the late 1950s and again in the 1970s. In 1950, eating wheat flour was

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[177] *Tong'a*, January 14, 1950

[178] 2,787 *sŏk* (equiv. to 500,000 liters, or 14,235 bushels) *Chayu Sinmun*, April 1950

encouraged by default. It was in order to save rice. From there, chapter 5 investigates the shift in the approach to wheat flour as the South Korean state and nutritional scientists hailed it as nutritionally superior food in the late 1950s. In the 1970s, the meaning of wheat flour changed again as it was enlisted to feed the urban laborers who participated in the industrialization drive under the Park Chung Hee regime.

In conclusion, while the consumer market and the industry of wheat flour was first established in Korea in the 1920s, it was this non-market consumption through rationing and relief programs that dramatically increased the use of wheat flour in post-1945 south Korea. The scale of 5.8 fold increase in comparison to the peak sales during the colonial era sufficiently qualifies it as a rupture. At the same time, the key to understanding a globalization of wheat flour as historically happened in Korea is the tension between the cultural unfamiliarity of wheat flour and having to eat it despite the unfamiliarity because wheat flour took up major part of general rationing and relief programs. The tension fed the politicization of wheat flour, enmeshing it as a continuation of USAMGIK's failed food policy. With a hindsight, involuntary consumption through rationing was the beginning of the eventual market formation in the 1970s and 1980s. The consumer market of wheat flour, which was linked to Korea's nation-building via industrialization in the 1970s and 1980s, had a much larger scale and with different meanings of consumption and history from that of the colonial period.

My work in this chapter contributes to the field by presenting what happened between the industrialization of wheat milling of the colonial period and the appropriation of wheat flour under nationalism and industrialization in the 1970s. The chapter explains why developments from 1945 to 1950 were crucial. Prior to the formation of a ramyŏn market in the 1970s and

1980s, the involuntary consumption via rationing and foreign relief supply set the initial stage. This happened outside the market system and was the base of a globalization of wheat flour in Korea. Wheat flour was imposed on unwilling population through general rationing, and thus recipients were made to become familiar with wheat flour before liking it. This new staple substitute would not have survived under market conditions. Thus, when there was very little prospect for the formation of a market in 1950 - nor in 1960-, the formation of the market in 1970s was unforeseeable. The tension around wheat flour was augmented because of the cultural unfamiliarity of wheat flour to Koreans. Wheat and wheat flour composed approximately over two thirds of ration food. However, the other one their and for some months, barley and foreign rice were given out. However, complaints about barley was not so much perhaps because barley was not considered foreign. “Foreign rice” (oe-mi) was from Egypt, Burma, Siam, Mexico and Brazil, and these origins were not so much associated with the United States.

The failure of USAMGIK’s initial food policy becomes important through two parallel developments. USAMGIK’s food policy was a failure both before and after the rationing of wheat flour in August 1946.[179] Wheat came too late, and its amounts were not sufficient to stage successful general rations to undo the failures of 1945 and 1946. However, it was because this initial U.S. food assistance policy between 1945 and 1950 failed to win the goodwill of the Koreans towards “democracy” that the policy had to be re-worked into humanitarian food assistance in 1955, which will be discussed in chapter 3 and chapter 4. Secondly, despite assessing it as a failure, the food policy between 1945 and 1950 also becomes important because it set the foundation of the legal and social structure of channeling U.S. surplus food

[179] 24,000 tons of wheat received in July began to be rationed throughout Korea in August.

commodities after U.S. Public Law 480. For example, the same structure continued for Counterpart Fund, for military spending, and one tenth price.[180] It shaped the structure of interaction between USAMGIK and its occupational zone, which later turned to a new South Korean state. The difference between the two periods was that after 1955, Public Law 480 and Section 402 only dealt with U.S. agricultural surpluses. In other words, we cannot understand post-1955 developments of U.S. surplus foodstuffs in South Korea without examining the developments between 1945 and 1950.

[180] The continuity is discussed in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2.

THE KOREAN WAR AND THE INVASION OF AMERICAN FOODSTUFFS, 1950-1953:

Free milk stations and the diversion of foodstuffs from U.S. military provisions to the black market

> Funded by the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration, the U.S. Army distributed 4,000,000 C-rations to Korean civilian population in celebration of the armistice in 1953. Around the same time, the U.S. Army also supplied 7,000,000 C-rations to the Korean military. C-rations were military food for U.S. troops. It is canned food of meat with vegetables (beans, or potatoes), and of bread and deserts. However, even if it were not for the U.S. Army's gift in celebration of the armistice, U.S. C-ration was well-known to Koreans since there were plethora of C-rations on sale in the black market.
> (reference, E.K. Shulte, Chief Foreign Financial Officer to the Foreign Operations Administration, Washington, 1066; #4B; UD422; RG 469

Powdered milk became a familiar food to Koreans through U.S. food assistance. Koreans encountered U.S. surplus powdered milk through milk-feeding programs, war refugee camps and family relief rations. While the domestic market for milk was negligible, relief milk (*kuho uyu*) from the United States was the main source of that encounter. In addition, Koreans accrued familiarity with factory-manufactured foodstuffs such as Spam (crushed meat), Hershey's chocolate, Wrigley's chewing gum, Chivas Regal whiskey, and tobacco through the black market.[1] Most of these foodstuffs must have been illegal diversions from U.S. military provisions since the South Korean state did not import these American brand commodities. In the spread of American food items as both relief goods and black market commodities, the Korean War played

[1] The Quartermasters Headquarter of the U.S. military categorized cigarettes under food and agricultural commodity.

a major role by unleashing two types of massive population movements. First, the war produced millions of Korean refugees who needed relief food. Secondly, this internationalized war drew in a large number of U.S. troops, among other foreign participants from the United Nations forces – and the food sent to feed the U.S. troops was diverted to the black market. These two methods of commodity acquisition – through foreign relief programs and black market purchases – associated the new foodstuffs with Korea's condition of poverty and the presence of a large-scale foreign armies. By discussing the familiarization of foreign food as a result of the war and the massive population dislocations that ensued, I interpret the familiarization of new food practices as a dimension of the extension of U.S. hegemony to Korea.

The overall aim of this chapter within the larger frame of the dissertation is modest. By emphasizing the Korean War as an intensifier of the distribution channels that spread new foodstuffs, it investigates the early history of powdered milk in Korea, which formed the basis for later, postwar schemes run by voluntary agencies (chapter 4) and UNICEF (chapter 3). While the establishment of free milk stations (*uyu chuk muryo kŭpsikso*), serving milk gruel, was a short-term measure for war refugees, a number of foreign voluntary agencies concurrently began resettlement community-building projects for refugees from the northern communist zone. Refugee resettlement programs, called "assimilation programs" by the U.S. military, were a medium-to-long term measure. Foreign voluntary agencies used U.S. surplus food as wages-in-kind in resettlement programs, and this use of food as wages in construction programs became the prototype for the U.S. Food for Peace provincial self-help projects of the 1960s, which are discussed in chapter 6. Thus, this chapter, which shows how the war accelerated the popularization of new food, provides historical context for later chapters.

Chapter 2. The Korean War and the Invasion of American Foods

As pointed out in chapter 1, Koreans were not very inclined to buy new food such as U.S. surplus wheat-flour in the market. However, having no alternative means to procure food during the wartime emergency, relief recipients had to tolerate ration food, mainly composed of wheat-flour, barley, cornmeal, and powdered milk from U.S. surplus stocks. In addition, millions of refugees created the population pull for foreign voluntary agencies to operate feeding programs, and thus expand their influence in Korea in rather dramatic ways.[2] The South Korean state did not possess the resources to provide for their own refugees. War refugees added to an already serious problem of dislocated returnees after Japan's empire collapsed in 1945. Koreans who returned to their homeland from the former Japanese empire in Manchuria, South Asia and Japan numbered over two million before the Korean War. Now, the Korean War created particularly large refugee movements in its first year, during which the frontline of battle fluctuated dramatically. First, the North Korean (DPRK) army cornered the South Korean troops in the small parameter of the city of Pusan at the southeastern tip of the peninsula. Second, the United Nations Commander in the Pacific theater, General Douglas MacArthur, successfully instigated a landing in Inch'ŏn in September 1950, pushing the North Korean troops up to the Chinese border of the Yalu River. Yet again, in that winter, Mao's Chinese reinforcements swept the U.N. troops back to the 38th parallel. Large number of refugees moved up and down the peninsula, following the changing frontline. Where the refugees camped, mobile free milk stations and black markets were also set up.

At the beginning of the War, Seoul, South Korea's capital, had approximately 1.3 million residents. After the evacuation order from the city in 1951, the number of residents decreased to

[2] See chapter 4 for the definition of foreign voluntary agencies.

450,000, or according to the police survey in June that year, to 310,000. On June 10, 1951, 200,000 refugees congregated in Yŏngdŭngp'o-gu, waiting to return home after the government granted permission to re-enter Seoul. In Inch'ŏn and Suwŏn, likewise, 500,000–600,000 refugees were waiting for the government order to return to Seoul. These refugees were the first recipients of milk gruel from the free milk stations, which were established in 1951.

During the Korean War and the early post-Korean War period until the end of 1954, the Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK) program, subordinate to the U.S. Eighth Army, was in charge of coordinating all civilian relief materials. The goal of the United Nations Command's relief assistance to Korea was to prevent starvation, disease, and social unrest. During the CRIK period (1951-1955), all relief grains were imported through the U.S. government via the CRIK program, and the CRIK also processed private donations from foreign voluntary agencies and other U.N. member nations in a sub-program called the SUN (Sundry, meaning donations from U.N. member nations and foreign voluntary agencies) U.N. Program.[3]

Since the relief food was mainly composed of U.S. surplus food, the number of Koreans that the CRIK provided for was the number of Koreans who were fed new foods like wheat-flour and powdered milk. During its tenure from 1951 to 1955, the CRIK fed from 3.5 million up to 8.9 million refugees daily. In 1953, the CRIK provided food for 3,350,000 refugees. One million of them received a full ration (3 hops of grain, equiv. to 0.8 pounds) daily, and the remaining 2,350,000 people received a half ration.[4] For the 1953 civilian relief program, the CRIK imported 368,000 metric tons of grain and approximately 3,500 metric tons of powdered milk

[3] 1408; #62; HQ; RG 469

[4] "Wood Mission to Korea, August 1953: On Food Situation"; 1233; #19; UD 422; RG 469

Table 2.1

CRIK Civilian Relief Two Parts Programs (SFO Program and SUN Program), 1951-1954

	SFO Program Army Civilian Relief Requirement		SUN Program (Voluntary Donations)
	Foodstuffs Only (both in tons and dollar)	Total Relief (incl. food+ others)*	Total Dollar (incl. food)
1951 (CRIK, U.S. Army)		$6,836,000	$16,973,000
1952 (CRIK, U.S. Army)		$74,815,000	$11,093,000
July1952- May1953 (11 months supply) (CRIK, U.S. Army)	$57,142,547 total food: 399,241 tons wheat: 59,491 tons coarse grain: 322,736 tons other foods: 17,014 tons (in metric ton)	$132,279,851 1,331,053 tons (in metric ton)	
1953 (CRIK)	$ n/a total food: 371,500 tons grain: 368,000 tons p.milk+salt: 3,500 tons (in metric tons)	$74,499,000	$11,507,000
1954 (CRIK, terminated in Nov.) (incl. carry-over of five months supply from 1953)	$43,885,000 201,000 tons **** grain: 195,000 tons milk: 5,600 tons (in long tons)	$118,051,903 986,871 tons (in long tons)	
1955	N/A		

1946= U.S. Army, 1947-1949= GARIOA (Army)

* Relief Total included
Medical, Sanitation Supplies, Soap, Solid Fuels, Petroleum Products, Trans equipment, Communication equipment, clothing, shoes, textiles agricultural supplies, industrial repair equip. misc.

Figures are pulled from a number of CRIK Reports, C.2403, C.2406, C.2408~ C.2413; Headquarters of Far Eastern Operations Missions; Entry 1276; RG 469

and salt. Importantly, refugee relief did not end with the armistice on July 27, 1953. In 1954, the

U.S. Army estimated that 8.9 million Koreans were in need of food relief, a number that comprised a full tenth of the refugees in the world.[5] Whether 3.5 million or 8.9 million, the number of refugees receiving CRIK food made up a significant portion of the South Korean population (then 20.5 to 21 million), and these Koreans thus became familiarized with, though not accustomed to, U.S. surplus wheat flour and powdered milk.

Although relief rations were mainly composed of grain and powdered milk, food donations from foreign voluntary agencies and other member nations of the United Nations through the CRIK SUN Program, at times, could be diverse. These exotic new foodstuffs were also introduced to Korean recipients in small quantities. The Church World Service (CWS) from Holland donated 60,000 duck eggs through the CRIK SUN Program in April 1955, and the duck eggs were delivered to Seoul, Taejon, Taegu and Pusan.[6]

Nevertheless, new foodstuffs that were rationed in large-scale and regular supplies were powdered milk and wheat flour. Powdered milk, in particular, became a familiar food with Koreans as an improvised ration food. When grain became difficult to obtain during the war, powdered milk substituted grain in ration food. In other words, the habit of milk eating was able to spread in Korea because powdered milk was invented as a substitute for grain ration. During the wartime emergency and the food shortage that it caused, refugees were more likely to eat unfamiliar powdered milk than when they had a choice. In the beginning of the war, the government made an effort to provide 2 to 3 hops of grain ration to each adult in order to provide approximately 1300 calories daily. However, when they soon ran out of grain to ration out, the

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[5] KAVA, *The 40 Year History of Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies*, P.113

[6] Weekly Status Conference Report; Box 10; 1276; RG 469

authorities replaced grain with powdered milk in state rations. Interestingly, since powdered milk substituted grain, rationed milk was not drank in liquid form, but milk was made into "milk gruel" to serve as a proper meal. To make milk gruel, you dissolved powdered milk in water, and boiled it with whatever other foodstuff that you had on hand. Often, other foreign relief grains like cornmeal, wheat flour, and long-grained "foreign rice (oe-mi)" were thrown in.[7] Thus, powdered milk was cooked with grains into gruel. Instead of "drinking" reconstituted liquid milk, people used spoons to scoop up milk gruel.

Powdered milk was consumed in large quantities during the war because free milk stations (*uyu chuk muryo kŭpsikso*) served milk gruel to refugees. The Women's Bureau of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Korean Civilian Assistance Command (KCAC, a U.N. organization) team came up with the idea of operating milk stations for refugees as an improvisation. The January 4th Retreat of 1951 was one of the most dramatic moments in the Korean War as the Chinese communist reinforcement swept down the peninsula with unexpected speed and scale. When the retreat brought about massive movements of refugees, the team of the Women's Bureau and the KCAC began operating free milk stations that were mobile and thus able to move with the flow of refugees.[8] The first three milk stations were set up in Suwŏn, Inch'ŏn and Seoul in April 1951. Each station provided milk gruel to over seven hundred refugees a day.[9] Milk

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[7] In Korean, they were called oe-mi.

[8] During the Korean War, the number of citizens in Seoul was 1700,000. After 1.4 1952, only 700,000. Rhee Syngman flee without the evacuation order and bombed the bridge. The United Nations Command retreated to the line of Naktong River.

[9] The Women's bureau was established in 1946 was an American addition to what was only about Hygiene during the Japanese colonial period, adding welfare and aid. The wartime emergency, combined the women's bureau with civilian women's organization, - focused on relief work during the war.

stations gave priority to children, elderly and the sick.[10] Within a year, the number of milk stations was increased to thirty. The bureau counted that they had provided milk gruel to 6.6 million refugees.[11] This is a significant number that a new food could not easily attract under regular market conditions.

Milk gruel was a neologism that was first used during the Korean War. Moreover, wartime rationing was the first means through which powdered milk was provided to a large number of healthy adults in Korea. Previously, milk had been used to feed babies and the sick. However, during the war, feeding stations tended to limit rice gruel to children and the debilitated as a special treatment, and the other refugees had to settle for milk gruel, resulting in the spread of powdered milk in Korea.

Milk gruel (uyu chuk) and Milk Stations (Uyu Kŭpsikso) were curious names. When you make milk-gruel, you also throw in other available grains. Thus, powdered milk was not the only main ingredient. Wheat flour and cornmeal were added since the Americans made them available for relief, and they were also unfamiliar food. U.S. also sent barley, but Koreans were familiar with barley that is also grown domestically. Given the presence of other grains, the fact that the dish was named after milk, and the feeding station was called "Milk Station" seem very curious.[12] It is probable that milk felt more foreign to Koreans with its particular texture and taste of bovine origin, and of the "smell" that was traumatically unappetizing to Koreans. It is also probable that the name, milk-gruel, drew attention to its liquidity. The diluteness resembling un-

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[10] *Tong'a,* April 7, 1951

[11] Sahoebu Punyŏkuk ŏpchŏk pogo uyu chuk paekŭp t'ong'gye sucha for 4284 (1951). However, repeated feeding was not accounted for.

[12] Cornmeal-gruel was given, too.

filling and non-nourishing water emphasized the depravity of the wartime. Milk-gruel was not drank. The refugees and children-without-meals scooped the liquid up with spoons like when they were eating grains. Milk seemed even feebler substitute for rice and barley than cornmeal-gruel and wheat-flour buns. After all, the tales of milk gruel by Koreans witness that not all foods were substitutable culturally and socially.

In terms of the continuity of the history of milk in Korea prior to wartime milk stations, milk was certainly not unknown to Koreans before U.S. relief assistance. Nevertheless, it was still an unfamiliar food to Koreans in 1945. In fact, the history of milk consumption in Korea goes back to Christian missionaries in late nineteenth-century Chosŏn. The foreign missionaries brought in condensed milk from the United States for their own consumption.[13] During the Japanese colonial period, foreign missionaries began giving out milk to local children and the sick in their charity programs. In 1926, Maren Bording, an American Methodist missionary, opened the first milk station in Korea, in the city of Kongju, approximately 120km south of Seoul. Bording's milk station could provide milk to thirty to one hundred children daily. Several foreign missionaries in the region followed the example and established their own milk stations. However, milk stations operated by missionaries during the colonial period remained local, and their impacts did not reach beyond the small number of children and affiliates in missionary-run institutions.[14]

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[13] There were occasional record of people drinking cow milk during Chosŏn. But these were exceptional cases, and it was certainly not a widespread habit.

[14] Hwang Mi-suk, "Sŏnkyosa Maren Bording ŭi Kongju, Taejŏn chiyŏk yuabokchi wa uyukŭpsikso saŏp." *Han'guk Kidok'kyo wa Yŏksa*. Vol. 34, 2011. pp.165-190

During the colonial period (1910-1945), newspapers and magazines like *Tong'a* construed drinking milk as a cultural and economic privilege. However, the commercial market for milk was not developed due to a lack of both supply and demand. However, newspapers and magazines made efforts to encourage milk consumption by linking it with modern scientific nutritional practice. These media wrote to establish modern housewives and mothers as potential consumers of milk, and educated their readers about the use of milk. However, the recommendations given in the magazines did not seem practicable to most of their readers. For example, an article advised potential consumers to arrange daily delivery of milk with their local dairy farms. However, since there were less than thirty cow farms registered with the state in the country, and since most of the thirty farms were small-scale operations, the advice did not sound practical.

In any case, cows bred in Korea were not traditionally used for milking.[15] Thus, some western missionaries argued that producing goat milk was more feasible than expecting Koreans to drink cow milk. The market production of milk had to wait until 1963 when the first Korean milk factory was opened under the Park Chung Hee regime. Not only milk as beverage but also diary products like butter, cheese, ice cream, and biscuits were not widespread during the colonial period.[16] Some products were available as imports from Japan, but the access to these commodities was a privilege.

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[15] Twenty-six milk farms were registered under the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in 1952. *Pogŏn Sahoe T'onggye Yŏnbo*, 1955-1957, P.219. In 1953, 23; in 1954, 8, in 1955, 18, in 1956 18. See Sahoe for the number of farming animals, and the number was also given in RG 469

[16] Ingredients for biscuits were wheat-flour, Milo starch, sugar, powdered milk, fat (margarine) and salt. Korea imported all these food ingredients from abroad.

Thus, relief rationing of milk to the poor and to war refugees by the U.S. military brought about a radical change in the meaning of milk. From the beginning, the U.S. military distributed powdered milk as a relief item. Surplus powdered milk from the United States was first distributed in Korea for a school-feeding program in Seoul in March 1946.[17] Although the amount of milk imports from 1945 to 1950 were not large in comparison to the imports during the war powdered milk had already been introduced as a relief food during the period of American military rule.

The reason why the Americans chose powdered milk as a relief food was because the price of powdered milk was sharply declining in the United States due to a large surplus. Thus, when grains were becoming scarce, the SCAP imported powdered milk to substitute for grains. In April 1947, the Joint U.S. State, War and Agriculture Mission alerted the Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo of the declining price of powdered milk and its availability in U.S. surplus stocks. Powdered milk that had cost 13-16 cents per pound the year before could be obtained at 10.5-12 cents in the spring of 1947.[18] The Mission also informed the SCAP that the roller processed milk was 1-2 cents cheaper per pound than the spray processed batch. Taking account of the price factor, the Joint Mission "recommended the use of skim milk to supplement the shortage due to lack of grains" in Japan.[19] The same advice was extended to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Representative (CINCREP) in Seoul and the U.S. military base on the Ryukyu Islands. The price of powdered milk further fell in 1950. The roller processed milk cost 3 cents

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[17] November 20, 1947. ref. 195, #6429, UD 1733, RG 331. I could not find records for 1945, but I need to re-check. In 1947, when seventeen metric tons of powdered milk that licensed voluntary agencies received for Relief in Asia Program (Asea Kuchehoe).

[18] 869; #6431; UD 1733; RG 331

[19] 866; #6431 and 397; #6439; UD 1733; RG 331

per pound and the spray processed one cost 5 cents at U.S. ports in August 1950.[20] These prices were less than one fifth of their 1946 prices.

Taking advantage of the declining price, the Supreme Command of Allied Powers in Tokyo replied to Washington, requesting 15,000 tons of powdered milk in addition to the powdered milk it had originally programmed for Japan in 1947. For Korea, the SCAP planned to divert 1,200 tons of powdered milk from Japan in September 1947, but the allocation to Korea was cancelled at the last minute for an unspecified reason. The importation of powdered milk to Korea in 1947 was limited to the 17 tons that foreign voluntary agencies distributed. In 1958, the SCAP sent a new stock of 1,800 metric tons of milk to Korea in January and again 1,200 metric tons in February with no further allocation that year beyond these 3,000 tons. The SCAP did not allocate any powdered milk for Korea in 1949. The fact that the choice of powdered milk as relief food was based on surplus availability and price will be seen again in the period covered by chapter 4, when powdered milk was replaced by cornmeal because there was not enough surplus powdered milk.

Powdered milk was adequate as food aid in several aspects. Due to the technological innovation in powdered milk making, the production of powdered milk was made simple. Most importantly, with respect to the American domestic politics, giving surplus powdered milk as foreign assistance was a useful way of getting rid of surplus agricultural produce.[21] Powdered milk was easier to transport across the Pacific Ocean, which took over 34 days from Texas to a Korean port, than other forms of milk. Besides, powder kept better and longer at room

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[20] August 1950; 873; #6431; UD 1733; RG 331

[21] Sarah Phillips

temperature than liquid milk. As with wheat flour, powdered milk could be mixed with other substances to bolster nutrition. At times, the SCAP especially requested powdered milk with fifteen percent sugar to derive more caloric intake.

In addition to the Women's Bureau of the Ministry of Social Affairs and the KCAC, foreign voluntary agencies also operated free milk stations. Moreover, they continued to operate free milk stations after the armistice. In the postwar era, agencies like CARE (Cooperative for American Relief to Europe) and the NCWC (National Catholic World Council) served a wide range of recipients such as the poor, the partially-unemployed and refugees from North Korea. In 1957, there were fifteen milk stations in Seoul alone, each station providing lunch to 17,000 people a day on average in places like Yongtu-dong, Ch'ôngnyangni and Mia-ri.[22] By 1958, the NCWC had ninety-three milk stations in South Korea. Each day, 17,940 people ate at stations, and stations used 9,170 *p'odae* of wheat flour and corn-meal and 55,020 can (*t'ong)* of powdered milk each month.

The Korean War and Foreign Voluntary Agencies

In fact, the Korean War (1950-1953) in some ways brought the working relationship between foreign voluntary agencies in Korea and the U.S government closer. Because the CRIK was in charge of channeling all civilian relief materials to Korea between 1951 and 1955, foreign voluntary agencies had to go through the CRIK to send any civilian relief supplies. Moreover, most of the foreign voluntary agencies had evacuated Korea at the outbreak of war in June

[22] Of shipped metric tons as of April 30, 1954, *Kyŏnghyang*. March 1, 1957; Kyônghyang, March 31, 1958

1950.[23] It was not until 1952 when fifteen of the foreign voluntary agencies, including CARE (Cooperative for American Relief to Europe), returned to Korea. Thus, the CRIK was the only channel for foreign voluntary agencies to send relief materials, and all of CARE's donations were also channeled through the CRIK. For example, one of the largest voluntary agencies in Korea, CARE paused its person-to-person relief program, which was the organization's signature program, when it closed down its Korean office in 1950. Although CARE could not send packages to designated individual recipients, it continued to send bulk civilian relief materials through the U.S. Army. CARE donated bulk grains through the CRIK, and it once sent 150 cases of Gerber's Pineapple Pudding for Korean civilian relief.[24] Similarly, other foreign voluntary agencies donated aid materials to the SUN program (sundry donations and UNCACK donations).[25] The U.S. Foreign Administrations Agency, Department of State, was in charge of processing the transactions to the CRIK.

When CARE made donations to the SUN program, the U.S. Army organized transportation to pick up the materials at CARE's Philadelphia warehouse. The Army then moved these materials to ports on the east coast from which they were shipped to Korea. From September 1950 to June 1953, CARE donated 5 million pounds of relief food through the SUN Program of the CRIK/UNCACK. In Korea, it was the South Korean government that distributed CARE-

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[23] Fifteen voluntary agencies, including CARE, came back to Korea in 1952.

[24] C.2546; 1276; RG 469

[25] The FOA Aid program to Korea, CRIK and UNKRA (United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency, 1950-1955). In 1955, the separate aid programs were integrated into one program.;; Civilian relief works included public health, resettlement and assimilation medical supplies, sanitation supplies, building materials for refugee resettlements. Civilian relief works included public health, resettlement and assimilation medical supplies, sanitation supplies, building materials for refugee resettlements.

donated foods to the general public.[26] In other words, neither CARE nor the CRIK was much involved with distribution within Korea. During the wartime period, CARE donated both surplus grains and non-surplus food like strained apricots and apple sauce for babies.[27] CARE was the largest donor of foods among the foreign voluntary agencies in Korea during the war. The National Catholic Welfare Council (NCWC) was the second largest, having donated 1 million pounds of food to Koreans in the same period.

In 1952, the U.S. Army permitted fifteen foreign voluntary agencies that had returned to Korea to resume providing direct relief to designated consignees in Korea.[28] Still, the army continued to supervise their activities closely by requiring the agencies to submit the names of the consignees and their addresses to the detail of each village (*myŏn*). What is significant is that even when foreign voluntary agencies arranged direct shipments for their designated consignee parcels, the U.S. Army and the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA under the U.S. Department of State) reimbursed the agencies for the costs of ocean freight.[29] Ocean freight was a significant contribution since the cost of cross-oceanic shipment to Korea amounted to approximately ten percent of the total cost, the remaining ninety being the cost of the relief materials. However, despite having direct channels available, CARE and other foreign voluntary agencies continued to send most of their relief materials through the CRIK/UNCACK SUN

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[26] CARE donated 4,913,625 pounds. WRS (NCWC) donated 1,132,239 pounds. 1165, #18, UD 422, RG 469.

[27] C.2546; 1276; RG 469

[28] In 1952, the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration/army approved voluntary agencies to directly distribute relief materials to designated consignee in Korea. However, individual donor in the United States were not specified. SOP 16, supplement to the Public Law 480. 1164, #18, UD 422, RG 469, and other places

[29] 1535; #86; HQ; RG 469, and also see #11. Funds_Programs, 1955; 1276; RG 469, NARA, College Park, Maryland.

Program for general distribution in Korea, meaning that the South Korean state distributed them to the recipients.

The wartime system of civilian relief continued for another two years after the armistice of the Korean War on July 27, 1953. The U.S. Army continued coordinating the civilian relief until 1955 because the armistice did not technically end the war. An armistice meant that the war could be resumed at any time. Thus, for another two years, foreign voluntary agencies continued to donate civilian relief supplies through the CRIK's SUN Program. From August 11, 1953, to June 30, 1954, CARE sent 513,700 pounds of surplus powdered milk and 2 million pounds of other foodstuffs to Korea.[30] This volume of relief might seem insignificant in comparison to the 55 million pounds of surplus milk that, as well will see in chapters 3 and 4, CARE inherited from UNICEF to deliver in 1957. However, it was through donation transactions like these that U.S. voluntary agencies like CARE built a close cooperative relationship with the U.S. Army and FOA after 1949. This close relationship, in turn, became the basis for the much bigger projects that foreign voluntary agencies took on after 1955.

The Christmas Holiday Food Program of 1954 was one such example of cooperation between foreign voluntary agencies in Korea and the U.S. government. In December 1954, the Foreign Operations Agency (FOA) decided to implement a Christmas Holiday Food Program to celebrate the holiday with Korean civilians. The FOA handed over the food to U.S. voluntary agencies. The four participating voluntary agencies carried out the program, choosing whom to give the food parcels to and distributing them directly to recipients. The participating agencies were CARE, the National Catholic Welfare Council (NCWC), the Mennonite Central

[30] 1383; #42; HQ; RG 469

Committee, and the General Council of the Assemblies of God (Foreign Service Committee).[31] The Christmas food parcel had more varieties than the usual grain ration. Yet, what Mr. Walter in the office of the CINCREP (U.N. Chief in Command, Representative in Seoul) reported to the FOA about the composition of the food parcel interestingly shows the ways that Koreans reacted each new foodstuff differently.

Most important there should be a re-assessment of the composition of the food packages for particular countries. There were some items in the Korean packages which were practically useless. For example, although fats and oils are very much desired by the Korean consumer the Koreans are not accustomed to shortening and butter and have very little use for it, particularly the indigent people to whom the program is addressed. In the same category is cheese- only the more wealthy Koreans are even remotely acquainted with cheese as a food and even they have little taste for it. Also the beans were of little use to these people. They are unaccustomed to this kind of food, and furthermore it takes too much valuable fuel to cook beans properly. It is probably for these reasons so much shortening, butter and cheese were to be found on the black market.[32]

These Christmas food packages received a favorable and adequate amount of press coverage in Korea, which the FOA found satisfactory. Interestingly, Walter in Seoul observed that "Cooking oil, meat (except pork products and meat with gravy), rice, shortening [were] most useful. Butter, cheese, beans [were] not liked and appeared in market at low prices."[33] The place where Koreans could easily procure American foodstuffs that were not officially imported was the black market. When there was a general shortage of commodities, the black market played a major role in keeping the economy going. The next section discusses the ways in which the

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[31] Projects- Santa Claus; Box 15; Entry 1276; RG 469

[32] Report, Mr. Walter (Acting) of CINCREP to the FOA, Washington, June 15, 1955; 1373-5; #42; HQ; RG 469, Shortening= any fat that is solid at room temperature and used to make crumbly pastry. It is different from butter.

[33] Voluntary Agencies, 1380, #42; HQ; RG 469

large-scale U.S. military presence functioned to maintain the diversion of food to the black market.

U.S. Military Men and the Locals: P.X. (Military Canteen) and the "Black Market Economy"

In the 1950s, the black market activities that sustained the Korean economy formed what I call the Black Market Economy. The Black Market Economy was an effect of the physical presence of a large-scale U.S. military contingent and the large number of Korean War refugees. The goods in the black market were mostly diverted from U.S. military provisions, which were sent to feed and support the U.S. military personnel stationed in Korea. Not only the commodities on sale but also the vendors, or black marketeers. Many of the black market vendors were returnees from the former Japanese empire and Korean-War refugees who were homeless and unemployed.

The foodstuffs sent for U.S. soldiers trickled out to local Korean markets through the P.X. (military canteen) and through personal trading between American soldiers and Koreans. The South Korean state could neither endorse nor shut down black market activities since the black market was what was running the economy. In Korea, black market food did not mean food from the countryside that the rural people hoarded to sell at higher prices instead of surrendering them to the government for rationing. In Korea, black market commodities were mostly illegally diverted U.S. military provisions. The nature of this illegality imparted meanings to the new commodities that were basically only available through U.S. military provisions such as Spam, chocolate, chewing gum, coffee, beer, whiskey and tobacco. Korea was not unusual in its phenomenon of the black market economy. In fact, black market activities were rampant in many

other countries such as Japan, Italy, and France. The black market activity as a "global" phenomenon prompts us to consider the context of the globalization of American food in the post-1945 with regards to the effects of U.S. military and economic hegemony.

Local Koreans called the black markets "Yankee markets." Since Americans were pejoratively called "Yankees" by the locals, the term, "Yankee market," denoted the originating place of the commodities in the black market. The black market phenomenon was not only limited to the Korean War period. It began with the coming of the U.S. troops in 1945, and by the end of U.S. military rule in 1948, Yankee markets in the city of Seoul alone numbered ten. More than four thousand people earned their livelihoods in these markets. The Korean War intensified the phenomenon of the black market. During the Korean War (1950-1953), the Kukche Sijang (International Market) in Pusan became the heart of the South Korean economy with 100,000 people visiting the market daily. A survey taken by the Kukche Market Cooperative (Kukche Sijang Chohap) during the war in 1952 recorded that among the registered members of the market cooperative, half were refugees from North Korea, one fifth were refugees from Seoul, and the rest were locals of Pusan. At the same time, this survey noted that among the un-registered sellers without stores operating with movable carts, ninety-five percent were refugees from the north.[34] This survey was taken as a legacy of the Japanese colonial regulation that required each market to be registered as a company. During the war, the black market vendors who were returnees from the former empire and northern refugees now had to face stiff competition from the market sellers who fled from Seoul and other southern cities and settled in the Kukche Sijang.

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[34] *Tong'a.* February 29, 1952

The war refugees who crossed the 38th parallel became permanently dislocated after the armistice in 1953. In Pusan, war refugees and returnees from the former empire settled down and formed an ad hoc village in parts of Sinch'ang-dong and Ch'angsŏn-dong. The Japanese military had previously cleared out this large piece of land in front of the port. The original intention was to reduce the damages expected from U.S. air raids during the last phase of the Pacific War.[35] However, after liberation, the empty lots were filled with refugee camps and black marketeers. Black market activities were vibrantly carried out in the Freedom Market (*chayu sijang*), later the International Market, in that area. Among many other vendors, visitors to the market could find an array of rice and soup stalls (*kukpab chip*) and wheat-flour food stalls, which were said to have been noticeably numerous.

Food products sold in the black market were not officially imported and many of them had U.S. military provision marks and U.S. brand names. In 1955, there were over 500 cafes (*tabang*) in Seoul. The proliferation of cafes and bars was a noted social phenomenon after the U.S. occupation forces arrived in 1945. Decades later in 1990, Yu T'aejong, a retired professor from Korea University, reminisced about the time during the war when he and the poet, Pak Yongrae, met in Taegu while on evacuation, and the two ended up running a tea house (*ch'atchip*) in the city. They built a make-shift wooden house using Oregon pine planks from the U.S. military camp. What Yu remembers about the black market is that they could buy as much coffee, black tea, and hot chocolate powder as they wanted at incredibly cheap prices. Yu claims

[35] [6.25 is alive], *Kyŏnghyang*, June 21, 1975.

that these commodities poured out from U.S. P.X. stores "like mountain hills," emphasizing large amounts.[36]

The black market was not the only place Koreans could obtain illegally diverted P.X. foodstuffs. The locations where foreign foodstuffs were sold ranged from quite-established Yankee markets to numerous street-corner stores. Newspapers mention "the Korean P.X. stores" selling foreign products.[37] There were also itinerant peddlers in the streets, and these peddlers could visit their customers' homes to sell their black market commodities. The U.S. Quartermasters office was aware of these activities. One U.S. soldier describes seeing "small quantities of US cigarettes, candy and canned goods in numerous stands in all towns and villages along routes" Also, the number of corner stores (*kumŏng kagye*) increased after 6.25 (the June 25th invasion). In these ways, foodstuffs from Yankee markets trickled down to local retailers and to domestic spaces. Black market foodstuffs such as beer and tobacco were associated with illegal activities. However, the black market trade itself does not seem to have been considered especially dangerous by the South Korean state. In the month of December 1950, 600 Koreans were caught in alleged black market activities and was turned over to Korean courts. However, only 5 were convicted.[38] U.S. military provisions could be stolen in transit from ships or from freight trains freight, and also from storage. Another route of acquisition of illegally diverted U.S. foodstuffs was trading directly with U.S. military men.

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[36] *Maeil Kyŏngje*, January 12, 1990

[37] *Taehan Min'guk Sudo Sŏul ŭi Ch'ulbal*, 1945-1961, p. 220

[38] [Black market activities] p.9, p.43, and other pages, Section [Journal] January 20, 1951; Office of the Inspector General APO 301; RG 338

In many instances, U.S. military personnels acted as agents of illegal transfer from military provisions to the local black market. One could guess the large size and the glamor of U.S.-U.N. P.X. stores from the fact that the whole of Tong'a Department Store, which was one of the prestigious department stores in Seoul, was appropriated and used as a P.X. store during the Korean War.[39] In order to keep U.S. military men out of this illegal activity, Lieutenant Colonel McConnell of the Quartermaster's office "visited four Post Exchanges (P.X. stores) in Pusan to check the compliance with non-sale of 'gift' merchandise and posting of signs to that effect in stores."[40] Along with tobacco, which seemed to have a different route, both the South Korean state and the U.S. Army noted the abundance of U.S. beer in the local Korean market. To this, Colonel Elliot reported to the U.S. Army Inspector General that he believed that the "United Seamen's Service" (Mr. Hauer; owner = Mr. Bartham, a U.S. citizen) to be the largest outlet of illegally transferred beer in Korea.[41] Thus, not only the U.S. military but also service people adjunct to the U.S. military also seem to have been implicated in selling U.S. provisions to local Koreans.

Then, why were the U.S. soldiers illegally diverting P.X. commodities? One motivation could be to obtain local currency, Korean *hwan*. Paik Too Chin, South Korean Prime Minister, made a number of complaints to Ty Wood, the Economic Coordinator in Seoul regarding U.S. military men who sold P.X. goods to Koreans in order to obtain local currency.

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[39] *Yŏsŏnggye*, Vol. 4, April 1955

[40] Section [Journal] January 20, 1951, p. 18, 0800-63, Office of the Inspector General APT 301; Headquarters Eighth United States Army Korea (EUSAK) RG 338

[41] Trade- Customs; #18; 1276; RG 469

PX goods which possibly are sold by UNC personnel to Korean traders in order to obtain their Hwan requirements, to liquor supplies which may be sold from UNC messes and to uncustomed goods perhaps brought into Korea by UN personnel when returning from leave.[42]

Paik couched his complaint against illegal diversions in terms of the loss of possible tax revenue for the South Korean state, military canteen goods were not taxed until 1957. Ty Wood did not have a competent solution to offer to Paik regarding this problem.

One way that U.S. military personnel carried out economic activities with local Koreans was by using the MPC (Military Payment Certificate). When a military person arrived at his station in Korea, he was required to exchange all his greenbacks into MPCs. MPCs were denominated in U.S. dollars, such as $10 MPCs. Military wages were paid in MPCs only, and U.S. military personnel could exchange MPCs for *hwan* at an official rate. However, the problem was that the official "fixed exchange rate" was very disadvantageous to the MPC holders in comparison to the black market rate. In 1952, the official rate for 1 dollar was 180 hwan, but the unofficial exchange rate in the black market valued 1 dollar at 440-570 *hwan*.

While in principle MPCs were only to be used by U.S. personnel, it seems that Koreans frequently used MPCs in black market activities. South Korean police chiefs resorted to putting up posters in Korean saying, "Use of MPCs Strictly Forbidden" (*kunp'yo sayong ŏmgŭm*). In another example, in 1953 the Finance Office of the U.S. military recommended opening an official exchange outlet in the center of the city of Ch'unch'ŏn, the site of a huge U.S. camp. The Office's report argued that current locations of exchange outlets were inconvenient for the military men to use. Both of the official *hwan* sales outlets were set up on U.S. military premises while the circulation of MPCs in the business district of the city was known to be pervasive.

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[42] A correspondence from Paik to Wood, December 22, 1954; #10; 1276; RG 469

Another motivation for U.S. military personnel to use MPCs was based upon the price differential of MPCs in the U.S. Pacific Theater. South Korean Prime Minister Park Too Chin's letter to General Hull on May 29, 1954, points this out.

> MPCs and Greenbacks command about the same price in Japan, whereas there is a significant differential between the two in Korea… It is profitable to smuggle MPCs into Japan for conversion into luxury or non-essential goods currently excluded from the official import list, and smuggling these goods into Korea for sale.[43]

MPCs were about 30 percent cheaper than greenbacks in 1953 and 1954 in Korea. If a U.S. military man took MPCs from Korea to his vacation in Yokohama, Japan, and bought P.X. commodities, he could make a 30 percent profit in the transaction.

The sex trade was one of the well-known ways that local Koreans obtained MPCs and black market commodities like foodstuffs through person-to-person contact with U.S. military personnel. Again, all of this person-to-person contact and trade between U.S. soldiers and local Koreans, including the sex trade, was a result of the large-scale U.S military that was stationed in Korea. These girls, whom Koreans pejoratively called "Western princesses" (*yang kongju*), charged 5-10 dollars for one night's fee, and also accepted any commodity from U.S. military provisions.[44]

The person-to-person contact between American soldiers and local Koreans increased after the armistice as the soldiers were put into civilian rehabilitation work. After the armistice in September 1953, American troops stood by in Korea in case of a possible military emergency. However, when there was no war, they stayed idle. Prime Minister Paik Too Chin proposed using

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[43] Paik Too Chin to General Hull, May 29, 1954, #10. Finance- M.P.C. (Military Payment Certificate); Entry 1276; RG 469

[44] *Kyŏnghyang*, November 27, 1955

U.S. military forces and surplus materials in South Korean resettlement programs. This program, called the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK), began in late 1953. The program built orphanages, schools and refugee housing, and it was "considered vital to U.S.- R.O.K. community relations and... [the] morale of troops in Korea."[45] This program was similar to the self-help programs that I examine in chapter 6 except that I did not find any evidence that Korean laborers were paid in U.S. surplus food. In any case, the large number of U.S. military men that this program dispatched into civilian areas increased the chances of their acting as agents in the distribution of foreign food by selling or giving away items like chocolate or chewing gum.

In addition, Koreans could acquire American foodstuffs by being employed at U.S. military camps. The ROK Office of Supply and the U.N. operated the KESS, standing for "Korean Employees Sales Stores." The KESS was an official channel for the disposal of UNC goods by auction or private sales to Korean employees.[46] It was an officially sanctioned practice to pay Korean employees of the U.S. military facilities in goods or by awarding the privilege to purchase foreign goods at the KESS.[47]

Unofficially, individual American soldiers would hire a housekeeper or a day laborer and pay them with food or cigarettes. An American soldier, Ottoboni, speaks about Korean laborers who worked from dawn to sunset for a pack of cigarettes. He also remembers paying a cleaning woman with a military C-ration (ham and lima beans can), which she did not seem to be happy

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[45] 1544-1545; 1449-1451; #84; Headquarters, Office of Far Eastern Operations: Subject Files, 1950-1959; RG 469

[46] KESS Stores; Box 15; Entry 1276; RG 469

[47] January 18, 1955; Box 10; Entry 1276; RG 469

with. Kim Chŏng-man, who later practiced as a veterinarian, tells of his wartime memories when he worked as a house boy at the U.S. military. He particularly remembers taking chocolate and canned meats home at the end of his workday.[48] How Koreans like Kim remembered and recounted the stories about their encounters with American foodstuffs imparted a range of enduring images and meanings to them.

In conclusion, this chapter examined the impact of massive movements of Korean War refugees and large-scale U.S. military contingents on the spread of new foodstuffs like powdered milk and illegally transferred U.S. military provision. On one hand, it is likely that had it not been for the emergency relief needs created by the war, powdered milk and other factory-manufactured foodstuffs would have had very different histories in Korea. On the other hand, because of the context of feeding stations, resettlement villages, and the black market, these foodstuffs attained cultural meanings associated with the specific historical situation of 1950s Korea. It is true that the foodstuffs were associated with poverty, the presence of U.S. soldiers, and the sketchy and precarious activities of the black market. At the same time, pictures of life during wartime also show the plethora of goods diverted from U.S. military provisions, the crossing of legal and cultural boundaries, the freeing of consumption and the inventive uses developed for culturally new products. This was not a picture of wartime recession and commodity shortage. Yet again, Koreans did not forget the origin of these commodities that despite Korea's independence from the Japanese empire, Korea was now a divided country and had foreign militaries on its land.

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[48] *Kyŏnghyang,* November 5, 1996

In a 1959 newspaper, a recently widowed reader asked the editor how she could make a living running a general food store. The editor answered that, for a food store, it is essential to trade in Japanese and American canned food products and alcohol. Then the editor assured the widow that it was quite easy to obtain these foreign items.[49] With the presence of American military bases, food wastes from the U.S. military bases were turned into commodities. Until the end of the 1960s, food wastes from the U.S. military continued to be collected, bought and sold in the market at established prices ranging from 120 to 200 *wŏn* per *kun*.[50] Such memories of American food was transmitted orally through generations and in literary texts and popular media. It may have been that only the poorer section of the population received rations and only particular sections of the population purchased illegally diverted U.S. foodstuffs. Yet, all sections of the population were in one way or another touched by the insertion of U.S. foodstuffs in 1950s Korea. However, the meanings given to new food began changing. How the meanings changed and what new resonances they accrued will be discussed in the following chapters.

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[49] *Tong'a Ilbo*. November 15, 1959

[50] *Tong'a Ilbo*. December 22, 1960.; *Kyŏnghyang,* August 28, 1957; *Kyŏnghyang*, January 26, 1966.

Chapter 3.

The Invention of Humanitarian Food Relief in Korea, 1953-1955: UNICEF Milk-Feeding Program

Earlier in chapter 1 and chapter 2, new American foodstuffs such as wheat flour and powdered milk spread rapidly in post-1945 Korea through the state's ration networks and wartime feeding stations. While millions of Koreans depended on U.S. aid food, U.S. Army's food policy failed to persuade the Koreans towards the American camp in the Cold War. Not only did the Koreans find the taste and smell of wheat flour and powdered milk disagreeable, newspapers associated the new foodstuffs with the U.S. imperial motivations in juxtaposition to the presence of a large-scale U.S. troops in Korea. The political inefficacy of the earlier U.S. food assistance policy makes the different approach to food assistance by the United Nation's Children's Education Fund (UNICEF) in 1953 all the more significant. Large-scale relief needs in Korea drew in international organizations and non-governmental agencies to Korea. The UNICEF sponsored a milk-feeding program in Korea beginning in October 1953, and this milk program successfully transformed the association that powdered milk had with U.S. food assistance and poor relief, to Korea's social and national development. The U.N. Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul, subordinate to the U.S. Department of State, observed the advantages of appropriating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and child health in the UNICEF milk program.

Chapter 3. The Invention of Humanitarian Food Relief

The image of UNICEF delivering milk gruel to children in South Korea made a powerful impression about civilian humanitarian assistance. However, what was not known to Koreans was that the original donor of powdered milk to the UNICEF was in fact the U.S. government. However, the U.S. government did not immediately embrace the principle of humanitarian assistance. In 1953, U.S. officials in the Department of State considered a UNICEF milk program in Korea unnecessary. However, in just three years, the Department of State completely changed its position regarding the Korean milk program by calling it essential by 1956. In fact, the U.S. Department of State had political calculations in changing its position to humanitarian food assistance in the mid-1950s. U.S. officials in the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul acknowledged the political effectiveness of the use of humanitarian language through the UNICEF milk-feeding program. This chapter explores what the UNICEF milk program was able to achieve in-between this change in American food policy between 1953 and 1956. The development during those three years is important because it preceded the legislation of Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of U.S. Public Law 480 in 1955. Title III of U.S. Public Law 480, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

The milk program was particularly politically savvy because it addressed the issue of "children without meals (kyŏlsik adong)." This term referred to children who could not eat three meals a day, and the existence of these children, numbering between four hundred thousands and nine hundred thousands according to the agricultural cycle, had been receiving much attention in newspapers. However, the South Korean government did not have the

wherewithal to take care of children-without-meals when the nation was just coming out of the Korean War.

"UNICEF milk" was familiar to Koreans in the mid-1950s as South Korean state bureaucrats and newspapers revealed the identity of the donor only as UNICEF without referring to its original donor, which was the U.S. Department of State. On the other hand, the U.S. government was present as a shadow to the Korean Civil Assistance Command (KCAC), which was officially subordinate to the U.N. Command in Tokyo. The KCAC's role in the milk program was the distribution of the powdered milk. Thus, the short-hand appellation, UNICEF milk, understated the package of sponsorship given by the U.S. Department of State which provided surplus food for free.

In 1957, U.S. officials in the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul assessed that powdered milk became rapidly familiarized in South Korea in three years since the distribution of UNICEF milk in 1954. In the circular-report to the U.S. International Cooperations Agency in 1957, American officers in charge of food distribution at the CINCREP in Seoul, Gerrild and Strickland, acknowledged the unfamiliarity of new American foodstuffs to Koreans and explained the rapid process of familiarization as a result of the food shortage. In other words, the consumption of milk spread rapidly not because Koreans liked milk, but because they did not have alternatives to choose from. The subtitle of the below excerpt was the "Suitability of foods available for donation in relation to dietary habits of persons to be benefited."

If Koreans could choose the foods they were to receive they would probably eliminate most everything except rice. However, they have learned to eat almost anything. For hungry people

any food is better than nothing. Cornmeal was not an item in the Korean diet, yet today many Koreans are eating cornmeal. The wheat flour has become a favorite item for those who never ate it before. It is used for many dishes. Beans of any kind have always been part of the Korean meals. Powdered milk is becoming more popular. Cheese, except in rare instances, is still an item that should be brought in very small quantities. Along with butter it would be a most helpful addition to the protein-lacking diet of the Koreans... Koreans are gradually acquiring a taste for foods previously uncommon in their diets.[1]

The UNICEF program was the only large-scale milk program at the time.

The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) sponsored the milk-feeding program in the Republic of Korea from October 1953 to August 1957.[2] Milk aid had been initially requested by the South Korean government through the office of Sam Keeney, Far Eastern Regional Representative for UNICEF. In response, UNICEF sent fifty-five million pounds of non-fat dried milk and fifteen million pounds of fish liver oil capsules for an emergency program in Korea in 1954. However, the original donation by the U.S. Department of State was not widely publicized to Koreans.[3] Aside from the powdered milk, Maurice Pate, Director of UNICEF, allocated $1,348,000 from UNICEF funds to cover the cost of inland transportation within the United States and also for ocean freight to Korea.[4]

Interestingly, UNICEF and the U.S Department of State initially had different goals regarding food assistance to Korea. When the UNICEF Executive Board met in October 1953 to discuss the milk-feeding program in Korea, U.S. Representatives on the board strongly

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[1] "Voluntary Agencies Title III- PL 480 Distribution Programs," airgramed from CINCREP Seoul to ICATO Circular A-240, drafted by Gerrild/Strickland, June 24, 1957. Ref. 1531; #139; UD 422; RG 469

[2] The official commitment was from October 1953, although the milk was delayed till February 1954. 1340; #50; UD 422; RG 469 SCAP

[3] UNICEF, 1201; #19, Korea Subject Files, 1953-1959; Office of Far Eastern Operations (OFEO), UD 422; U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, Record Group 469; National Archives, College Park, MD (NACP).

[4] Korea- Relief- C.A.R.E, ref. 1506, no. 69-86; Subject Files, 1950-1959; OFEO; RG 469; NACP.

opposed the proposition. The U.S. representatives believed that the Korean milk program was incongruent with the mission statement of UNICEF. They reminded the UNICEF Executive Board that since 1950, the U.S. funds to UNICEF had been appropriated by Congress for "primarily assist(ing) countries in the development of permanent child health and welfare services." In other words, the program had to have a long-term goal. Indeed, there were exceptions in which UNICEF could sponsor emergency relief programs. However, its commitment had to be a short-term contract, and it was reserved for natural disasters like floods, earthquakes, draught and famine. The Korean program did not fit any of the criteria. Previously, UNICEF had initiated a similar plan to give 200,000 pounds of powdered milk to Korea in March 1950, but it was a small-scale and short-term relief program, compared to what the Executive Board was considering in 1953.[5]

Moreover, the U.S. Representatives on the UNICEF Board argued that additional food program to Korea was unnecessary since the Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK) was providing for all civilian food requirements. In fact, the U.S. Eighth Army and U.N. Far Eastern Command in Korea had inherited a different set of goals for civilian relief programs, which was on the continuum of the wartime emergency policy. The goal of civilian relief, in which food assistance was of part, was "to prevent starvation, disease and unrest among the civilian population." A goal of rehabilitation was added to this list of objectives after the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953. However, this did not change the purpose of food assistance which was militarily motivated. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State believed that

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[5] *Tong'a*. March 28, 1950

numerous existing relief programs in Korea already had considerable overlaps. The Department pointed out that Korea had the Civilian Relief in Korea (CRIK of U.S. Eighth Army), U.S. bilateral aid, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), U.N. Technical Assistance, programs of U.N. Specialized Agencies, and U.S. voluntary agencies to help the civilian population.[6] Adding UNICEF to the list did not seem to make an efficient use of resources and further hindered the efforts already on the way to organize an integrated civilian relief program in Korea. Thus, in 1953 when the priority was still on military concerns, investing in long-term development of children's health seemed to be pre-mature for Korea. Thus, the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration, Department of State, assessed that Korea already received sufficient milk supply for relief needs for 1954, and thus that UNICEF should not stretch its thin resource for a new program in Korean.

However, the Korean Civilian Assistance Command (KCAC) and the South Korean government argued that the proposed UNICEF milk program did not overlap with other milk programs, currently managed by the CRIK and foreign voluntary agencies in Korea. It was true that CRIK was providing powdered milk to Koreans through foreign voluntary agencies in its SUN (sundry, donations from U.N. member nations and foreign voluntary agencies) Part Program. However, existing milk programs were limited in area, and the agencies showed their favoritism in choosing groups to give the milk to. For 1954, CRIK allocated 467 tons of powdered milk to Korea monthly. It was planned to feed 220,000 persons 2.5

[6] 1202; #19; UD 422; RG 469

ounces of powdered milk daily.[7] The recipients were mainly orphans and patients in institutions run by foreign voluntary agencies. In comparison to the UNICEF programs, the donations of powdered milk made by other voluntary agencies had small scale. The United Church of Canada made a commitment to donate 0.45 metric tons of dried milk to Korea through CRIK's SUN Program in 1953, which it received in April 1954. The Cooperative for American Relief to Europe (CARE, Inc.) gave 39.63 metric tons of powdered milk in 1953.[8] The Church World Services (C.W.S) and the National Catholic World Council (N.C.W.C) programs were the only relatively large milk programs in Korea distributing to hospitals and orphanages.[9]

In comparison, the UNICEF program instigated a national-scale milk-feeding campaign for the first time in Korea. Its milk fed 1.5 million people daily. Since the recipients were mainly children in primary schools and nursing mothers, it overlapped little with the existing milk feeding programs. In any case, the scale of the UNICEF program was 6.8 times larger than the sum of all the existing milk programs. When the U.N. Command Representative on the Combined Economic Board, the Commanding General of KCAC, and the South Korean Minister of Health and Social Sciences showed support for the UNICEF program, the U.S.

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[7] 2.5 ounces= 0.16 pounds = 71 grams. C.2414; #8; P323; RG 469

[8] The Civilian Relief In Korea Report of Programs Issued and Shipments made as of 30 April 1954. of shipped metric tons, SUN Program, cumulative; 1139-1140; #18; UD 422; RG 469

[9] 1195; #19; UD 422; RG 469

Representatives on the Executive Board of UNICEF reluctantly agreed to go with the allocation of powdered milk by UNICEF to Korea.[10]

The initial quantity of UNICEF milk was a small load of nine hundred tons, discharged at the port of Pusan on December 31, 1953. On February 4, 1954, S.S. Popi delivered five thousand tons of non-fat dried milk to the ports of Inchôn and Kunsan. This was the first substantial amount of milk delivered by UNICEF. S.S. Popi had been delayed for six weeks, but the distribution of milk had not been disrupted since UNICEF was able to borrow powdered milk from the U.S. Army in Korea. Lastly, Sven Salen closed the month off with the unloading of milk at the port of Pusan.

Koreans expressed gratitude for the gift of powdered milk and gave credit to UNICEF, which provided milk, and the KCAC, which distributed milk, as well as acknowledging the role of their own Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. In the monthly report of February 1954 to UNICEF Headquarters, I. H. Markuson, Country Officer in Japan-Korea for UNICEF, described the welcome ceremony during which Koreans greeted S.S. Popi in Inchŏn on February 5, 1953. The ceremony was attended by representatives from UNICEF, KCAC (Korean Civil Assistance Command, U.N.), the South Korean government, and also by students in primary schools.

In the afternoon of 5 February, a celebration of arrival was held at Inchŏn City Hall with the attendance of over five hundred people, including two excellent school bands. The program included speeches by the Governor of Kyŏng'gi province, the Vice-Minister of Social Affairs, the Mayor of Inchŏn, Colonel Scobey, representing the KCAC. Colonel Murphy, Director of Port Operations, and the Country Officer, who presented symbolic packages of milk to Vice

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[10] CINCREP, Seoul, to Mr. Normal Paul, Office of Program and Planning, FOA, October 14, 1953; 1202; #19; UD 422; RG 469

Minister Kim and Mayor Pyo. Two large bouquets were presented to us by school children and Colonel Murphy received two for the Captain of the ship. As the program ended the children present were served glasses of hot UNICEF milk.[11]

The Inchŏn ceremony was not the only occasion for the public display of appreciation for the powdered milk given by the foreigners. Another "bless-the-milk ceremony" was held on the steps of Seoul City Hall "surrounded by truckloads of UNICEF milk" on February 18. The enthusiastic welcome by the Koreans assured the U.N. representative in Seoul to report that Korean reaction to the program had been satisfactory. The representative assessed that Koreans recognized the program as a joint effort by the KCAC-ROK-UNICEF, and media coverage on the UNICEF donation and ceremonies had been adequate.[12] Markuson's report above also describes all three parties' being elevated to the podium and given recognition for the delivery of powdered milk.

Koreans learnt from newspapers and governmental announcements that UNICEF donated 5.5 million pounds of powdered milk for children-without-meals in schools. The newspapers also informed the readers that the milk-feeding program itself was administered as a joint project of UNICEF, the South Korean government, and the U.N. Korean Civil Assistance Command (KCAC). However, from what is available in newspapers, It is difficult to gauge how much the Koreans, in fact, knew about the original donor of milk to UNICEF. On the other hand, the newspaper articles clearly stated the donor only as the UNICEF.

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[11] UNICEF Pusan office, "Korea-Japan Monthly Report," February 1954, ref.1196; UNICEF, no. 19; Korea Subject Files, 1953-1959; OFEO; RG 469; NACP.

[12] ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, which was the official name for South Korea.

Moreover, although the KCAC was mentioned, the credit given to the government of the United States through the KCAC was only referential. It is true that, the KCAC was largely a U.S. operation. American personnel in the KCAC belonged to the 8201st army unit assigned to Eighth Army, and most of the funding and policies for the KCAC derived from the government of the United States. However, it was technically an organization of the United Nations. Moreover, receiving the credit for the program indirectly through a U.N. organization created different dynamics from crediting the U.S. government directly, nor did the phrase like "in cooperation with the KCAC" adequately represent the level of involvement by the U.S. government.

Although UNICEF officially sponsored the program, UNICEF milk was distributed under the supervision of the KCAC and the Office of the Economic Coordinator as other U.S. aid materials were.[13] At the ports of discharge, the South Korean Office of Supply took over the freights. The Ministry of Culture and Education allocated milk to Seoul and each of the nine provinces, and sent it down through state's administrative channels. UNICEF and the U.S. International Cooperation Agency had initially requested the South Korean government to pay for inland transportation within Korea. However, the costs of inland transportation were usually defrayed from the Counterparts Fund, which was where the profit earned from selling U.S. agricultural surpluses to Korean buyers was deposited.[14]

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[13] C. Tyler Wood, UNC Economic Coordinator, to Sam Keeney, Director, Asia Regional Office, UNICEF, March 8, 1956, ref. 1507; Korea Subject Files, 1950-1959, Headquarters; RG 469; NACP.

[14] For the explanation on Counterparts Fund, see chapter 1.

Surprisingly, UNICEF achieved all these in Korea with only one official, Irvin H. Markuson, Country Officer for UNICEF, and his administrative assistant. Moreover, Markuson was covering for UNICEF in Japan as well as Korea in 1953. This Markuson went around the country making contacts with Korean voluntary organizations and local governments, and through those channels, the UNICEF milk reached 1.2 million-1.5 million children daily. However, at the same time, it makes one wonder how much actual work UNICEF could have done with only one official to carry our the large-scale program.

UNICEF was only one of the participants in the joint program with the Korean Civilian Assistance Command (KCAC) and the Republic of Korea (ROK).[15] Moreover, looking at it carefully, UNICEF did not play much role beyond arranging ocean freights, and having Markuson in Korea to supervise the distribution. Then, why were the Koreans giving so much credit to UNICEF for the program?

In fact, it was difficult to draw a line between UNICEF and the KCAC when it came to supervising the program. In addition, UNICEF's office in Korea was attached to the Social Affairs Branch of the KCAC, and later it was transferred to the Community Development Division of the UNC Office of the Economic Coordinator."[16] Thus, the U.S. government officials were involved in every step of the way from funding to procurement of surplus powdered milk, to distribution and to supervision of the program in Korea. Yet, it maintained a shadowy presence through the KCAC and UNICEF to the eyes of the public in Korea.

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[15] KCAC, the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC) was a major command of the Far East Command, inaugurated on 1 July 1953, as a successor to the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCACK, December, 1950-June 1953).

[16] Ref. 1340; no. 50; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.

Teamed with the KCAC, the job entrusted to UNICEF was to deliver the commodity from the warehouses in the United States to the ports in Korea, and to supervise and give technical advice regarding the program. According to the job description, after S.S. Popi discharged powdered milk at Inchŏn and Kunsan, Irvin Markuson busied himself with setting up the program throughout the country. He visited major cities to inspect the progress made in distribution, and to discuss the program with local officials and representatives of civil organizations. On February 6, 1954, Markuson proceeded from Inchŏn to Chŏngju in Chungchŏng pukto. The feeding station at the Chŏngju City Hall had been serving rice and milk-gruel to 1,000 persons daily. Each recipient held a ticket that recorded the number of family members eligible for food relief. The station had cooking facilities, but because it did not have a dining, people took food home to eat. Below is Markuson's description of the feeding station.

The kitchen bordered the alley at the rear of City Hall and serving was done through a trap door cut in a high board fence. The two-pot cooking stove was well constructed and was roofed over only. There was considerable evidence that spillage on the dirt floor had occurred over a long period of time, and that flies would be a real problem in warm weather. Storage was adequate. Although we were told that the four women in attendance were volunteers, Mr. Kroll believed that they received some kind of pay for their work. The addition of a cement floor with proper drainage would add considerably to the cleanliness of this station.[17]

In the next excerpt, Markuson discusses the school-feeding program with the locals of the city of Chŏngju. At the meeting, Markuson persuades local administrators to distribute powdered milk as reconstituted liquid skim milk. The school-feeding program was important

[17] Citation from UNICEF Pusan office, "Korea-Japan Monthly Report," February 1954, ref. 1197, no. 19; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.

to UNICEF as the agency's main concern was children in primary schools. Between 1954 and 1956, UNICEF delivered 134 million pounds of powdered milk to Korea. Of this, seventy five percent was distributed to students in primary schools, and the remaining twenty five percent went to feeding stations in urban areas and through maternal and child health programs.[18] In the excerpt below, Markuson phrases the principle of liquid distribution as a matter of hygiene and health.

In the afternoon, I met with representatives of the provincial government health, education and relief sections; the provincial head of the women's association, the Chŏngju city head of the women's association, Mr. Kroll, Dr. Lapamarege, and Miss Brandt, Public Health Nurse from the Team… When the meeting was opened for question and discussion the principle of liquid distribution was immediately under fire. The Catholic Church, it developed, had also issued milk to the Chŏngju primary school- one drum for each classroom- and the teachers were sending it home in dry form with the students. The head of the women's association pointed out that this was very satisfactory in her own case and that she believed this to be the best system. I pointed out to her that such was probably true in many cases, but that she was undoubtedly more intelligent and a better housekeeper and mother than the average. I again pointed out the certain waste inherent in the practice and the danger involved in the sanitation aspect when children ate the milk dry from dirty hands, as they often do. I also pointed out that the national government and the national president of the women's association endorsed the UNICEF requirement for liquid distribution.

I left Chungchŏng pukto that night with confidence that the visit had engendered enthusiastic support. As I entrained later for Pusan, I was informed by the stationmaster that the first carloads of milk had arrived at railheads that afternoon.[19]

As cited in Markuson's report, the National Catholic World Council (NCWC) already had school-feeding programs in Chŏngju as well as in other cities. However, the NCWC milk

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[18] Over 75% of the supply went to primary schools, *Yearbook of Ministry of Health and Social Affairs* (Seoul, 1955-7); Warne, Oct. 11, 1956, ref. 1340-1, no. 50; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.

[19] Citation from UNICEF Pusan office, "Korea-Japan Monthly Report," February 1954. ref. 1197; #19; UD 422; RG 469

programs in Chŏngju gave out raw powdered milk for children to take home. The administrators did not seem to have cared about the form of distribution as much when the NCWC school-feeding programs were sporadic and small in scale. The program supplied powdered milk to twelve primary schools in several Catholic dioceses in the city when it had a supply of milk to distribute. Markuson's KCAC-UNICEF team informed him that fuel was expensive, and without fuel, it was difficult to carry out liquid distribution in most schools. Regardless, Markuson reiterated the principle of liquid distribution and finished the meeting.

In comparison to small foreign voluntary agency milk programs, the UNICEF program was much larger, and it was committed for a long period of two years. For the program, the UNICEF distributed powdered milk to over 4,200 primary schools throughout the nation, which included the rural areas. Moreover, UNICEF made a contract with the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs for a year - to be renewed for one more year afterwards -, which made UNICEF responsible for ensuring constant supply of milk during that twelve month period.

On the day, Markuson left the city of Chŏngju and traveled to the southeastern city of Pusan in Kyŏngsangdo. As he expected, the UNICEF milk-feeding program was successfully expanded throughout the country.[20] By February 23, 1954, UNICEF distributed powdered milk to 577,278 recipients in Korea daily. By April, the number of recipients exceeded 1.5 million, which was the number that had been contracted by UNICEF. In the same month, UNICEF provided a pint of reconstituted skim milk a day to 1,100,239 children in primary

[20] The survey counted Seoul as one province.

Table 3.1 **Importation of Aid Milk (Kuho Uyu) from 1955 to 1964**

	Quantity (pounds)	Total Number of recipients	Number of Schools	Number of School Children	Number of Pre-school Children	Adults	Maternity
1953 (4286)	October-December						
1954+ (4287)	No Data						
1955 (4288)	(UNICEF) 43,808,400	17,277,273 (1,439,772)	4,226	11,847,200 (987,266)	2,377,539	1,988,933	1,063,601
1956 (4289)	(UNICEF) 37,220,836 +++	19,942,918 Monthly = (1,661,909)	4,095	14,257,640 Month Av. (1,188,136)	2,833,483	1,998,047	853,748
1957 (4290)	(UNICEF) 20,271,160 ++++	13,456,281 (1,121,356)	3,860	10,227,856 (852,321)	1,399,352	1,409,626	419,447
1958 (4291)	(CARE) 9,073,800	3,857,265 **	5,493	3,108,711	338,017	279,946	130,591
1959 (4292)	(CARE) 20,909,800	10,398,560 (866,546)	4,804	7,970,090 (664,174)	936,883	1,190,868	300,719
1960	(CARE) 67,800	88,571	30	88,571 ***	none	none	none
1961	1,420,600	185,700 ****	609	182,700	3,000	none	none
1962	284,840	481,582	1,030	481,582	none	none	nonec
1963	4,489,800	967,418	1,508	542,000	223,034	193,459	8,777
1964	31,022,000	2,429,893	1,946	1,984,255	166,458	268,117	11,063
1965 ++	No Data						

Source: Yearbook of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1954, 1955-7, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966-

Figure 3.2

Relief Milk Imports by Month, 1955-1964
Unit in 1 d/m = 200lb

	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept.	October	Nov.	Dec.	Total
1954													
1955											Monthly Not available.		219,042
1956	2,357,678	5,879,448	2,625,192	2,789,142	1,411,473	1,998,371	3,016,230	3,148,795	7,647,866	2,918,682	2,249,689	1,178,270	37,220,836
1957	10,743	21,534	9,476	28,840	4,579	12,061	10,696	701,900	—	1,214,618	3,429	9,240	2,027,116
1958	358	—	—	—	113	—	22,035	3,724	10,192	6,768	—	2,179	45,369
1959	30,407	2,071	2,070	24,988	5,925	2,332	18,078	778	13,541	2,525	1,585	249	104,549
1960	220	71	42	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	339
1961	Monthly data not available. All 7,103 d/m went to Chŏlla Namdo . The other eight provinces and Seoul received none.												7,103
1962											Monthly data not available.		14,242
1963											Monthly data not available.		22,449
1964											Monthly data not available.		155,110
1965													no data

Source: Yearbook of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1954, 1955-7, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965

schools (ages 6 to 11), 209,816 pre-school children (ages 1 to 5), 76,606 pregnant and nursing mothers, and 225,927 adults in institutions and hospitals.[21]

As the figures show, UNICEF focused on helping students in primary schools. The UNICEF school-feeding program was not designed to provide for all students enrolled in schools, as it was the case in Japan at the time. It only provided for students who were registered as "children-without-meals (Kyôlsik adong)" with the Ministry of Culture and Education. "Children-without-meals" was a term used since the Japanese colonial period to refer to children who could not eat all three meals a day.

[21] *Pogŏn Sahoe T'onggye Yŏnbo, 1955-1957* (Seoul, 1957), p. 352; 469 422 19, 1195 UNICEF's contract with the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was to feed 1.5 million Koreans in the contract However, the agency also had a more ambitious plan of reaching 2 million recipients in Korea. In the latter plan, UNICEF planned to provide a pint of reconstituted skim milk a day to 656,000 children in primary schools (ages 6 to 11), 450,000 children not in school (ages 6 to 11), 500,000 pre-school children (ages 1 to 5), 200,000 pregnant and nursing mothers, 100,000 children in institutions and hospitals 100,000 and 105,000 reserved for expansion where most needed, ref. 1195, no. 19; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.

Chapter 3. The Invention of Humanitarian Food Relief

The phenomenon of children coming to school without lunch-boxes began drawing renewed attention from the public in 1952. The issue stayed in high visibility throughout the 1950s and the 1960s. The reason for the sudden rise in the issue could be attributed to the increase in the number of students. Since the American Military Government (1945-1948) implemented compulsory education for primary school in 1946, the number of students in primary schools, which was 1,460,000 students in 1945 after the Liberation, increased to 3,188,000 by 1958.[22] That was more than a two fold increase. The number of students, including middle school, high schools and college students, was 4 million, comprising one fifth of the total population of South Korea, which was 21-21.5 million people at the time. Feeding the new food, milk, to 1.5 million people in the nation of 21 million was a substantial number.

As primary school education was normalized, children from less economically privileged families began entering school, and the number of children-without-meals also increased. In 1950, the Ministry of Culture and Education, based on the survey conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, estimated the number of children-without-meals at 350,000 nationally.[23] The national average was higher when students from poor farming families (ch'ŏlnyang nong'ga, literally meaning agricultural household without food) in the countryside were counted. During the war in 1952, the number of children-without-meals increased to 617,000 children, which was forty four percent of the total 1,390,000 children (adong) both in school

[22] *Chayu Sinmun*, December 24, 1945; *Kyônghyang Sinmun,* August 7, 1958.

[23] *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun,* June 16, 1950.

and not in schooling.[24] In 1955, 900,000 children were skipping one or two meals a day when the total number of primary school student was three million.[25] The number of children-without-meals fluctuated according to the agricultural cycle. The spring season had the most acute food shortage before the fall harvest. May and June period was called "Barley Hill." Before "Barley Hill," South Kyŏngsang-do ran a survey on 480,000 children in primary schools. Children who skipped meals totaled 170,000. Ten percent of children skipped two meals daily, and one in four children responded that they skipped a meal a day.[26] Nationally, the percentage of children-without-meals did not go below thirty-five percent until the late 1960s.

Before the UNICEF school-feeding program, the UNCACK, ROK and foreign voluntary agencies at times arranged impromptu and localized efforts to feed children in primary schools.[27] These were short-term improvisations for emergencies. When the situation was dire, especially during the spring season, children were given rice, sorghums, bread, and powdered milk. The organizations had to incorporate powdered milk in school-feeding because there was a shortage of both rice and bread. In 1946, one thousand students in primary schools in Seoul each received 1 hop of free powdered milk.[28] In the same year, the city government of Seoul sold bread and rice meal to primary school students at subsidized

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[24] Children in Korean is adong. *Tong'a Ilbo,* November 23, 1952

[25] *Kyŏnghyang,* May 10, 1955.

[26] *Pusan Ilbo*, May 2, 1957.

[27] UNCACK was re-named to KCAC in 1953.

[28] *Tong'a*, March 15, 1946.

prices. Bread made of wheat-flour cost 2 wŏn 20 chŏn per 100 grams, and a hop (equiv. to 0.25 pounds) of rice-mixed meal cost 3 wŏn.

In 1953, Seoul City opted for milk feeding in schools because there was a shortage of bread. The city had 9,240 *kyŏlsik'adong* (children without meals) which counted for 30 percent of the students in primary schools.[29] During the Korean War, in 1952 and in 1953, the ROK Ministry of Culture and Education had applied to the UNCACK (United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea) for barley and rice for children without meals. UNCACK had neither barley nor rice, but promised to allocate powdered milk as a substitute in 1953. In January 1953, the Unitarian Church of Canada donated powdered milk to Seoul City through UNCACK.[30] With this milk from the Unitarian Church of Canada, all children in primary schools in Seoul from aged 6 to 12 received 50 grams of milk per day for two months.[31] The Unitarian Church again donated 0.45 tons of milk in 1954 (UNICEF provided 2000 tons a year).[32]

When newspapers criticized the South Korean government for not developing an independent plan, and merely depending on UNICEF milk for children-without-meals, both the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture and Education balked at taking on the responsibility. The Ministry of Culture and Education shoved the responsibility to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs by saying that procurement of food

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[29] *Kyŏnghyang*, July 11, 1953.

[30] See Introduction in *Hakkyo Kŭpsik Paeksŏ*, (Seoul, 1978); UNICEF planned to give 200,000 pounds of powdered milk in 1950, *Tong'a*, March 28, 1950.

[31] *Kyŏnghyang*, January 24, 1953.

[32] Unitarian Church of Canada, *Kyŏnghyang*, January 24, 1953.

was not its duty. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs announced that it did not need to provide milk for these children because they were already provided food in the family-feeding program. Thus, the Ministry considered allocating food for children-without-meals as double counting in two separate categories. In any case, both ministries had to manage with severely limited funding and it would have been difficult for them to come up with funds for children-without-meals. Thus, school-feeding continued to depend on UNICEF and other voluntary agencies.

The program was successful, feeding 1.5 million children a day. However, this does not mean that those who received milk liked it or found it familiar. The foreign nature of milk created resistance. UNICEF channeled seventy-five percent of its milk to primary schools; it received frequent complaints from students suffering from diarrhea and enteritis after eating powdered milk. The relevant South Korean Ministries and newspapers alleged that ailments were caused from eating raw powdered milk.[33] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs had instructed primary schools in the feeding program to make milk-gruel in school and feed students on site. The powder had to be dissolved in water and boiled in order to kill the germs before being served. However, the ministries also had to acknowledge that few schools were equipped with cooking facilities and large pots. In addition, obtaining fuel was an obvious challenge. Thus, most schools gave out raw powdered milk for children to take home.

The difficulty of affording fuel was discussed at a round-table discussion in 1955 between representatives from schools and the Ministry of Culture and Education. They discussed ways

[33] For example, see *Kyŏnghyang*, February 28, 1957.

to abolish miscellaneous fees in schools. Miscellaneous fees were supposed to be voluntarily collected from parents, but that it was not very voluntary and put financial pressure on students from poorer families. Sŏ Hyŏng-ho, Headmaster of Sosŏng Primary School, pleaded that he could not manage his school with meager government subsidy and tuition fees.[34] He said he used the fund from miscellaneous fees to pay for water, telephone, electricity bills and even to pay teachers' salaries. Sŏ emphasized that preparing milk gruel was especially costly because fuel was expensive. He sarcastically informed his co-discussants that "when we asked for fuel, the Ministry heaped us with more powdered milk." Instead of providing fuel or funds to buy fuel, the Ministry of Education gave extra powdered milk, expecting the schools to gather their wits to transform the milk into fuel. Thus, his school ended up having more powdered milk without fuel.[35] At the same time at a different place, an official from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was censuring primary schools for selling powdered-milk to the commercial market.[36]

Although the UNICEF program alleviated the situation, it alone could not solve the problem of children-without-meals in postwar Korea. It also had limitations. The distribution of powdered milk varied widely month to month. There were often three to four months that went by without distribution. In addition, 40 to 50 grams of powdered milk was not enough to relieve a child's hunger as it provided less than 300 calories.[37] Sometimes powdered milk

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[34] Miscellaneous fees (chappu kŭm) was fee that parents voluntarily contributed. This fee was separate from the tuition fee and the subsidies from the government.

[35] Round Table Discussion [2], *Tong'a*, August 6, 1955.

[36] *Kyŏnghyang,* May 10, 1955.

[37] Ibid.

was caught in storage for as long as three years and were spoilt. Also, milk supply had to compete for inland transportation with those of relief grain, clothing, lumber, cement, and fertilizer, the last of which had top priority. Lastly, powdered milk was only given to children who were registered in primary schools when one million children did not attend school for financial reasons. It was likely that these children needed more help than students who could attend school.

On November 15, 1956, Sam Keeney, Far Eastern Regional Representative for UNICEF, and his associate Bowls informed Edward Warne at the Office of the Economic Coordinator, Seoul, of the UNICEF's plan to terminate the milk feeding program in Korea by August 1957.[38] They explained that "UNICEF was under pressure to divert the $800,000 it now pays annually for freight on U.S. powdered milk deliveries to the ROK to the world-wide mosquito eradication program." Thus far, UNICEF had paid in total approximately $5 million on ocean freights for the Korean program. Keeney added that his organization was willing to continue administering the program if it did not have to pay the ocean freight bill. Otherwise, UNICEF requested the Office of the Economic Coordinator to take over the program with Title II, PL 480,[39] which was a provision for emergency relief.

In a little over three years, the U.S. officials in CINCREP, Seoul, changed their position regarding the milk-feeding program from unnecessary to essential. Before the program started, the U.S. side had objections, but in 1957 the U.S. officials were convinced of the effectiveness and needs of milk distribution in Korea. American officials, Whitman and

[38] November 16, 1956, ref. 1340, no. 50; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.

[39] Ref. 1196, ref. 1340; #50; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.

William E. Warne in Seoul recommended the Office of the Economic Coordinator, Seoul, continue funding the milk program in Korea through other voluntary agencies for two years. Although using Title II for this was inappropriate, the program could be continued through the provision of Title III, PL 480, which was to divert foods to international organizations and voluntary agencies. Below are two excerpts. The first excerpt was sent by Warne sent on October 11, 1956 to the International Cooperations Agency.

> The Koreans now accept the advantages of the program and ask for its continuation. This is a real accomplishment in itself since milk was a strange food to most Koreans and at the beginning of the program we met with much resistance. The children themselves were the basis of the acceptance. Once the children began to drink the milk they quickly learned to like it and thus overcame the resistance of the adults.[40]

A U.S. official, Whitman, CINCREP, Seoul reported to the International Cooperations Agency,

> It is recommended that the (milk feeding) program be continued. The program is directly furthering the U.S. Objectives in Korea. It is a program that assists daily one and half million people throughout all parts of the ROK. It is helping to build a healthy nation by reaching children whose diet is nutritionally insufficient. Almost every community in Korea knows the program and is aware that the milk is supplied through foreign aid. Much progress has been made through the past three years the program has been in operation. There has been steady improvement in administration of the feeding program through schools, clinics, and feeding stations. The nutritional supplement has been of value in maintaining health among children and pregnant and nursing women among poorer groups of the population. The Koreans have learned to know and like milk as well as understand the value of milk as highly nutritious food which has contributed much toward combating malnutrition and under nutrition.[41]

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[40] Warne, Economic Coordinator, to ICA/W, October 11, 1956, ref. 1340-1341, no. 50; UD 422; RG469; NACP.

[41] Whitman, CINCREP Seoul, Cablegram to ICA/W, January 5, 1957, ref. 1484-5; Headquarters, Office of Far Eastern Operations; RG 469; NACP.

In these reports to the International Cooperation Agency, the U.S. officials like Whitman and Warne in the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul were convinced that by 1957 Koreans recognized milk as a healthful and necessary food, which had particular relevance to the physical development of children.[42] They concurred amongst themselves that the joint milk-feeding program brought about positive changes in Korea, and that it was a progress achieved by the Koreans who learnt the value of milk in preventing and combating malnutrition and under-nutrition. Milk was also cited as a preventative measure to curb active tuberculosis, which was pervasive in Korea at the time. Children were especially vulnerable to the onset of tuberculosis and its major cause was known as malnutrition.[43]

The American supply of powdered milk was slow to take root in Korea. In 1956, the commercial import of powdered milk to Korea was only 250,000 pounds.[44] Warne in OEC concluded that the market for milk did not exist in Korea and its potential in the future negligible.[45] Thus, in order to continue the supply of powdered milk to Korean children, the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul searched for a way to continue the milk program.

Whitman and Warne presumed that Koreans had acknowledged the incompleteness of their conventional diet. Grains composed over eighty-five percent of the everyday diet of Koreans. These food officials emphasized the value of milk in supplementing protein, fat and

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[42] Ref. 1484-5; ref. 1514, #84-86; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.

[43] *Pogŏn Sahoe T'onggye Yŏnbo, 1955-7* (Seoul, 1957).

[44] From Warne, CINCREP, Seoul, to ICA, Title I import, November 4, 1957, no.1514; #86; HQ; RG 469

[45] Ibid.

vitamin B to balance this overwhelmingly carbohydrate-concentrated eating practice.[46] At the same time, the U.S. officials paid less attention to the complaints against milk, or assumed that Koreans had seemingly overcome the bodily discomfort and personal dislike of milk in a matter of three years. The Americans observed the milk-feeding program as an objective transaction between the availability of surplus foods and the need of the hungry people, and they interpreted eating milk as a sign of acceptance of the food.

On the other hand, when Korean newspapers and state officials referred to eating powdered milk or milk gruel, the food was usually accompanied by descriptions like "not quite to our palate" and by words like diarrhea and stomachache. This unfamiliarity continued to be expressed into the mid-1960s.[47]

In the next chapter, we will see the ways in which this decentralized and personalized connection was engineered by the U.S. Department of State through the case of the American Korean Foundation in 1954. However, even when the images of humanitarian goodwill and decentralized agencies were established, using them to the American political advantage in the Cold War was a wholly different matter. For example, how do you induce Koreans to agree that the sum of individual donors was better than a state, however arbitrarily it may be, giving the same help? What made one better than the other when you received the same material gifts whether from the state or from the people?

A value judgment as such to tell people that humanitarian, religious, and relatively non-political "civilian" assistance was better than the imperial-state sponsorship of foreign aid

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[46] Ref. 1484-5; #84-86; UD 422; RG 469; NACP.

[47] For example, see *Tong'a*, July 20, 1963.

had to be established as an imposition by the power of repetition and indoctrination. One obvious appeal of the relative non-politicality was that it was less threatening to the national autonomy of the Koreans. However, this point alone did not suffice. The rest of the belief system had to be corroborated with the feelings.

The jump from the acceptance of the constructed image of American food-giving to the self-decision for democracy had only one process to rely on, which was to naturalize the preference for democracy, but this did not happen. However, the pre-conceived image of Koreans' choosing democracy was uncannily similar to the image of American citizens' voluntarily donating money to feed children in Korea. The imitative spin-off of this shift worked by giving extra meaning to the image of American humanitarian assistance, and thus, it was supposed to be replicated by the Koreans in their choice for democracy, as if on an imperial scale. In this, Americans existed in the same imaginary space as a future possibility for Koreans, thus drawing affinity.

The following chapter 4 will reveal Cold War political considerations, and explore the partnership between the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and U.S. voluntary agencies. The next chapter discusses the Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of U.S. Public Law 480 of 1954, which authorized the U.S. Department of State to donate surplus food obtained by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to U.S. voluntary agencies and international organizations. Thus, U.S. voluntary agencies and international organizations were able to superimpose the image of humanitarian assistance on food relief programs because the U.S. government donated surplus food to them for free.

CHAPTER 4. C.A.R.E. AND THE NEW COLD WAR POLICY, 1955-1962:[1]

When the U.S. voluntary agencies donated, when the U.S. citizens donated,. . .

> (On May 22, 1954, the government in the east-zone of Germany sent a a sixty-car freight train full of material assistance to North Korea as a present)
>
> . . . it (East German train freights to North Korea) is not a people making a free offering, as is being done by the American people, but the Communist Government of East Germany, acting officially and with all of its governmental powers.
>
> But, however the Communists may go about it, we must surpass them. The 60 cars spoken of in the dispatch are a mere bagatelle to what the American people are willing to give (to South Koreans).
>
> Remember, the Communists are trying to keep their hold on the reluctant people of North Korea. Remember, we American people are trying to show our sympathy to the people of South Korea, who fought voluntarily at our side, who are as one with us in their opposition to Communism, and who deserve every ounce of help that we can give them for the reconstruction of their country.
>
> LOOK AT WHAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE DOING AND THEN SEE THAT WE DO MANY TIMES AS MUCH!
>
> - a telegraph from Henry C. Alexander, National Campaign Director of the American Korean Foundation, received by the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul on 30 June 1954 (unknown number of recipients in the U.S. Department of State)

Previously in chapter 3, the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul, subordinate to the U.S. Department of State, observed that the UNICEF milk-feeding program having a number of political advantages: through the donation of powdered milk to school children, UNICEF mobilized the Koreans in public ceremonies of the program's inauguration, educated them on nutritional science and hygiene at local community levels, and garnered

[1] CARE stood for the Cooperative for American Relief to Europe. It was one of the largest U.S. voluntary agencies in Korea. It changed its name to the Cooperative for American Relief to Everywhere in 1955.

much publicity that fostered a friendly attitude towards UNICEF and the Korean Civilian Assistance Command (KCAC). Beginning in 1955, according to Title III of U.S. Public Law 480, the U.S. government donated ten times more surplus grains to U.S. voluntary agencies in Korea in order to de-emphasize the government's role and make the agencies appear to be the original donors. While I do not suggest that the reports from the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul on the UNICEF milk program had any direct effect on the legislation of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (PL 480), because of this U.S. Congressional legislation, U.S. voluntary agencies were able to channel much more U.S. government-donated surplus grains to Korea, resulting in humanitarian food relief. This chapter focuses on Title III of PL 480, which co-opted international organizations and U.S. voluntary agencies in the U.S. government's foreign food assistance programs.[2]

The image of foreign voluntary agencies and international organizations delivering milk gruel to children in South Korea was fed into the production of metaphors of the American cold war in the mid-1950s.[3] U.S. state officials, political personages and the media that were invested in constructing an artificial dichotomy between the United States and the Soviet Union used invoked image to visualize a difference between the humanitarian assistance of individual American citizens and, according to the U.S. rhetoric, political manipulation by the unfeeling Communist state that used food as a tool for compliance. The interested U.S. state

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[2]"Foreign Voluntary Agencies in Korea" was the name that the non-governmental charitable agencies had given to themselves; In Korean, Oekuk Minkan Wŏnjo Tanch'e; for definition, see p. -. *KAVA Directory of Foreign Voluntary Agencies in Korea*, 1955; *Pogŏn Sahoe Paeksŏ,* Pogŏn Sahoe Pu, 1965.

[3] Koreans translated, Foreign Voluntary Agencies as Foreign Civilian Aid Organizations (Oekuk Minkan Wŏnjo Tanche). The appellation used U.S. official documents, foreign voluntary agencies, does not have the equivalent of "minkan," which meant "civilian."

officials, political personages and the media began putting an emphasis on the voluntary nature of donations made by U.S. citizens, and on the imagined individual connection between American donors and Korean recipients. This imagined person to person connection was possible because the Koreans were told that voluntary agencies donations were from individual citizen's donations. If fact, using the fund appropriated in U.S. Congress, the U.S. Department of State donated surplus food to international organizations and voluntary agencies for free. Importantly, by not emphasizing its own role as the original donor, U.S. government made it possible for international organizations and voluntary agencies to invent and superimpose an image of humanitarian food relief on U.S. food assistance.

This voluntary agency program, Title III of PL 480, was a parallel addition to the continued state-to-state supply of surplus food, which was re-instated as Title I of the same legislation. The U.S. Department of State's donation of surplus food to voluntary agencies only counted for ten percent of the amount that the U.S. Department of Agriculture sold and the Department of State donated directly to the South Korean state under Title I. However, despite its small amount, the voluntary agency program (Title III) of PL 480 played a disproportionately important role in promoting an image of humanitarian food assistance. This chapter explains the two-step mechanism of the humanitarian image that was politically useful in U.S. cold war strategy. Firstly, Title III program of PL 480 made it appear as if the donors were multiple, and decentralized. Secondly, publicity campaign for voluntary agency donations further broke down the donors into individual American citizens, voluntarily contributing their fifty cents and one dollars to help the Koreans.

Chapter 4. C.A.R.E.

Politically, the civilian humanitarian approach produced a necessary difference to differentiate American aid from the communist ones. It differed from the militarily motivated food assistance by the US military covered in chapters 1 and 2 (1945-1955). In chapter 1 and chapter 2, despite the large-scale aid of new food such as wheat-flour and powdered milk, Koreans did not take food aid as a valid reason to choose democracy over communism. One of the reasons why food did not make Koreans more amenable to democracy was that it was not effective in comparison with North Korea. The visual satires in newspapers had capitalized on an image in which the Americans and the Communists were wooing Koreans to choose one side over the other. The irony was set in as the Koreans did not see a difference between the Americans and the Russians, neither in their foods nor in their politics. However, when the Americans could take advantage of the humanitarian image, it provided the content with which the recipients could easily favor. The U.S. government hoped that this goodwill created by the universal appeal of humanitarianism would lead the Koreans to choosing democracy.

The current chapter establishes the year 1955 as a turning point in which the U.S. put the voluntary agency programs in operation, as amended in Title III of Public Law 480. In 1955 American foreign food relief policy went from military (postwar) command to civilian (longer-term) strategy. 1955, as will be shown, was also the year that U.S. foreign relief turned its direction in a major way from Europe to Asia. The U.S. Department of the Army gave the control to the International Cooperations Administration. One of the change was using voluntary agencies to distribute food to relief recipients in foreign nations.

Chapter 4. C.A.R.E.

Food assistance was personalized and humanized in South Korea as it was propagandized as given by individual American citizens. Decentralizing and multiplying the distributing agents was a strategy played by the officials in the U.S. Department of State who had learned through trial and error that giving food alone did not convince Koreans to turn to democracy. Receiving food was one thing, but voting politics was another. On the other hand, the concept of humanitarian food relief opened up new ways of promoting politics for the United States by building the bridge between food and politics.

In fact, the process went a stage further, as we see from the quotation in the beginning of the chapter. Beyond the institutional representations of the agencies, foreign food aid in South Korea simulated the image of private citizens of the "Free World" making small contributions, say, five cents a day, to feed a child in Korea. The image delineated an imaginary people-to-people connection between American donors and Korean recipients. Thus, the image played its part in producing the difference by humanizing and personalizing American food aid. Thereby, the humanitarian assistance of the United States opened a means of promoting politics by penetrating everyday life.

When the U.S. government adapted the Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of PL 480, it had significant impacts on food relief organizations in Korea as U.S. organizations comprised the majority of foreign voluntary agencies operating. According to the registration record at the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social affairs in 1955, thirty-two agencies out of forth foreign voluntary agencies were from the United States. In 1965, U.S. voluntary agencies accounted for sixty-four agencies out of ninety-three foreign agencies agencies. The

rest of the agencies were based in West Germany, Italy, Britain, Australia, France, Swiss, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan, and Norway. The national origin of three agencies were unaccounted.[4]

However, before jumping into the Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of PL 480, let us first investigate the relationship between the U.S. Department of State and a voluntary organization, called American Korean Foundation.

AMERICAN KOREAN FOUNDATION AND HELP KOREA TRAIN[5]

The American Korean Foundation (AKF) showed a deeper involvement of the Department of State in the business of foreign voluntary agencies, and the AKF can been seen as a precursor to the changing agenda of many voluntary agencies in the mid-1950s. The American Korean Foundation was established in New York in 1952 in order to raise money and materials to help rehabilitate the war-devastated Korea. Thus, the agency was late-born, compared to other major voluntary agencies like the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) and the NCWC (National Catholic World Council (NCWC) which were established during the Second World War. Although the AKF sent more surplus industrial items than surplus foods, the American Korean Foundation is relevant to our discussion because its relationship with the Department of State was gradually followed by other

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[4] *KAVA Directory of Foreign Voluntary Agencies in Korea* (Seoul, 1955); Pogŏn Sahoebu, *Pogŏn Sahoe Paeksŏ* (Seoul, 1965); Foreign Voluntary Agencies in Korea, or KAVA, was the name that the non-governmental voluntary agencies had given to themselves.

[5] American Korean Foundation in Korean was Hanmi Chaedan.

voluntary agencies, especially by CARE after 1955. Therefore, the story of the foundation shows the changing role assumed by voluntary agencies in the mid-1950s.

From its inception, the American Korean Foundation was the product of the American Cold War. The Cold War machinery-quality of the foundation could be seen from the letter circulated to the USOMs (U.S. Operations Missions) by Henry C. Alexander, National Campaign Director of the American Korean Foundation. Alexander's letter concerns the Help Korea Trains, which were AKF's most ambitious program of raising 500 carloads of relief materials from the American public to help Koreans. However, the American effort was pre-empted by the East Germans who sent sixty car-loads of relief train to North Korea before the Americans implemented the project. Alexander accuses the East Berliners of imitating the AKF project. In his letter reacting to the article in the Associated Press published on May 21, 1954, he gives detailed comparison of the two rival projects.[6] In his emotionally charged language, the National Campaign Director of the AKF advocates the superiority of the American trains to the Communist ones.

Look at what the Communists are doing!

Apparently word got quickly to Moscow because there has now appeared in American newspapers the following dispatch from the Associated Press

[AP Article] Berlin-Korea Train Off: BERLIN, May 22, AP- A sixty car freight train left East Berlin last night for North Korea. "Tägliche Rundschau," official newspaper organ of the Soviet military administration, reported today. The train, a present from the Communist East Zone government to the North Korean Reds, was loaded with tractors, furniture and textiles." (End article)

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[6] Associated Press; The Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul had kept the letter, receive stamped on June 30, 1954. C.2586; #16; 1276; RG 469

But in this dispatch it is not a people making a free offering, as is being done by the American people, but the Communist Government of East Germany, acting officially and with all of its governmental powers.

But, however the Communists may go about it, we must surpass them. The 60 cars spoken of in the dispatch are a mere bagatelle to what the American people are willing to give.

Remember, the Communists are trying to keep their hold on the reluctant people of North Korea. Remember, we American people are trying to show our sympathy to the people of South Korea, who fought voluntarily at our side, who are as one with us in their opposition to Communism, and who deserve every ounce of help that we can give them for the reconstruction of their country.

LOOK AT WHAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE DOING AND THEN SEE THAT WE DO MANY TIMES AS MUCH![7] (capital letters in the original)

From what we can gather in the AP article and Alexander's letter, the Americans and the Soviets were essentially doing the same thing, of sending relief materials to their respective friendly nations. However, Alexander argues that the two trains were vastly different in their intentions and methods. First of all, the American "people" were sending much more than the East Germans. More importantly, he argues that the American trains were made more meaningful because individual U.S. citizens spontaneously donated to help Koreans. In other words, Alexander is imposing an extra meaning to the sum of voluntary contributions as something better than a project carried out by a government. Thus, the East Berlin train was denigrated for having been sent, supposedly, by the state at the expense of its people. While Alexander does not explain why one is worthier than the other, the decision was obviously a value judgment driven to the point by the sheer power of repetition and propaganda. In his own propaganda, he made use of the dichotomy between "the American people" and "the Communist Government of East Germany."

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[7] C.2586; #16; 1276; RG 469

The Help Korea Train, which Alexander discusses in the excerpt, was the American Korean Foundation's most publicized program. With the campaign slogan, ""Help Koreans Help themselves," the foundation introduced a freight called "The Freedom Express" to the public in New York on April, 20. This first Help Korea Train departed the city on the next day to cross the nation from the East Coast to the West Coast.[8] After a six week journey, the train arrived in San Francisco Bay Port, loaded with relief materials for Korea. The foundation had five such Help Korea Trains, and together, they had toured around seventy-five cities of the United States by early June.[9] The U.S. manufacturers and citizens donated a locomotive, used buses, pencils, farm animals among many other material supplies. The Help Korea Train campaign put surpluses to use as an official at the Department of State commended, "During the Help Korea Train campaign, we found a reservoir of used capital goods on the surplus inventory lists of large corporations…"[10] The campaign was successful. The foundation had initially called for raising five hundred carloads, but it outperformed the goal and ended up with six hundred carloads of donations instead.

Another part of the Help Korea Train campaign was to raise $10 million in cash for Korean rehabilitation. The pamphlet exhorted Americans citizens that "50 cents will provide [a] child a full day's care."[11] Thus, the readers of the pamphlet in the United States received the image that linked them directly to the nameless face of a child in Korea.

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[8] 1192; #18; UD 422; RG 469

[9] 1169; #18; UD 422; RG 469

[10] 1180; #18; UD 422; RG 469

[11] 1188, 1372; #18; UD 422; RG 469

Moreover, the process of personalization of the charity attains significance because it was seamlessly linked to politics. While giving the image of humanitarian assistance, the campaign at no point dropped its desired political effect. On the contrary, it clearly stated that voluntary donations were meant for far more than the physical sustenance of Koreans. The campaign transplanted the idea to potential donors in the United States that their donations fed Koreans so that they could gain strength "to foster democracy" in Korea by themselves. At the same time, it hinted that Communism and the Korean War had caused misery for Koreans. This causal relationship completed the circular argument in which politics was the fundamental way to be humanitarian, for example, by saving the unfortunate children. The pamphlet says that 50 cents from an American would in the end bring about the political change, which was revealing because of the assumption that went into establishing it. Food was put before politics because it was believed that the naturalization of humanitarian aid inspired Koreans to move to the naturalization of democracy.

However, to put it clearly, the private donations of the campaign were designed and heavily promoted by the U.S. Department of State. The whole idea of the American Korean Foundation had been conceived by the Department of State. Moreover, the Department of State suggested the program to President Eisenhower, who was only happy to agree and gave his full support. However, Alexander all these politics out.

The political engineering could also be seen in the timing of the Help Korea Train. The United States Information Agency "intentionally" timed the American Korean Foundation's Help Korea Train campaign to peak right before the Korean Political Conference at the

International Conference on Far Eastern Problems in Geneva in 1954. On April 5 1954, Stassen at the U.S. Information Agency sent the message in the excerpt below,

> "Trains" project and Foundation's campaign provide ample material for sustained major emphasis, particularly during opening Geneva Conference, in Korea and other countries where usefulness and receptivity permit, to dramatize sincere efforts American people, business and industry to aid in Korean reconstruction by supplementing U.S. Government grants with personal money and material gifts to "help Koreans help themselves," and to demonstrate extensive response American people in aiding other freedom-loving peoples in time of need and recognition Korean sacrifices in cause of freedom. Media will provide stateside coverage.[12]

At the end of the airgram, Stassen advised the officials not to "comment on [the] timing of [the] start of [the] fund drive with opening Geneva Conference." Thus, the political intention was not to be spoken out in public. At the same time, the Train program in the United States was timed also to assure the Koreans that they had their strong allies in the United States at Geneva Conference.

The active propaganda in the media also encouraged much of the private voluntary contributions. The "informational services" such as the national TV-broadcasting systems and movie theaters were mobilized. Stassen continued,

> This campaign will be promoted by informational programs using all information media. Expected for example that Walter Winchell will be master of ceremonies on 3-hour TV program covering all aspects of American-Korean relations.[13]

The Walter Winchell program was played extensively on national TV networks. Not only that, but President Eisenhower himself made an appeal to some 80 million movie-goers in a film on Help Korea Train. With the sponsorship of the Council of Motion Picture

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[12] 1151; #18; UD 422; RG 469

[13] 1153; #18; UD 422; RG 469

Organizations (COMPO), the promotion film was screened in movie houses throughout the United States on October 4, 1954.[14]

The "private citizens" who led the American Korean Foundation came from unusually strong political backgrounds.[15] President Eisenhower made use of his political, media and military contacts to recruit the leading names of the Foundation.[16] The National Campaign Director, Henry Alexander, was President of J.P. Morgan and Company. Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, President of Pennsylvania State University and brother of President Eisenhower, was the honorary chairman. Dr. Howard A. Rusk, Associate Editor of the New York Times and a specialist in the rehabilitation of veterans as well as of war-torn countries, was the President of the foundation. General James A. Van Fleet, the former Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea, was the foundation's Chairman. Other figures included Mrs. Wendell Wilkie to lead campaign for women and Howard Brooks.

When President Eisenhower himself made a request for free transportation of 500 carloads, 138 American railroad companies responded to the President's call and over 600 carloads of gifts were raised during the two months campaign. The freights were shipped to South Korea from the ports of San Francisco, Oakland, Stockton and other West Coast ports. The first ship, Mercy, carrying the Help Korea Train donations, was received with speeches, parties and much fanfare with it arrived in Pusan, Korea, in June, 1954. The short-term event

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[14] 1399; #42; Headquarters of Fast Eastern Operations; RG 469

[15] All information on the American Korean Foundation is from ref. 1150-1152, 1169-1193; #18; UD 422; ref. 1371-1372, 1399; #42, Subject Files, Headquarters Office of Far Eastern Operations; C.2563-C.2587; #16; 1267; RG 469

[16] 1153 and other places

of the “Help Korea Train” continued its shipments until January, 1955.

Now, the U.S. Department of State was anticipated several advantages in channelling surplus food donations through foreign voluntary agencies, or what seemed to appear as a civilian agency like the American Korea Foundation. Firstly, the U.S. government could reduce its level of commitment to provide a set amount of surplus food regularly. This seems to be one of the reasons why when UNICEF discontinued the milk-feeding program in Korea in August 1957, the Office of Economic Coordinator did not consider taking over the program by itself. Instead, the Office looked for voluntary agencies that could take up the job.

Secondly, as mentioned earlier, voluntary agencies could be used to propagate the concept of humanitarian relief food as the UNICEF milk-program did. By diverting attention to civilian parallels, both the U.S. and the South Korean states could avoid political baggages with American imperial motivations and the absence of South Korean autonomy respectively. Furthermore, civilian relief programs had impacts disproportionally large to the size of their programs as they fostered the powerful image of direct contacts between the Americans and the Koreans. Compared to the number of foreign personnel stationed in Korea, which did not go over a few dozens all together, the memory of receiving foods from foreign voluntary agencies stayed extremely strong in many oral and written accounts of ordinary Koreans experience of poverty and hardship in the 1950s.

Thirdly, the voluntary agency programs (Title III) of PL 480 provided channels to bypass giving surplus food directly to the South Korean state. When the South Korean state

controlled the U.S. donated grains, it became the cause of much political corruption. In fact, in direct state-to-state supply (Title I), the U.S. did not have any control over surplus food over the Korean ports. By handing the foods over to the South Korean Office of Supply at the Korean ports, the U.S. officially gave the possession of foods to the ROK state. The South Korean MHSA also distributed foods within Korea. The South Korean government used it as a way of boasting its own competence in newspapers, while deemphasizing that the food was actually given by the U.S. Thus, given the visible roles played by the South Korean state, the U.S. was in an awkward position to complain when the South Korean state claimed credit for securing foods from the United States as the result of its own work. After providing foods for free and also delivering them across the ocean for free, it was not a satisfactory return for the United States.

These advantages of opening up parallel civilian routes through voluntary agencies seemed to have been enough for the Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul, Department of State, to tolerate the inconvenience of double paper work and indirect negotiations. When international organizations and voluntary agencies received powdered milk from the US Department of Agriculture and delivered it to the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, they handled double the amount of administrative paper work. The agencies were required to draw a separate contract with the South Korean government, and again, a different one with the same content with the U.S. International Cooperation Agency. Moreover, the volume of surplus foods that went through international agencies and

voluntary agencies was about one tenth of the volume of grains that the U.S. government channeled through Title I of PL 480 and Section 402.

In general, the U.S. government maintained loose supervision over the activities of foreign voluntary agencies in Korea. Upon approving the programs proposed by voluntary agencies, the government generally did not intervene, and helped where it could to provide funding and surplus foods. Thus, American voluntary agencies had quite a latitude to use the wealth of the U.S. government to further their religious and secular humanitarianism. While there seemed to have a level of convergence in the directions of these voluntary agencies and the U.S. government, which changed the dynamics of the Cold War politics since the mid-1950s, the activities of foreign voluntary agencies in Korea also helped produce an image of decentralized, democratic and humanitarian hegemony. (how do you explain the disgust on eating milk?)

Moreover, U.S. food aid could benefit from the expertise and networks that foreign voluntary agencies had built in Korea since the Nineteenth Century, and appropriate the reputation that had been built by them. The most active agencies like the Maryknolls and the Methodist missions had religious foundation. The western missionaries in Korea also had a reputation as practitioners of modern medical care and education for women and children. When foreign voluntary agencies gave out U.S. government-donated surplus foods, the project was taken as an extension of their larger projects.

As the story of the American Korea Foundation relates to the changes that other voluntary agencies had in 1955, CARE was one of the largest foreign voluntary agencies in Korea that

made active use of supports given by the government of the United States through the Voluntary Agency Program (Title III) of PL 480. CARE was not like the American Korea Foundation that was designed by the Department of State, and led by key politicians in Washington. Nevertheless, the organization, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE, Inc.), shows a set of changes in 1955 that are significant.[17]

CARE was incorporated in 1945 under the law of the District of Columbia with headquarters at 660 First Avenue, New York, NY. Twenty-five religious charity agencies had gathered to organize voluntary people-to-people contributions of Americans and Canadians. CARE had been known as a voluntary agency that specialized in sending relief packages to designated recipients anywhere in the world. In its first decade, CARE's acronym stood for the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, or alternatively, as the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief to Europe. Both expressed the agency's initial focus on relief works in Europe. By 1950, CARE was sending person-to-person packages to twenty-eight countries in the world. Korea was one of them as CARE had operated person-to-person gift parcels program in Korea since the agency entered the country in 1949.

However, Title III of PL 480 of 1954 brought the relationship between foreign voluntary agencies and the U.S. Department of State much closer CARE began forming a closer relationship with the USOMS in 1955. In fact, 1955 was not a mere return to the pre-Korean War order in which voluntary agencies had to go through the CRIK because of the emergency status and military monopoly of the sea and shipping. The cold war rivalry was intensifying

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[17] Until 1955, CARE stood for Cooperative of Assistance and Relief to Europe. C2451

in the post-Postwar period of the mid-1950s in many places of the world. CARE, more than other American voluntary agencies abroad, embraced the newly inaugurated role of American relief works in the American cold war. The change corresponded with the addition of Title III to the Public Law 480 of 1956, which provided for free provisions of surplus agricultural commodities to U.S. voluntary agencies abroad.

CARE's major program in 1955 was "$1 Package Fall Food Crusades." The program's relationship with the ICA was reminiscent of the Help Korea Train Program of 1954 by the American Korean Foundation. The ICA authorized the minimum of $1 million for the program, and the Department of Agriculture had the foods ready. The program also had the support from the Advertising Council for the nation-wide promotion campaign in which CARE called upon the "American public" to contribute $1 for a surplus food package of approximately 20 pounds. Each dollar donated by a citizen was matched in dollar by the ICA. CARE prepared 1 to 1.5 million packages to be distributed in eight to ten economically needy countries, and the list of the countries was under discussion with ICA missions and local governments.[18]

This change in CARE's direction should be considered in conjunction with the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, a.k.a. Public Law 480, authorizing the U.S. government to use surplus agricultural commodities in its foreign policy.[19] Thus, Public Law 480 could be summed up as a surplus food program. PL 480 fund

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[18] C2547-C2550; #16; 1276; RG 469

[19] 68 STAT. Title I, Title II and Title III, Public Law 480, Eighty-third United States Congress, Second Session. P.454-459

could only be used on surplus agricultural commodities from the United States[20] Among the three initial Titles of PL 480, Title III allowed the U.S. government to donate surplus foods to international organizations and U.S. voluntary agencies to distribute in their relief programs abroad.

The Agricultural Trade Act of 1954, Title III of U.S. Public Law 480

From 1955, U.S. Department of State donated free food to U.S. voluntary agencies in Korea according to Title III of Public Law 480. The program continued till the South Korean government integrated all voluntary agency programs to its national development program in 1966. Thus, the U.S. government decided to enlist the voluntary agencies in its endeavor for foster the image of humanitarian relief. This chapter begins with 1955, when PL 480 Title III was put into effect and when the U.S. cold war rhetoric of American vs. Soviet dichotomy was established. The direct state-to-state transfer of surplus food continued as before in Title I of Public Law 480 while Title III was newly instituted in 1955. Each title had a parallel role to play. Title I, direct state-to-state supply continued to serve the Cold War military purpose, and this will be discussed in chapter 5. Although the surplus grain supply through voluntary agencies was only about 10 percent of the direct state-to-state supply in Title I, the enlistment of the voluntary agencies had significance beyond the number of tons of grains they transported.

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[20] 1288; #29; UD 422; RG 469

Chapter 4. C.A.R.E.

PL 480 reflected an institutional reconfiguration in the United States from the Army to the Department of State with regards to foreign policy. From 1955, Koreans started receiving bags of aid goods, printed with the emblem of the U.S. International Cooperation Agency (ICA). The ICA was the agency that replaced the former Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in the Department of State. Section 305 of Public Law 480 required the statement, "Furnished by the people of the United States of America," to be written on the bag both in English and in Korean. Until the end of 1954, the U.S. War Department had been in charge of the civilian affairs in Korea, making it the source of administrative and military power for a decade after the end of the Pacific War (1930-1945). The military control continued for two years after the Armistice Agreement till 31 March 1955 with the new Korean Relief, Rehabilitation and Defense support Program, 1953-1955.[21] In November 1954, a year after the armistice of the Korean War in 1953, U.S. civilian officials took over the control of civilian affairs in Korea from the War Department. In March 1955, the Department of Army cut funding for the non-military agencies in the process of hand-over, terminating CRIK's SUN and SKO programs.[22]

The Public Law 480 was the legislation for the International Cooperations Agency under the U.S. Department of State to continue the food relief programs that the U.S. military had carried out during the wartime emergency. While many of the major features of the legislation were continuations of the Army's civilian relief programs in Korean, the most

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[21] 1954; #12; 1276; RG 469. Also, see 1068; 4B; UD 422; RG 469

[22] 469 1276 A few exceptions may have been possible, but I could not find an example; The Department of the Army was formed as one of the three military departments within the U.S. Department of Defense in 1947.

noteworthy change was in expanding the role played by international organizations and U.S. voluntary agencies abroad, Title III of PL 480. Thus, by forming a close relationship with voluntary agencies, PL 480 provided the legal and administrative structure for humanitarian food relief programs. In order to make the transition from military to civilian control smooth, the Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul had been established in 1953. The office was strengthened in 1955 with the responsibility over civilian relief programs. C. Tyler Woods, known as Ty Woods, was appointed as the Economic Coordinator in 1955.

Most importantly, U.S. Public Law 480 was a surplus food program. That Public Law 480 only pertained to U.S. surplus agricultural commodities was a change from the pre-1955 relief program. Previously, foreign voluntary agencies and international organizations like the UNICEF distributed non-surplus food items, as well as surplus food, and non-surplus medical and educational materials, funded through private donations. However, Public Law 480 only pertained to U.S. agricultural surpluses, and it only donated surplus food and subsidized ocean freight costs only on transporting U.S. surplus food.

However, voluntary agency program (Title III) was, in key aspects, a continuation of the prior system supervised the U.S. Army. Even before the inauguration of Title III of PL 480, U.S. voluntary agencies had already been donating significant amounts of surplus foods to Korea and other countries in the world. This surplus food had been donated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. U.S. donated surplus food included dry skim milk, butter and cheese. From July 1953 to June 1954, twenty-seven U.S. voluntary agencies received surplus food from the Department of Agriculture to send to sixteen different nations worldwide. The

recipient-countries were Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Trieste, Yugoslavia, Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Lebanon, India, Pakistan, Formosa (Taiwan), Hong Kong, and Korea. According to the reports submitted to the Foreign Operations Agency, together the voluntary agencies donated 145,395,132 pounds of surplus foods, and 76,087,673 pounds of the sum of non-surplus foods, clothing, medical and other supplies for the duration in the same period from July 1953 to June 1954. Thus, the U.S. Department of Agriculture-donated surplus foods comprised 65.6 percent of the total volume of voluntary agency donations. In dollar value, free donation of U.S. surplus took up 63 percent of the total. Thus, even before the inauguration of Title III of PK 480, U.S. Department of Agriculture donated surplus food was already a significant percentage, and channeling it was the major project of the voluntary agencies not only in Korea but in many other nations.[23]

The U.S. Department of Agriculture had been authorized to donate surplus agricultural commodities to voluntary agencies under the Section 416b of the Agricultural Act of 1949.[24] The volume of foods that foreign voluntary agencies imported for the aid programs in Korea was only a fraction of what the government of the United States donated.[25] Powdered milk was one of the food items that voluntary agencies shipped, but the volume was never very substantial. However, the legal structure for American voluntary agencies sending U.S. government-donated surplus foods abroad had been there since 1949, and the practice was

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[23] FOA documents. cc.2506- 2511; 1276; RG 469

[24] 81-439. 7 USC. 1431, enacted on October 31, 1949. ICA, "Voluntary Foreign Aid Division of the Office of the Assistant Director for Refugees, Migration and Voluntary Assistance,"

[25] "Authorized Importation of Relief Supplies into Korea by Voluntary Agencies Under HQS. KCAC Memorandum #2," c.2530-2544; #16; 1276; RG 469

resumed in 1955, two years after the Armistice of the Korean War, but this time, the volume was ten folds of what it had been in pre-Korean War period. The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, also known as Public Law 480, Section 302 was based on the Agricultural Act of 1949 with amendments.[26]

In addition, CARE was one of the voluntary agencies that were eligible for subsidies on the costs of ocean freight. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Department of State subsidized the costs of ocean freight incurred by voluntary agencies since 1949. By signing the Voluntary Relief Agreement on May 5, 1949, the Republic of Korea was included in the list of the countries to which voluntary agencies could use the U.S. government subsidies on shipping costs. [27]

The cost of ocean freight was prohibitively expensive. Thus, the subsidy played a crucial role in promoting American voluntary agencies to ship aid materials overseas. From the U.S. ports to Korean ports, the voyage took thirty to thirty four days across the Pacific Ocean. Ocean freight cost approximately one tenth of the dollar value of the materials in transit.[28] From August 1953 to June 1954, the U.S. Foreign Operations Agency disbursed $830,000 for the costs of ocean freight to sixteen nations when the total dollar value of aid materials were

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[26] Relief-Voluntary Ocean Freigh ; #16; 1276; RG 469

[27] Essentially, the same agreement was made with Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Trieste, Yugoslavia, Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Lebanon, India, Pakistan, Formosa, Hong Kong, and Korea. ref. 1389; #42, Subject Files, 1950-1959; HQ; RG 469

[28] The large ocean freight cost was one of several reasons why the ICA wanted import materials from Japan to Korea.

$9 million.[29] In Korea, the subsidy was given on the condition that at least half of the tonnage be carried on U.S. ships. While this subsidy applied to all aid materials, including clothing, medical supplies, and machineries, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act of 1954 (Public Law 480), and the Agricultural Act of 1956 (Public Law 540) only applied to surplus agricultural commodities.[30] The main amendment in the mid-1950s was that the subsidy was drawn from the Mutual Security Fund, and no longer from the integrated Korean Program fund. The ROK government gave duty free entry of aid materials. It also agreed to pay the costs of inland transportation within Korea, but usually fund was defrayed from the Counterparts Fund.

Thus, the novelty of Title III was not in the structure of cooperation between voluntary agencies and U.S. government, but on the increased quantity and intensity of their relationship. Foreign voluntary agencies began handling U.S. surplus foods, increased ten times when the U.S. Eighth Army dissolved the CRIK (Civilian Relief in Korea) in 1955.[31]

In addition, although it was not specified, after Title III in 1955, the turn to Asia from Europe in U.S. foreign assistance policy became clear. This, in turn, influenced the activities of foreign voluntary agencies. In Financial Year, 1953-4, voluntary agencies had focused more on programs in Europe, Lebanon, and India than in East Asia. As we will see later, it began to change around 1955 and voluntary agencies turn their attention towards East Asia.

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[29] "from August 11, 1953 through the balance of the fiscal year, ... valued at $9 million with amount reimbursed for ocean freight totaling $830,000." ref. 1389; #42; HQ; RG 469

[30] 1542; #86; HQ; RG 469

[31] 8 million pounds of foods in total from 1950 to 1954.

In 1955, CARE decided to discontinue several programs in Europe and Latin America, and to strengthen its Asian and Middle Eastern programs. William McCahon of the ICA attributed the new veering to CARE's new leadership. Richard W. Reuter had succeeded Paul Comly French as Executive Director on July 14, 1955.[32] In the report, McCahon noted Reuter's plan "to encourage the closest possible liaison and cooperation between the CARE Mission Chiefs and the embassies and USOMs."

Reuter was not merely paying a lip service. The changes CARE made converged closely with the view of the U.S. Department of State which considered the post-Postwar reconstruction winding down in Europe and in Japan, and a new cold war structure consolidating in Asia. In an unofficial memorandum on August 15, 1955, he informed the USOMs that CARE was closing offices in Japan, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. In addition, CARE was also closing down "Sales offices" in Benelux, England, France, Austria and Australia, and the post of regional director was abolished. Further, regional offices in Singapore, the Island of Cyprus, Bonn, Panama and Peru were being closed. On the other hand, CARE maintained full-scale package and self-help programs in Finland, Berlin, West Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Israel, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, India, Haiti, Panama, and Bolivia. The programs in Columbia, Honduras, Egypt, Philippines, and Mexico were downsized. Reuter announced that in 1955, the emphasis would be on programs in Korea, Vietnam and Laos.

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[32] cc.2547-2550; #16; 1276; RG 469

Before the 1955 amendment of Title III, free dispersal of surplus agricultural products to voluntary agencies had been limited to short-term emergency programs under the provision of Title II of the same law promulgated in 1954. CARE found Title III amendment directly relevant to its surplus agricultural commodities programs. CARE already sponsored bulk surplus agricultural products programs in Finland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Panama, Bolivia, Columbia, Honduras, and Egypt in 1955. In addition, the agency was looking to expand the program by negotiating with El Salvador, Libya, Malta, Indonesia and Peru (1956).[33]

Interestingly, just as Title III gave American voluntary agencies the access to the Department of Agriculture's warehouse of surpluses stocks, CARE introduced a 35 percent cut in its annual funding for 1955. At the same time, Reuter announced that CARE planned to maintain, or exceed the previous year's performance, that was, despite the reduction of $1,035,000 in its funding.[34] In the previous year, 1954, CARE had moved $43 million worth of commodities overseas. CARE, with Reuter as new Director, terminated a number of projects in several regions in order to cut operational expenses. Instead, its new strategy was to concentrate on fewer number of countries where CARE could make noticeable differences. Although Reuter did not cite Title III of Public Law 480 as the agency's new sponsor, Title III funding was a reliable and substantial resource for its overseas programs.

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[33] Unofficial memorandum by Richard W. Reuter, CARE, to William McCahon, ICA. cc.2547-2550; #16; 1276; RG 469

[34] CARE's 55-56 budget was 1,945,000 dollars was reduced by thirty five percent from its 54-55 budget. Unofficial memorandum by Richard W. Reuter, CARE, to the ICA. August 15, 1955. cc.2547-2550; #16; 1276; RG 469

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In 1955, foreign voluntary agency had to register with the U.S. International Cooperations Agency and the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in order to receive material and administrative support from the U.S. government. Sixteen foreign voluntary agencies registered with the governments by August 1955. They were American Friends Service Committee, American Korean Foundation, Assemblies of God-Foreign Service Committee, Church World Service, Inc., CARE, Inc., Foster Parents' Plan for War Children, Lutheran World Relief, Mennonite Central Committee, Pestalozzi Foundation of America, Ind., Salvation Army, National Headquarters, Save the Children Federation, Unitarian Service Committee, War Relief Services- NCWC (National Catholic Welfare Council), World University Services, YWCA World Emergency Fund. In December 1955, fifty four percent of the total that sixty-one foreign voluntary agencies processed in dollar value was food. By May 1957, the number of registered foreign voluntary agencies increased to sixty seven.[35]

The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the South Korean state defined "foreign voluntary agencies" as organizations that were registered with the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and the International Cooperation Administration, Washington, D.C.[36] The term, foreign voluntary agencies, was also used to call the members

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[35] 1535; #86; HQ; RG 469

[36] List of Voluntary Agencies approved by ROK MHS and the ICA Aug 23 1955 were American Friends Service Committee, American Korean Foundation, Assemblies of God-Foreign Service Committee, Church World Service, Inc., CARE, Inc., Foster Parents' Plan for War Children, Lutheran World Relief, Mennonite Central Committee, Pestalozzi Foundation of America, Ind., Salvation Army, National Headquarters, Save the Children Federation, Unitarian Service Committee, War Relief Services - NCWC (National Catholic Welfare Council), World University Services, YWCA World Emergency Fund. In total, there were fifteen agencies. By May 1957, the number of agencies increased to sixty seven. 1535; #86; HQ; RG 469. Also see,1395-1398; #42; HQ; RG 469

of the Korean Association of Voluntary Agencies, which was non-governmental foreign charity organizations.[37] The voluntary agencies and the ICA-MHSA formed and maintained close relationships. In turn, the voluntary agencies were required to submit regular reports of their activities every six months. Sixty-one voluntary agencies were registered in 1955, and the number increased to sixty-seven in 1957.[38]

Especially, CARE's taking up the milk-feeding program in 1957 could not be fully explained as a continuation of the prior division of labor between voluntary agencies and the U.S. government. First of all, the milk-feeding program differed from CARE's more typical overseas programs in crucial aspects. The milk program, inherited by UNICEF, was an annual contract with the South Korean government on the national scale. A contract for 40 million pounds of surplus milk per annum was different from donating whatever was available at hand, which in any case was hardly ever over a couple of million pounds of foods a year. While CARE milk program served 1.2-1.5 million people, the total sum of people that all other foreign voluntary agencies in Title III programs were 400,000. An ICA report showed that for 1960, Title III were given to seven agencies- National Catholic Welfare Council (NCWC), Church World Services (CWS), Lutheran World Relief (LWR), Cooperative for American Remittances Everywhere (CARE), World Relief Commission (WRC), ACC and Mennonite Central Committee (MCC). The report also noted that these seven agencies served the total of 400,000 recipients in the family category for 1960. In 1960, the monthly ration of wheat-flour was reduced from 4 pounds to 3 pounds. The

[37] KAVA 1952-1995

[38] 1535; #86; HQ; RG 469

cornmeal ration was reduced from 6 pounds to 3 pounds per month.[39] Family projects were one of many projects that the voluntary agencies carried out.

In a way, by taking up this milk program, CARE was giving up an important right for a voluntary agency, which was choosing the relief recipients. For the milk program, the South Korean Ministry of Education did the supply. Moreover, the program particularly excluded the aspect of direct personal connection between donors and recipients that CARE had been emphasizing. The milk was single-handedly funded by the ICA under the provisions of Title III of Public Law 480. In addition, the ROK Ministry of Education of South Korea was in charge of distributing the milk to schools in Korea. Overall, CARE's presence in the program did not go much beyond rending its name, "CARE milk", and the agency had a very limited chance of establishing contacts with the end-users, the children. Yet, CARE decided that someone should take on the responsibility, and the organization volunteered for the milk program.

CARE's Milk-Feeding and School-Lunch Programs

When UNICEF terminated its milk-feeding program in August 1957, the Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul did not take over from UNICEF directly, but searched for candidates among voluntary agencies to take over the program. Thus, USG was able to maintain the civilian humanitarian assistance.

[39] Exact figures for each voluntary agency for milk, cheese, flour, rice, cornmeal, see 1590-1591. 1585-1589

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Given the benefits of milk-feeding programs mentioned in chapter 3, the ICA mission to Korea recommended the Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul to continue funding the milk feeding program in Korea. The minimum requirement of powdered milk in Korea was estimated at 18,000 metric tons annually, thus maintaining the amount UNICEF had been supplying.[40] When ICA was searching for candidates to take on this large-scale program, Paul Gordon, CARE Headquarters Representative in Asia, expressed his interests in the program. On April 5, 1957, Gordon cabled his agency, CARE, recommending it to assume the responsibility, now currently managed by UNICEF.[41]

CARE was in a good position to take over the milk-feeding program. The agency already had the standard country relief supply agreement with the Republic of Korea. Thus, Gordon argued that his agency could use the existing distribution channels to get the milk quickly en route. As far as the ICA was concerned, CARE had sufficiently proven competency in similar programs in other places in the world, and in FOA's Christmas Holiday Food Program in Korea in the winter of 1954-1955.[42] Lastly, the remaining partner in the three institutions' joint program, the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, concurred and requested CARE to take over the program from UNICEF.[43]

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[40] 18,000 tons= 40 million pounds. 1340; #50; UD 422; RG 469

[41] 1430; #67; Headquarters of Far Eastern Operations; RG 469

[42] The Christmas parcel operation of 1954 was delayed because of transportation difficulties, and parcels were distributed around the Chinese New Year in January, 1955. 1373; #42; HQ OFF FE OPNS; RG 469

[43] The Office of Economic Coordinator (1953-) was firsts headed by Edward Ty Wood and then by Warne since 1955. Despite the UNC in the title in, the OEC belonged to ICA, which in turn belonged to the Department of State. 1430; #67; HQ; RG 469

Thus, CARE's taking up the milk-feeding program in 1957 should be understood as a cooperative contribution by the agency as the CARE and the ICA converged on their understanding of the world situation in the mid-1950s. On June 1, 1957, CARE signed a two-year contract with the ROK Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to distribute 80 million pounds of U.S. surplus powdered milk to one and half million recipients through primary schools, hospitals, feeding stations and welfare institutions. The annual requirement was divided at 40 million pounds each. CARE's national milk-feeding program was contracted to provide a glass of milk per day per child, giving daily "40 grammes of the commodity as reconstituted liquid skim milk or in its powdered form."[44] In addition, CARE offered to provide cooking equipments such as stoves and pots when they were not available in primary schools. CARE planned to distribute milk to 4,273 primary schools in the country, but only few had cooking facilities. As pointed out during the UNICEF program, children's eating raw powder posed several hygienic problems.[45] The ROK Ministry of Education also made a gesture to put efforts in obtaining cooking facilities and fuel so that teachers could boil and give milk to children in schools.[46]

The only major difference from the UNICEF program was that the ICA, through the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Department of State, provided the costs of ocean freight for the CARE program. UNICEF had paid for its own ocean freights. The cost of ocean freight

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[44] Unit converted to 22,679.6 metric ton of milk and 13,607.8 metric ton of cornmeal. 1883; #169; UD422; RG 469

[45] *Chosŏn Ilbo*. May 19, 1957. p3.

[46] *Tong'a*. June 17, 1964

from the United States to Korea was prohibitively expensive, taking up one tenth of the total dollar value of the shipments, including the commodity. UNICEF disbursed approximately $800,000 a year on ocean freights to Korea. The willingness by the ICA to step in and cover the costs of ocean freight indicated the considerable change in thinking on the side of the U.S. Department of State regarding the milk distribution in Korea. When searching for an appropriate agency to take over the UNICEF program, the Office of Economic Coordinator, Seoul, recognized that no foreign voluntary agency in Korea was capable of running the program of this size without financial assistance. The Combined Economic Board of the Americans and Koreans authorized the ICA to expend $200,000 from U.S. funding and $101,000 from Counterparts fund to provide ocean freight charges for the first three months of 1958 in order for the milk distribution to continue without interruption.[47] In addition, Warne, who was the Economic Coordinator in Seoul, requested separate $111,000 for CARE to hire three US staff to supervise the program in Korea and to purchase office equipment, and $84,000 in counterpart funds to hire Korean staff for 1958.[48] Below excerpt is from Warne's cablegram to the ICA/W on April 5, 1957.

> [The ICA] Mission cannot overemphasize the importance of this program from a total health, welfare and economic stand point, and believes its abandonment at this time would greatly aggravate an already serious nutrition situation.
>
> Mission can suggest no feasible alternative to proposed CARE operation and believes situation justified an exception to ICA/W normal policy in respect to voluntary agency participation.[49]

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[47] 1431; #67; HQ; RG 469

[48] Korea- C. Milk, 1430; #67-68, Office of Far Eastern Operations. Korea Subject Files, 1950-1959; UD422; RG 469

[49] 1431; #76; HQ; RG 469

However, despite promising preparatory work, the program immediately fell behind the schedule. When CARE took over the program from UNICEF in September, 1957, it was expected to continue the program without interruption after UNICEF's withdrawal. However, CARE was not able to deliver powdered milk to Korea until July, 1958. The milk feeding program was thus re-introduced only in July, 1958 after a hold of ten months. Through the end of the year, CARE delivered 9 million pounds of powdered milk, which was less than a quarter of annual 40 million pounds under contract.[50] Milk was delayed again in 1959 until May of that year. Supply improved in the next months, but CARE could only procure 20 million pounds of powdered milk for Korea in 1959, which was a half of what had been agreed in 1957.[51]

When Sohn, ROK Minister of Health and Social Affairs, enquired about the prolonged and repeated delay in the delivery of powdered milk since 1958, the answer came from CARE Headquarters in New York that the U.S. Department of Agriculture was not releasing surplus powdered milk to CARE. George D. Taylor, CARE Representative in Korea, relayed the message that the shortage of surplus powdered milk in the United States made it difficult for the Department of Agriculture to obtain the large amount of powdered milk at one place. The Department had to assemble available surplus powdered milk from multiple places scattered in the United States. Thus, powdered milk had to be shipped from multiple ports, which made it necessary to "make shipments in a manner which will provide for six

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[50] *Pogŏn Sahoe T'onggye Yŏnbo, 1958,* P. 212

[51] 1574; #130; HQ; RG 469; Also see *Pogŏn Sahoe T'onggye Yŏnbo, 1959*. P. 278

unloadings at Korean Ports."[52] For reasons unspecified, the Department of Agriculture refused to perform the feat. Nevertheless, Taylor maintained an optimistic view by commenting,

> In short, the Milk Powder was not available... The delay might not be as harmful as envisioned. Due to the closing of schools during January and February the Milk allocated for this period should be sufficient enough to carry over until early May. The majority of our Institutional distributions are also supplied by C.W.S. (Christian World Services) and N.C.W.C. (National Catholic World Council) so there shouldn't be any drastic shortages.[53]

In order to continue the school-feeding program in Korea, CARE and the ICA agreed to amend the original contract of 1957 on December 11, 1959, with the expiration of the contract at the end of the month. They replaced 30 million pounds of surplus milk that was now unavailable with 30 million pounds of surplus cornmeal.[54] For two years, CARE had been able to supply only 30 million pounds of surplus powdered milk instead of the planned 80 million pounds. The amended contract replaced 30 million pounds of surplus milk that was now unavailable with 30 million pounds of surplus cornmeal, and it was given ext ran six months to fulfill the obligation.[55] The U.S. Department of Agriculture was inclined to cancel the remaining commitment of 20 million pounds of powdered milk or cornmeal. However, the ICA and CARE persuaded the Department to carry the 20 million pounds to 1960, further extending the contract to December 1960. The ICA reported that the remaining

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[52] March 19, 1959. 1573; #130; HQ; RG 469.

[53] March 19, 1959, 1573; #130; HQ; RG 469; The statistics collected by the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs only show data on UNICEF and CARE. I could not find out how much CWS and NCWC imported each year.

[54] 1857-1861; #169; HQ; RG 469.

[55] 1857-1861; #169; HQ; RG 469.

delivery of 20 million pounds of powdered milk had been fulfilled by early 1961. However, the ROK Ministry of Health and Social Affairs published receiving less than 1 million pounds of powdered milk for relief use for two years of 1960 and 1961.[56]

Another ICA record showed authorizing the delivery of 9 million pounds of powdered milk for CARE's "school-lunch" program for twelve months' supply in July 1960, but the allocation was canceled in toto later that year. Already, the program was called the "school-lunch" program, and no longer the milk-feeding program. Instead of powdered milk, the supply of surplus cornmeal increased from the original 15 million pounds to 21 million pounds. Thus, 1.2 million children in primary schools, which was one third of approximately 3.5 million students enrolled in primary schools each year, received cornmeal lunches twice a week for the ten months of school year. CARE's other program for 90,000 refugees did not receive any milk since the ICA prioritized children in milk distribution.[57] Despite the effort, the delivery to primary schools was also highly irregular. Sometimes, three or four months went by without any distribution of milk to students. In 1960, all aid milk supply, which was mere 67,800 pounds, went to feed students in primary schools in Chŏlla pukto. As if taking turns, in 1961, all of 1.4 million pounds of powdered milk went to primary school students in Chŏlla namdo.[58] The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs records that for the two years, Seoul and the other 9 provinces did not receive any relief milk.

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[56] In 1960= 67,800 pounds of powdered milk, In 1961= 1,420,600 pounds of powdered milk

[57] Another contract with the MHSA, 5 million pounds of milk and 14,846,000 pounds of cornmeal for the school lunch program. milk receipt not confirmed on October 29, 1960, ref. 1899-1902; #169-170; HQ; RG 469; 2257; #1; P319; RG 469.

[58] *Pogŏn Sahoe T'onggye Yŏnbo,* 1960; 1961.

In order to continue the school-feeding program without powdered milk, CARE experimented with cornmeal and set up a pilot project in Taegu in 1959 and in 1960. It was a hot lunch program for 18,505 students in 43 primary schools in Taegu. Children-without-meals each received two caps of cornmeal twice a week.[59] There were some concerns about the replacement since the milk-feeding program had promoted the nutritional value of milk for child's health. In comparison, cornmeal could not be praised on the same scientific terms. However, despite the worries, Korean educators showed more enthusiasm for cornmeal than for powdered milk, thinking cornmeal was more suitable for feeding children in Korea.

Heartened by the success of the pilot program in Taegu, the ROK Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health and Social Affairs requested CARE to continue and expand the cornmeal lunch program to 4,200 primary schools in Korea. The contract between MHSA-CARE was signed on 13 March, 1961 and stayed in effect through 1961.[60] Based on the MHSA-CARE contract, ICA allocated CARE 38,323,000 pounds, mostly, of cornmeal on July 11, 1961. CARE's new feeding program provided for 1.2 million primary school children for school lunch three times a week and 80,000 individuals in assimilation and refugee projects.[61]

In the meantime, the milk feeding program was de-facto dropped, quite unnoticeably in the Korean press. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs recorded receiving 1.4 million

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[59] ref. 1564; #130; HQ; RG 469.

[60] ref. 1883; #169; HQ; RG 469.

[61] In 1961, the US Department of Agriculture donated 560,000,000 pounds (254,012 metric ton) of non fat dried milk to the world, an increase of 110,000.000 (49,895 metric tons) from last year. *New York Times,* April 21, 1961. ref. 1902; #170; HQ; RG 469;

pounds of relief powdered milk in 1961, 284,840 pounds in 1962, and 4.5 million pounds in 1963. The supply of relief milk was better in 1964 at 30 million pounds.[62] For 1965, CARE-MHSA contract agreed on 24 pounds of cornmeal, 5 million pounds of powdered milk through PL 480, and 7.75 million pounds of other foods.[63] However, the MHSA dropped the relief milk section in the Yearbook from 1955, and I could not confirm the receipt elsewhere.

When the U.S. Department of Agriculture did not hand out surplus powdered milk, the scope of action for CARE was slim. CARE administratively had a limited role. After making a formal request to the Department of Agriculture for the commodity, the agency could only begin work when the department released the milk. It "handled" surplus milk only to the extent of arranging the ocean freights to the ports of discharge in Korea. The milk was handed over to the ROK Office of Supply (Chodal Ch'ŏng) at the ports, from which points, the milk was officially the possession of the South Korean government.[64]

On the other hand, CARE had the capacity to provide technical advice and assistance to the program, and its field team made inspections of port and railroad warehouses.[65] When milk was not available for the school-feeding program in 1959, CARE sent around

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[62] See table 1. and figures from *Pogŏn Sahoe T'onggye Yŏnbo,* 1957-1962. in 1958=45,369d/m (x 200 lbs)= 9,073,800 lbs= 4,050 tons; in 1959= 104,549d/m (x 200 lbs)= 20,909,800 pounds=9,334.7 tons; in 1960=In 1960, 339dm x200=67,800 lb. In 1961, 7,103X200= 1,420,600 lb. In 1962, 14,242 dm (284,840 pounds). In 1963, 22,449dm (=4,489,800 pounds), in 1964, 155,100X 200= 31,020,000 pounds. Much discrepancy with ICA record. which was in 1960, 5 million pounds of milk and 1962= 9 million pounds of milk powder. MHSA shows that most of it were not delivered.

[63] Twenty-four million pounds (10,886 metric tons) of cornmeal, five million pounds (2,268 metric tons) of powdered milk through PL 480. In total of corn, milk and other foods, 30,000,000– 36,750,000 pounds of foods, corn + milk), *Tonga,* June 17, 1964; March 17, 1965.

[64] 1436; #67; HQ; RG 469.

[65] 1869; #169; HQ; RG 469.

educational officers to visit primary schools and distribution centers to provide education on the need to continue the feeding program with cornmeal.[66] Yet, it is questionable if CARE's presence had much impact with the three American employees and a dozen of Korean employees it had to supervise the nations-scale feeding program. Nevertheless, CARE was able to continue the school-feeding program by replacing milk with cornmeal, and it remained the largest school-feeding program in Korea until 1966. By July 1, 1966, foreign voluntary agencies in Korea terminated their school-feeding programs as the ROK government took over the responsibility.[67]

The milk-feeding programs with UNICEF and CARE were as much an ICA program as any other civilian relief programs in Korea. Congress of the United States financed the programs throughout the 1953-1966 period. The ICA gave even more support for the CARE program than for the UNICEF program. The Office of Economic Coordinator in Seoul was the official sponsor of the CARE program and it brought the funding under the provisions of Title III, Public Law 480.

Congress of the United States again stepped in when the South Korean state failed to provide the resources for school lunch program after taking it over from foreign voluntary agencies in 1966. In the end, the U.S. Congress ended up funding the South Korean state to continue the children-feeding program in 1957. Except this time, the funding was given under Title II, which was the emergency relief program, of the Public Law 480, and not under Title III as voluntary agencies had been eligible for. The South Korean government was able

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[66] 1436; #67; HQ; RG 469.

[67] *KAVA 40-nyŏn Sa*, P.113

to feed 2.8 million primary school students and 53,000 recipients under maternal and Child health program with the Title II funding.[68] Or, rather, the US Congress/ICA fed these children.

Regardless, the transition of the program from foreign voluntary agencies like CARE to the South Korean state was significant in the process of constructing the story of national development via children and their education. For example, a short story by Ha Kŭnch'an, "Warm-Blooded," published in *Segye (the World*) in April, 1960, explores a possible venue to move powdered milk from foreign donations to national development. In other words, Ha's story gives a glimpse of appropriation. The child in the story enjoys the taste of powdered milk, but it is still the last resort for survival before turning to eating "grasshopper-gruel (mettugi chuk)." With the tendency towards nationalization, in order to appropriate surplus powdered milk from the United States as a wholly Korean experience, Ha omits the origin of powdered milk. Powdered milk is still an artificial insertion from outside coming into school. However, this milk has now been nationalized at a school in the remote rural area of Korea.[69]

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[68] USOM/Korea April 1967 Status Reports: Food for Peace PL 480. c.6 RG 59/89.

[69] Ha's narrator, Hŏ Sŭng, is a newly appointed teacher in primary school in remote countryside. Hŏ follows the days of a meal-skipping child, Sŏ Kisu, with compassionate eyes, and in the end, he decides to take care of the child with his meager teacher's salary. While the story has a simplistic and didactic plot, it manages to avoid objectifying the meal-skipping child. The boy's status as a recipient of milk aid does not define who the boy is nor his depravity degrade him. Instead, powdered milk is used as a tool to open up the "humane" side of the boy and the teacher. Although powdered milk is meant to relieve the boy from hunger, it keeps slipping out of his possession until a new bundle is given to him only to repeat the process again. It causes more trouble for the boy than helping him. Ha Kŭnch'an, "Onhyŏl chŏk," *Segye*, April 1960, pp.347-355, 245. A contemporary literary critic, Paek Ch'ŏl, appreciated Ha's story for magnifying the "everydayness (ilsangsŏng)" and for directly applying "humanity (hyumaeniti)" to the subject matter, such as powdered milk. Paek Ch'ŏl, *Tong'a*, May 26, 1960.

Thus, “hyumaeniti” is attained not by the state nor by the science of producing and transporting surplus powdered milk across the world. Without mentioning foreign voluntary agencies in Korea or the U.S. government, powdered milk is only traced back to the teacher who has access to powdered milk, and his unreliable employer, the ROK Ministry of Culture and Education.

Ha’s omission of the place of milk’s origin were initially made possible because the identity of the original donor of milk stayed behind the scenes. When the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare distributed surplus powdered milk to children, milk was already sufficiently nationalized.[70] Thus, Ha’s story on powdered milk and the boy moves the issue to the question of national development.

The transition to national development was possible because milk had the potential to represent something beyond humanitarian aid and physical survival. It retained the reference to health and development. Although powdered milk was eaten the same way grains were eaten to fill empty stomachs, milk still retained more meaning from feeding that grains could not have, and this retained meaning had been fostered by UNICEF and CARE, which prioritized children by allocating over three quarters of their donated milk to them. As a supplementary food, milk feeding was meant to bolster the health of the vulnerable sectors such as children and breast feeding mothers, which did not directly translate to military

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[70] Perhaps when Koreans already recognized milk as foreign aid, there may have been little reason to identify donors in the texts. Contemporary readers of Son and Ha likely knew powdered milk as “aid milk (wŏnjo uyu).” The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs published its Annual National Statistical Book from 1955. From 1955 to 1965, the book had an entry, titled “Aid Milk.” It seems that domestic production of milk was too insignificant to deserve mentioning. There was no other section for milk than “aid milk.” The aid milk section was deleted from the statistical book from 1965.

capacity nor to social unrest. “A glass of milk per day per child” captured the organic “growth” metaphor of developmentalism. Feeding children milk was to contribute to raising healthy national bodies for the development in the Third World.

CHAPTER 5.

FEEDING CORRUPTION:

Failed naturalization of wheat flour and the April Revolution of 1960

> That is to say that there may be a "knowledge" of the body which is not exactly the science of its functioning. […] This knowledge and this mastery constitute what one may call the political technology of the body"
>
> Foucault, Introduction to *Discipline and Punishment*, p. 31

Earlier in chapter 1 and chapter 2, wheat flour was associated with the situation of post poverty and U.S. military occupation as recipients received wheat flour as relief rations and as wheat flour was most entirely donated by the US government. If you could afford rice, you ate rice, and turning to wheat flour given as relief ration was the last resort. However, in the late 1950s, the South Korean state made an attempt to remove this stigma against wheat flour and to substitute rice with wheat flour by coopting nutritional scientists. Through the use of scientific language, nutritional scientists re-established wheat flour as a rational and healthy practice. In other words, the state tried to naturalize the consumption of wheat flour by making it politically neutral, but a scientifically proven source of nutrition. If successful, wheat flour would no longer carry the connotation of postwar poverty and the dependency on foreign charities. However, the joint effort by the state and the nutritional scientists did not succeed. Not only did it fail to erase the memory of receiving wheat flour from the United States as relief donations, the state-sponsored effort to neutralize its consumption backfired by gleaning yet another unceremonious association. Given the large scale availability of

wheat flour to the government, wheat flour was regularly used in electoral bribery. Various forms of electoral and political corruption tainted the experience of democracy and the general franchise, and shaped the meaning of democracy as was experienced by the people on the ground in Korea. In this, wheat flour was associated with political and business corruption. Further, the United States which was widely known as the supplier of wheat flour to the corrupt South Korean state was not free from the new association that wheat flour had obtained.

The state-sponsored campaign to make the consumption of wheat flour more desirable was a political indoctrination. The campaign was further a form of corruption since the South Korean state was strongly motivated to import more wheat and wheat flour from the United States because their sales incurred huge profits according to the structure of Title I of US Public Law 480 (PL 480). PL 480 was important because the United States was practically the sole supplier of wheat and wheat flour that was commercially used in South Korea during the 1950s and 1960s, and all the wheat imports were initiated under PL 480 and also the Mutual Security Act.[1]

Teaching Nutritional Wheat in the New South Korean State, 1955-1962

South Korean state established and funded research institutions as a way of coopting

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[1] Industrial and commercial wheat was 95% to 99% U.S. imported until the early 1970s. "Uri nara cheppang kongŏp e taehan hyŏnhwang: kŭ munchejŏm, chwadam hoe, 1974 (Newspaper); In Soo Ryu and Nam Whan Oh, "Bread Baking Characteristics of Korean Wheat Varieties seen from their Amino Acid Composition." *Korean Journal of Food Science and Technology.* Vol 12, No. 3, 1980
ICA calculated domestic production of wheat in Korea at 172,000 tons, and that all of it was consumed by the cultivators, February 1956; i.n.1261; RG

nutritional scientists. The nutritional scientists made efforts to establish eating consumption into science in order to sanitized wheat of politics. If they made wheat as a superior source of nutrition, and part of rational way of life, people could put aside their cultural objection to wheat.

In looking ahead in time and asking whether the naturalization of wheat was successful, it gives varied answers. After five years, assessing wheat imports to Korea, Mr. Green, acting U.S. Economic Coordinator in Seoul, supports ROK request to increase under wheat import under Public Law 480, which we will examine later in the chapter, from $17 million to $22 million for the 1961 program. Green reports to the U.S. Secretary of State that by 1960, wheat had "strong market for flour, reflecting relatively high rice prices and to some extent growing acceptability by low-income groups."[2] Green does not go into detail explaining where he based his observation, but any way had a sanguine outlook on the prospect of wheat in Korea. Maybe we could assume that the food propaganda was successful, but let's see. In any case, the South Korean state policy was not just the lower income groups, but everyone above that would consider wheat as a superior food source, that people with income would make a choice to buy wheat-flour in the market. In making such endeavors towards science, the knowledge from the United States was essential as we will see.

It would not be possible to account for the ascendancy of wheat flour as the substitute for rice in post-1948 South Korean state vision without referring to the political and economic benefits that the state garnered by importing massive amounts of PL 480 wheat. Among

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[2] Mr. Green, Seoul, to the Secretary of State, Washington, No. 406, September 30, 1960; 1692, Agricultural Surplus; #139; HQ, Subject Files, 1950-1959; RG 469

starch food, Koreans were culturally more familiar with potatoes, barley, buckwheat, and millet than they were with wheat flour. They could steam potatoes and barley like they did with rice. In fact, immediately after the Liberation, potato seemed to a promising solution against the shortage of grain. In 1946, USAMGIK in fact imported potato seeds from Fukuoka, Japan, and Ireland specifically to substitute potato for rice.

However, state-sponsored nutritional scientists interrupted to keep potato as the priority substitute for rice by laboring to turn wheat flour into a healthful food. The U.S. government also assisted in the nutritional scientists endeavor to make wheat flour into a popular food.

Under the pretext of the scientific management of militaries, the U.S. Department of Defense sent a team of nutritional specialists to its allied nations, including Iran, Turkey, the Philippines, Libya, Pakistan, Spain and South Korea. Although this committee, which assessed the health of their national militaries was funded by the U.S. Department of Defense, the committee was, in fact, an interdepartmental committee which had its Secretariat in the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH). The U.S. Department of State participated in it together with the Department of Agriculture, HEW, AID and AEC.[3] Of course, the U.S. could only pull off such a feat around the globe only when it had a solution to solve the problems they found in the health tests. From 1956 to 1958, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense in Washington sent around a Committee on Nutrition for National Defense to Iran, Turkey, the Philippines, Libya, Pakistan, Spain and South Korea. Taking care of the bodies, especially the military bodies, was part of an extensive U.S. management of its

[3] From Washington to AIDTO CIRCULAR, February 8, 1963. 2983; #5. Voluntary Agency Programs; P 583; RG 286

allies during the Cold War. The Committee prepared reports on the nutritional conditions of these national militaries, and the U.S. Department of State was ready to give the scientific and material help to supplement the lacking nutritions thus found, contributing to their nation-building endeavors.

The U.S. Committee on Nutrition for National Defense conducted its assessment of the South Korean troops in 1957, and found that South Korean young military men lacked vitamin B in their blood tests samples and health checks. To this finding, the U.S. Nutrition Committee was ready to make its contribution. The committee recommended the U.S. Department of Defense to increase the dose of riboflavin, a form of Vitamin B,in wheat flour they send to Korean military, from 1.2 mg to 3 mg per pound..[4] Supplementary substances like riboflavin could be added in the process of milling the wheat. However, the U.S. Department of Defense was not practicing something unusual and radical in giving reinforced wheat flour to the Koreans. Riboflavin wheat was quite common from earlier times. For example, CARE (Cooperative for American Relief to Europe), a U.S. voluntary agency, had precedents in sending “enriched” white flour to Korea since 1953 from its Philadelphia warehouses.

With the suggestion of the U.S. Nutrition Committee to consume wheat-flour for vitamin B, South Korean nutritional experts easily agreed. The domestic experts cited scientific knowledge on diseases to encourage wheat-eating by warning against rheumatic neuralgia and beriberi, allegedly caused by vitamin B deficiency. In July 1958, a newspaper article

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[4] Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defense, U.D. Department of Defense, *Nutrition Survey of the Armed Forces and Civilians on South Korea,1957*; Other national reports on Iran, 1956; Turkey; the Philippines, November 1957; Libya, December 1957; Pakistan, September 1956; Spain, November 1958.

suggested reducing the amount of rice eating and replacing it with wheat-flour, that was, in order to prevent rheumatic neuralgia.

> Vitamin B1 and vitamin B2 are effective in preventing the deterioration of rheumatic neuralgia. We should reduce the amount of rice eating and consume more wheat-flour, such as noodle and bread. Beans, vegetables, eggs, muscles, and seaweed also has much vitamin B.

In fact, beriberi had been a perennial concern in Korean health since the colonial period, and vitamin B was well-known as a preventative. However, what was new in the late 1950s was that quite suddenly nutritional experts began recommending wheat as a food with vitamin B that people should eat. Attention to vitamin B continued in 1959, and this time the information pointed out that the lack of vitamin B adversely affected the mind, and warns that it was especially damaging to brain activities.

> The lack of vitamin B slows down the brain, brings down mental facilities and memory, and makes eyelids feel heavy. As a result, productive will for life disappears. This is what beriberi in the brain does. We mainly eat rice in our country, and thus we easily lack vitamin B. When the temperature goes up in spring and summer, the lack of vitamin B causes serious damages. It not only causes beriberi in the brain, but also causes sleepiness. One method to prevent the lack of vitamin B is to mix brown rice or barley to fill up three tenth of your rice, or mix rice with wheat-flour. It is also effective to take vitamin pills. You need to find out what's right for you. Families with children who are preparing for school entrance examinations should pay attention not to cause the lack of vitamin B in children.[5]

The last sentence of the article warns the mothers of school-aged children about the danger of vitamin B deficiency. It would have been a serious concern if the mother's hope for her child's upward social mobility would be obstructed by vitamin B deficiency. The adverse effects of vitamin B, which are sleepiness and slowing-down of brain activities, could prevent

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[5] *Tong'a*. May 10, 1959

her child from entering a prestigious schools. This was a very persuasive reason to feed your children U.S. surplus wheat-flour.

While it made sense for the U.S. Department of Defense to donate surplus wheat-flour that the nation's Department of Agriculture was holding in large quantities, the specialist-authors of the U.S. report suggests something beyond military advising. The report emphasized, in more than a couple of places, that exporting rice was the only method for South Korea to acquire foreign currency and to industrialize. In other words, the report was recommending that Koreans export their rice, and import wheat-flour to substitute rice.

The U.S. report on Korean troops did not stay within the military circles, but it was widely publicized to the general public. South Korean nutritional scientists cited this U.S. military tour in an attempt to persuade Koreans to eat wheat-flour. This was part of education campaign in the media called, Improvement on Eating Life (siksaenghwal kaesŏn). In the campaign, nutritionists argued for eating more bread and less rice for health reasons.

When the U.S. nutritional survey team visited in April, in 1957, the team examined both the civilians and the troops. The report indicated that Koreans had insufficient amount of protein, Vitamin A and B, and carotene. Protein can be obtained from wheat-flour. While white rice has six percent of protein, wheat-flour has twelve percent of protein, which is a double of what rice has. Wheat also has better quality of vitamin B1. It is true that brown rice also has much vitamin. However, brown rice is difficult to digest. Despite the vitamin content in brown rice, people avoid eating it if they can afford white rice. Thus, we need to change our main meal to wheat-flour meals (punsik). However, when you eat wheat-flour, try to avoid cooking it in the traditional way such as noodles or sujebi. It is difficult to digest wheat-flour cooked like those. If you can bake bread with yeast or baking powder, it is idea. [. . .] By eating wheat-flour, we can obtain protein and vitamin that lack in our diet, and life will become simplified and the average life span will extend (author's name not given, translation mine).[6]

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[6] *Kyŏnghyang*, January 30, 1959.

This nutritional expert recommends wheat-flour meals (punsik) instead of rice meals, and argues that superior nutrition in wheat flour will make people healthier, and thus they will live longer. It also sounds as if he is imparting a new piece of information when he tells the high protein make-up of wheat flour.

This expert seems well-coopted to the logic of U.S. Committee on Nutrition in choosing wheat flour as a dietary solution for protein insufficiency. When an obvious source of protein would have been meat, the U.S. nutritional report and the South Korean article suggest wheat-flour as a source of protein.

It is true that meat would not have made a feasible solution at the time in Korea. Meat was expensive, and cattle was scarce. Thus, recommending people to intake animal protein would not have helped many people. Previously before 1945, the Japanese colonial state had operated a cow farm in Kangwŏn-do. However, in the debacle after the liberation, the farm's cows were butchered and the farm disappeared. The U.S. Military Government in Korea had made efforts to increase the number of cattle in Korea by importing samples of Berkshire hogs, boars, cows and eggs from the United States. It also run 4-H farms on Cheju Island as model cattle farms. Thus, the author of the article may have made a savvy choice of avoiding recommending meat.

Nevertheless, the author emphasized the relatively high-level of protein in wheat-flour particularly in comparison to white rice. Brown rice was as excellent a source of protein as wheat-flour, but he facilely dismisses it as a solution, and anticipates people's digestive problems after eating brown rice. The collaboration between the U.S. nutrition committee and

South Korean nutritional scientists makes the choice of wheat flour as a food solution suspicious of politics. One gets surprised by how much the U.S. domestic politics of the Farm Bill, agricultural surpluses and rural votes influenced the consumption of wheat-flour in Korea.

However, in the article, the author also advises the readers against preparing wheat-flour as noodles or as sujebi, which was boiled dough balls in clear soup. These were traditionally used recipes, and as we saw in chapter 1, were associated with the poor. At the same time, noodles (kuksu) and sujebi were how most Koreans ate wheat-flour. The newspapers and magazines did not hesitate to impart information on how to eat wheat-flour scientifically.

In the late 1950s, newspapers and women's magazines often featured nutritionally beneficial cooking recipes involving not only wheat-flour, but also fat. Vegetable oil seems to refer to either corn oil or soy oil, both of which the U.S. offered in its list of surplus commodities available for PL 480 imports. U.S. surplus margarine and butter were also available as a source of fat from the list of the Public Law 480 surplus agricultural commodities. *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun had a regular* cooking recipe section, titled "Menu for Today's Dinner." The recipes in this section propagated numerous recipes using both wheat-flour and vegetable oil. Whether it was the result of this cookery propaganda in the print media, soy oil and margarine, which were unfamiliar to Koreans, became quickly popular in Korea. Incidentally, however, butter did not share that popularity, showing that Koreans also had preferences amongst the new foodstuffs.

Both continuities and discontinuities co-existed in the arena of wheat-flour cooking since the upsurge of U.S. surplus wheat-flour. The recipes for food like croquette and tempura had been popular in the print media during the colonial period, and their popularity continued into the post-1945 period. However, donuts and "hotdog," which Americans call "corndog," referring to fried wheat or corn dough over hotdog sausage, were new additions to Korean diet in the post-1945 period. In Japan, which had received more U.S. surplus wheat-flour than Korea in the immediate post-1945 period, this "hotdog" was called "American dog," noting the cultural and perhaps material origin of the food. Also, during the colonial period, the word, "hurai," adapted pronunciation of the English word, "fry," was commonly used in cooking recipes. While both continuations and changes existed since the colonial era, in the 1950s, these cooking methods, using wheat-flour and fat, were emphasized as examples of "rational meal," making it into a universal science.[7]

Technologies innovations followed to tame wheat-flour to local uses. Not many Korean kitchens were equipped with ovens to bake bread. Here, some ingenuities of local adaptation were seen in cooking wheat-flour foods. Korean kitchens traditionally had stoves to steam grains like rice. During the wartime, convenience in cooking was one of the reasons why the recipients of ration preferred barley and corn flour to wheat-flour. However, in the mid-fifties, a new machine was advertised in newspapers. This machine was invented in Japan and it could make bread without baking the dough in the oven. The finished product out of this new machine was similar to American-style white bread of the square shape.[8] This

[7] Central Commerce and Industry Committee, Korean Home Study Conference (Transcription). November 1960

[8] *Tong'a*, May 26, 1955

American-style bread, different from European darker bread loafs, was called meal-bread (sik-ppang) both in Japan and in Korea. The machine to make meal-bread was advertised for having several advantages. The machine made life more convenient since the meal-bread (sik-ppang) could be kept for several days in room temperature whereas women had to cook rice at each meal. The advertisement for the machine also pointed out that an ingredient like wheat-flour was cheap, and wheat-flour could be stored at home for a several months if you did not plan to use it right away. However, baking soda was expensive and hard to procure. For cheaper remedy, another recipe tipped the readers on substituting baking soda with Korean rice wine (makkŏlli) to induce the dough to rise. Thus, making wheat-flour bread was placed within the accessible distance of home cooking.

In all, the nutritionalists, in cooperation of the print media, selected these recipes of wheat-eating (not the traditional recipes) and drew them to the realm of "rational life" that could display an adeptness with modern nutritional science, health management, and home economics education. However, despite the aura of science, which sanitized and universalized the habit of wheat flour eating, Koreans were not willing to eat wheat-flour instead of rice in the 1950s. Moreover, wheat attracted yet another political and cultural meanings in addition to the image as a relief food. Wheat-flour attained media attention as a popular election bribe, and became the food of corruption in Korean politicians' collusion with foreign agencies. Several foreign voluntary agencies allegedly diverted U.S. government-donated wheat-flour to third party politicians in Korea. These will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter, but let us first examine Title I of U.S. Public Law 480 that

structured the distribution lines from the United States to Korea.

The artificial intervention with nutritional make-over of wheat was necessary because by the mid-1950s, the South Korean state was importing more wheat than the amount that its domestic market could absorb. The South Korean state 's reason given to the public for importing excessive amount of wheat was to fund its military spending through the use of U.S. Public Law 480 (PL 480). According to Title I of PL 480 and Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act, the South Korean state could purchase U.S. agricultural surplus at one tenth of its market price. Thus, when the South Korean state sold the imported grains to its domestic buyers, the state earned ninety percent profit.[9] The agreements between the U.S. and South Korean governments made it explicit that the sales proceeds from PL 480 sales must be immediately transferred to the account of the Ministry of Defense, or to Counterparts Fund.[10] However, U.S. ICA officials were aware that the South Korean state used few glitches to defer the transfer. Either the profit went to military spending or elsewhere to private pockets, the more PL 480 grains South Korea imported, the more money flew into the South Korean government's copper. Given the generous term of Title I and Section 402, selling agricultural surplus at one tenth of the price, U.S. officials found dishonest practices of the South Korean officials "extremely disappointing." An official complained that U.S. aid was being "misplaced" to fund the South Korean government's deficit instead of going to military

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[9] Hollister, S/Food, ICA to CINCREP Seoul ICATO, December 14, 1956; 1406-8, Korea-Relief; #62, Subject Files 1950-1959; HQ; RG 469. See also, Agricultural Surplus 1713; #139, Subject Files, 1950-1959; RG 469

[10] 1313-1315; #49; UD 422; RG 469

expenses.[11] Or, the missing wheat-flour could be channeled to political corruption. First, let us examine the structure of Title I of U.S. Public Law 480 that made the South Korean state be enamored with importing more U.S. surplus wheat.

Structurally Feeding Corruption: the Concessional Sales (Title I) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act U.S. PL 480)[12]

The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistant Act (U.S. Public Law 480) of 1954 was a surplus food program of the U.S. government, funded by U.S. Congress. Among its three Titles in 1954, the voluntary agencies program (Title III) of PL 480 was discussed in chapter four. The current chapter examines the concessional sales (Title I) of Public Law 480, in which the U.S. Department of Agriculture sold U.S. surplus agricultural commodities to the South Korean state at one tenth of their market price values. The concessional sales of surpluses funded three activities: Private company trade between U.S. sellers and Korean buyers, relief food for general population, and South Korean government stocks of grain for emergencies, mainly as a leverage for price control in the market. The negotiation for the size and the composition of food imports under Public Law 480 was bilateral between two governments, and it was done annually.[13] Title I was ten times larger in scale than Title III (voluntary agencies program), and they had different goals and processes. Whereas in Title III (U.S. voluntary agencies), the U.S. Department of State de-emphasized its role as the

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[11] 1406; #62; HQ; RG 469

[12] 3633-3634; #1. FFP; P153; RG 286

[13] 1610; #139; HQ; RG 469

original donor, in order to promote the image of civilian humanitarian relief by numerous decentralized U.S. civilian agencies, Title I officially broadcasted the origin of grains as U.S. governmental food assistance.

Wheat and wheat flour composed a considerable part of Title I imports of U.S. agricultural commodities, and wheat's percentage in total Title I sales generally increased year by year until 1960. In the 1956 PL 480 program, wheat accounted for 21 percent of the total $42.2 million dollar value of the program. To the value of the commodities, $4.7 million was added for ocean freights, bringing the total to $46.9 million for Korean program. Other commodities like barley and cotton took up more, or less, large percentage. Barley took up 27 percent of the total, and cotton made up 18.5 percent.[14] For which I can only construe as cultural familiarity with barley in Korea, barley imports, which was 30 percent larger than wheat imports, hardly received any media or literary attention as foreign imports. Barley, as in the colloquial expression, "Barley Hill" during spring shortage period, received much attention as a food to override rice shortage. However, as if it did not occur to anyone that barley could also have come from U.S. surplus stock, barley was taken very naturally in Korea. On the other hand, cotton received as much attention as wheat flour. Cotton was part of the "Three White Industries (sambaek saŏp)," which included wheat flour, cotton, and sugar, of the 1950s "Aid Economy (Kuho Kyŏngche)" that buttressed the Korean economy. After the Mutual Security Act of 1956, much of surplus cotton imports were moved to Section 402 of this act for defense spending, and thus, the percentage of wheat in PL 480

[14] Drafted by Strom, 1956; 1304; #49; UD 422; RG 469

increased proportionally. For 1959, 77.8 percent of the hwan value of PL 480 was wheat. Imported wheat came in three different kinds: red wheat, white wheat, and wheat flour. In the same year, cotton and cotton seed took up 20.7 percent, and corn barely showed its presence as 1.5 percent of PL 480 imports.[15] The amount of overall PL 480 imports progressively and continuously increased until the end of the decade. Because PL 480 imports were almost the sole supply of industrial and commercial wheat to Korea, the structure of PL 480 played a crucial role in Korean politics and economies.

As introduced in chapter 4, Public Law 480, applied from 1955, introduced two differences from the previous practice of concessional sales by the U.N. Government Appropriations for Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) and the U.S. Army. First, a civilian agency, U.S. International Cooperations Administration (ICA), took over the control from the U.S. Army. Secondly, PL 480 only pertained to U.S agricultural surpluses. Before, concessional sales were not limited to surplus, but included non-surplus agricultural commodities and also non-agricultural and non-surplus materials such as construction, medical, and educational supplies. The surplus status of PL 480 commodities has important implications by showing the link between U.S. domestic politics and the flow of materials going into PL 480 recipient countries, which over time number 80 different countries, including Korea. At the earlier stage of the program, John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, had to emphasize to the USOMs that PL 480 fund, and also Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act, only pertained to U.S. agricultural surpluses. In October 1956, Dulles cancelled

[15] 3992 #10 Counterpart; P583; RG 286 *but in 1961, wheat only 35 percent, and 9 billion hwan (3996)

previously allocated $4.5 million of surplus raw sugar to Korea. He explained the cancellation as a result of shortage of surplus sugar in the United States.[16]

On the other hand, the surplus nature of farm imports fed the tension that Koreans created to attain a upper hand in negotiations. In what was interpreted as a deliberate political maneuvering by Rhee Syngman, a number of Korean politicians published articles in newspapers to stir up the public opinion. They argued that it would have been expensive for the U.S. government to store surplus farm products, had they not been defrayed through PL 480. Thus, they argued, since it would have been cheaper for the United States to dump surplus produces in the ocean than pay for the storage, the U.S. should just give the surpluses to South Korea for free and also should increase the amount of its donation. According to the Korean politicians' political calculation, paying 10 percent of the market money price for the surpluses that was going to be dumped in the ocean was expensive. Fundamentally, their argument was based on their evaluation of the Cold War strategizing. They argued that when South Korea was the last bastion of against Communism in Asia, providing buffers for Japan, the U.S. should make more concessions regarding surplus grains. By emphasizing the Cold War motivations behind U.S. PL 480, Korean statesmen could exploit PL 480 trades. For example, in 1955, Koreans refused to pay the premium price for Formosan fertilizer because they were certain that the United States was to provide PL 480 grains.[17] Rhee and his men

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[16] Wood OEC to "FY 1956 Section 402 program as submitted ICA W totals $48.5 in DS component and $2.0 million in DFS component on February 1, 1956; 1355; #51; UD 422; RG 469

[17] Office of the Economic Coordinator, Seoul, Airgram to ICA/Washington (54-56)

understood the place that U.S. government was trapped between communism and authoritarian regime.

Basically, Koreans were confident in their demands because they realized that the U.S. government could not be flexible in the Cold War global military build-up. Title I of PL 480, and Section 402 of the Mutual Security Act, were exclusively used to fund U.S. and South Korean military operations in the divided Korea. Formerly, U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK, 1945-1948) and the U.S. Department of the Army (1948-1955) had sold U.S. products to Koreans at concessional rates of one tenth in order to raise the local currency, hwan. The sales proceeds were then deposited in the Counterpart Fund. The Title I of PL 480 and Section 402 continued this practice under the civilian supervision of the U.S. Office of the Economic Coordinator in Seoul, a temporary organization for the transition from U.S. military control to the U.S. Department of State control of foreign affairs. Whereas the Combined Economic Board (CEB) could use Counterpart Fund also in non-military projects, sales proceeds from Title I and Section 402 must be spent on military only.[18]

Linked to the Cold War military build-up, was the domestic politics of U.S. farm surpluses. Title I of PL 480 provided, and often actively created, markets for U.S. farm surpluses. This supply-driven globalization of commodities including foodstuffs is one of the overriding theme throughout the chapters. The commercial sales of Title I of PL 480 was particularly devised to link the private sellers in the United States, looking for markets to sell

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[18] From CINCUNG TOKYO SDG Lemnitzer to Washington DC "before new PL 480 funds are committed, a firm agreement be entered into with ROK providing that use of proceeds fro budgetary support of ROK military forces shall have priority over all other uses. I consider that this same principle should be applied to maximum feasible extent in development of counterpart budgets." in 1955; 1269; #29; UD 422; RG 469

their surpluses, to private buyers in South Korea. In order not to discourage foreign buyers from purchasing U.S. PL 480 agricultural surplus, the U.S. government placed a device not to incur any price disadvantages to foreign private buyers. When the price of U.S. surplus was higher than the commodity's world market price, the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), U.S. government affiliated organization that procured and priced the commodities, provided the differentials to match the world price. For example, the world sugar price was largely determined by the Cuban supply. Cuban sugar frequently had lower prices than U.S. surplus sugar. When buyers of PL 480 agreement nations purchased U.S. surplus sugar, they paid the world price, and the CCC supplemented the differentials to U.S. sellers. Thus, foreign buyers of PL goods could confidently choose from the CCC- published list of surplus commodities, titled, "*Reference Circular."*[19]

It is likely that Title I concessional sales of wheat contributed to the increasing number of wheat milling factories and shops in South Korea. However, not only did the U.S. government create the wheat market in Korea through the supply of wheat, but it also funded the construction of large milling factories. During the war, all four major milling factories, including P'ungkuk, had been destroyed. To rebuild the industry, the U.S. Office of the Economic Coordinator provided loans to build two large-scale milling factories in South Korea, which were Daehan Flour Miller's Association and Chosun Flour Milling Company from 1953 to 1955. By 1956, the milling capacity in Korea was above both the supply and demand for wheat. In Oct 1956, these local mills could process 35,000 tons of wheat each

[19]1290-1; #29; UD 422; RG 469

month. The capacity was much above 20,000 ton a month which was the estimated demand given by the Office of the Economic Coordinator (OEC).[20] This did not stop there. In 1958, within one year, due to the construction of new milling factory, with U.S. funding, the milling facility increased another 30 percent with comparable increase in production.[21] This overcapacity in wheat-milling forms a contrast to the post-liberation period in 1947 when the U.S. Military-Government could not find milling facilities of sufficiently large scale in Korea. Due to the lack of milling facilities in Korea in 1947, all wheat import to South Korea had to be come in flour form.[22] The situation was overly reversed by the end of the 1950s. By 1958, the wheat-flour industry was overextended with too many milling facilities. However, demand for wheat flour did not change much, and the price of wheat flour fell.

The increase in wheat-milling capacity and U.S. funding to create a wheat industry in Korea is significant because U.S. surplus wheat from PL 480 was almost the sole supply of wheat and wheat-flour to Korea from 1945 to 1972.[23] Domestic production was mostly self-consumed by the producers. Korean farms produce approximately 172,000 to 180,000 tons of

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[20] 242,000 ton for the financial year 1956, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, to Secretary of State, February 26, 1956; i.n. 1304, Korea Commodities Agricultural Surplus 1956; #49; UD 422, Korea Subject Files, 1953-1959; RG 469, NACP; South Korea joined the membership of the International Wheat Agreement in 1953; i.n.1444

[21] See 1304; RG 469. Tong'a says that the capacity increased by 3 times, but I take Tong'a's figure as a mistake. *Tong'a*. September 7, 1958

[22] CG XXIV Corps to CG 8th Army, SCAP, January 4, 1947; 224; #6429; UD 1733 Foodstuff Import File; RG 331 SCAP, 1946-1951.

[23] Kim Hyŏng-su, Kang Yong-hui, U Ch'ang-myŏng, and Yi Sŏ-rae, "Kuksan wŏllyo rŭl sayonghan pokhap'pun kaebal e kwanhan yŏn'gu." *Han'guk Sikp'um Kwahak Chi*, No. 2, 1973. Also see, the Korea Bank statistics says ninety-nine to hundred percent wheat were American until 1970. The wheat imported from the Philippines and Canada were negotiated and administered by the United States on behalf of South Korea. Statistics by Korea Flour Mills Industrial Association (KOFMIA) and U.S. Wheat Association in Seoul has that in 1986 and 1987, of imported wheat, 88.2% was from the United States, 8.0% from Austria, 0.7% from Canada, and 3.1% from Argentina.

wheat a year. However, the U.S. International Cooperations Agency (ICA) reported that most of domestically produced wheat was consumed by farming families themselves. Moreover, even if there was Korean wheat flour to be circulated in the market, Korean nutritional scientists found that the varieties of wheat that was cultivated in Korea was not suitable for industrial food-production. The Korean nutritional scientists explained that the protein percentage in Korean wheat was less than 10%, which was much less than the make-up in U.S. imported wheat, which were western white wheat, hard red winter wheat, and northern spring wheat. The lower protein level of Korean wheat varieties made it difficult to make dough-pastes such for bread, biscuits and chip-snacks, and thus, Korean varieties were not suitable for industrial uses. The absorption of domestic production through self-supplying and the unsuitability of Korean domestic varieties for commercial production meant that all wheat and wheat flour, for rationing as well as for market commerce, had to be imported. At the concessional price of one-tenth, South Korea had all the reason to order all wheat import entirely through PL 480 from U.S. surplus stocks.

Korean sources confirm the monopoly supplier status of PL 480 wheat. In fact, the overwhelming dependence on U.S. wheat for commerce and industry was to cause anxiety after 1966 when the U.S. government announced that U.S. Public Law 480 assistance to Korea was to gradually wind down and to be terminated in 1972. In preparation for the termination of the concessional sales, the South Korean state and state-funded research institutes invested in finding a substitute for U.S. imported wheat-flour. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, South Korean nutritional scientists experimented with naked barley flour,

defatted soy flour, defatted rice bran flour, defatted soybean flour, cassava, rye, corn, potato, yam, sorghum, millet, and sweet potato flours among others, in order to find an industrial substitute for wheat. Korea was not the only country trying to cope with the end of PL 480. Therefore, Korean nutritional scientists was able to consult India's Central Food Technological Research Institute, among others, that had been trying to find a wheat-substitute throughout the 1960s. The Koreans also studied the works by western, especially Latin American, nutritional scientists like H.G. Core, L.M. Ware, R.L. de la Fuente, and Bol Trimester, to reduce wheat dependency.[24] However, all this was without much result. Thus, from 1972 onwards, South Koreans had to buy U.S. wheat at its full price, and not at other previous concessional rate of one-tenth under PL 480. Despite having to pay the full price, U.S. monopoly of wheat supply was not challenged in Korea, although the percentage was reduced. The statistics by Korea Flour Mills Industrial Association (KOFMIA) and U.S. Wheat Association in Seoul published that in 1986 and in 1987, 88.2 % of wheat import to Korea was from the United States, 8.0% was from Austria, 0.7% from Canada, and 3.1% from Argentina. Thus, in the end, the concessional sales of wheat in the latter half of 1950s and 1960s were very effective in fostering the wheat market in Korea in the 1970s and in the 1980s.

However, in the meantime, in the late 1950s, fostering of commercial wheat market in Korea seemed very implausible. Koreans consumed more wheat flour because if was cheap, but the same choice could not be expected under full price market conditions. However, the

[24] Kim Hyŏng-su, Kang Yong-hui, U Ch'ang-myŏng, and Yi Sŏ-rae, "Kuksan wŏllyo rŭl sayonghan pokhap'pun kaebal e kwanhan yŏn'gu." *Han'guk Sikp'um Kwahak Chi*, No. 2, 1973

cheap price in the meantime induced the South Korean state to increase the consumption of wheat. The amount of wheat imported from the United States provided 16 grams of wheat per capita per day in 1956. The U.S. Department of State planned to raise the consumption of wheat in Korea to 26 grams per capita per day for the following year, 1957. The department predicted that the completion of two large-scale milling factories, which the ICA (U.S. International Cooperations Administration) funding, would further raise the amount to 35 grams of wheat consumption per capita.[25] However, the ICA blocked the funding, assessing that the milling capacity would surpass demand then. In 1958, wheat consumption per capita was 23.7kg. However, it did went down in 1959 to 18.8kg.[26] In 1958, wheat requirement for import to Korea was calculated at 35,000 tons a month.[27] In 1960, the annual wheat import requirement was 300,000 metric tons, which was an increase from approximately 250,000 tons before PL 480, but such increase does not seem as nearly dramatic as how much the print media in South Korea exaggerated the inflow of cheap wheat-flour from the United States. On the other hand, in comparison to the colonial era, it was an increase by about 20 times. and this was why wheat flour industry was closely associated with imperial U.S. food assistance in Korea.

Interestingly, print media in South Korea and rumors among Koreans emphasized the the excessive profit that the wheat-millers were making because of PL 480 imports. Their profit,

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[25] CINCREP, Seoul, to ICA, February 3, 1956; 1301, Korea Commodities- Agricultural Surplus 1956; #49, Korea Subject Files, 1953-59; UD 422; RG 469

[26] Chun Ye Yong, ROK Minister of Reconstruction to Walter D. McConaughy, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, July 13, 1960; 1710, Agricultural Surplus; #139, Subject Files 1950-1959; HQ; RG 469

[27] CINCREP, Seoul, To ICA, August 6, 1957, Korea Commodities- Flour; 1425; #66, Subject Files 1950-1959; HQ; RG 469

thus, was considered to be results of corrupt nepotism. Newspapers commented that not only big industrial companies, but also a few hundreds entrepreneurs jumped onto the wagon with small to medium-scale mills in order to share the huge profit margin in the wheat industry. Business corruptions such as Lee Han-Yŏl, the president of Tong'a Trade Company, who were arrested for illicit fortune accumulation in the wheat industry in 1961, and the connection between the Liberty Party and Tong'lip company suggest that wheat flour fed large-scale corruptive practices.[28]

Another collusion case between the government officials and businessmen involved a company called, Tongrip. The South Korean state had given Tongrip a great deal of preference from securing grants to build the factory and to buy machines. In 1960, at the Committee on National Defense, an Assembly Member Yi Chŏng-hyu accused the company for illicit practices involving "dry bread" rationed to the troops. Dry bread was a sort of biscuits made of wheat-flour, and it was issued to troops every three days in 250 gram bags in 1957.[29] In 1959, the government had awarded monopoly to Tongrip in supplying dry bread. The government gave the company two billion hwan a year to produce dry bread. The state provided wheat-flour and sugar. The deal was widely alleged as an outcome of political corruption. Assembly member Yi complained that dry bread went bad in three months. Eighty percent of it ended up eaten by moth, so they were mostly given away as animal feed. Yi also accused that dry bread that was supposed to be rationed to the troops were found in markets

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[28] CINCREP, Seoul, to Secretary of State, June 15, 1961; 1843, Korea-C-Wheat; #141; HQ, Subject Files, 1959-1961; RG 469

[29] International Committee on Nutrition, U.S. Department of Defense, *Nutritional Survey*, p. 17; p. 21

on a large-scale. The price of dry bread in the market was at one twelfth of the price of the raw material. The Liberty Party was alleged to receive illicit money from Tongrip.

At first, the ICA concurred that the Korean wheat-millers were making excessive profits. However, the report was soon rescinded, and the the same U.S. official then claimed that Korean millers were only making reasonable profit at the rate around 0.3 percent. He wrote that he was embarrassed by his previous mistake.

The large-scale wheat imports from PL 480 funding generated another controversy among Koreans about the Korean economy. Both Americans and Koreans in the 1950s and 1960s agreed that wheat imports had the effect of putting the prices of rice and barley down. At the time, such policy was commended as making Korean industrial products more competitive in the world market. When food price was kept low, workers wages could be kept low, and this in turn contributed to lowering the price of Korean products which were to be exported. Since the 1990s, the argument has been reversed, and not a few political scientists and policy makers have since then criticized U.S. wheat import under PL 480 for screwing the structure of Korean economy. While either opinion tells mostly about their political orientations, we can see how the visibility of U.S. wheat imports was looming large in their minds.

When the central state was imported PL 480 wheat beyond the market demand and ration needs, the South Korean Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had to find a way to distribute it. Thus, disposing superfluous wheat proved to be a burdensome business for the ministry. The excess wheat had to be sold before the passing of each spring. Otherwise, wheat was was

likely to develop molds. In addition, after the summer flood season, stored wheat drew insects, which rendered the grain un-marketable.[30] The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, out of other viable channels to willing buyers, chose to pass the excess wheat onto the employees of state ministries and local governments. The ministries disposed wheat-flour by giving it to public servants as salary-in-kind.[31]

Wages-in- wheat flour was enormously unpopular among the public servants. From 1956 to 1959, in each spring, public servants received vouchers for wheat flour. In 1956 and 1957, the government had announced to include rice in the wage packages of public servants. However, when the South Korean state succeeded in acquiring wheat beyond the market demand in PL 480 agreement with the United States, the government replaced promised rice in the wage package to surplus wheat-flour. The government asked for the sacrifice of its public servants, and justified it in terms of military requirement. The government argued that since the sales proceeds from Title I of PL 480 wheat was channeled to defense funding, the government had to imported large amount of wheat for national defense. Difficult to argue against it, three hundred and forty thousand public servants across the nation received 25 kilograms (1 podae) of wheat-flour for a month of 1957 and of 1958.

Not only the un-negotiated imposition of wheat flour itself, but also the rate of exchange for wheat-flour caused resentment among public servants. In 1958, Provincial Government of Kyŏngsang-namdo distributed a sack of wheat flour to each of its public servants, instead of cash or rice. Moreover, Kyŏngsang-namdo arbitrarily set the price of wheat flour at 2,310

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[30] *Kyŏnghyang*, April 15, 1959; *Tong'a*, April 16, 1959

[31] *Kyŏnghyang,* September 13, 1958.

hwan when in the market, it cost 2,200 hwan. Thus, public servants received 110 hwan less in wage. Again, in the spring of 1959, the government had four million sacks (25kg each) of wheat-flour to dispose of before the humid flood season. For the four months of April, May, June and July, all nation-wide 35 million public servants received one sack of wheat-flour each month. Still, the government could only dispose a million and half sacks (25kg each) of wheat-flour. It is not clear what the government did to the remaining 2.5 million sacks (62,500 tons) that year.

In order to appease the public servants in 1959 wheat wages, the government priced public servants' wheat-flour at 1,994 hwan, and this was 200 hwan cheaper than the market price. Thus, public servants had 200 hwan extra in terms of wheat flour's money exchange value. Despite the price advantage, many public servants sold their wheat-flour vouchers to market sellers at even cheaper prices than the government price. When a journalist requested a response to the sales of wage wheat-flour, apparently a government official responded that the state left this matter to their personal decision, and it did not plan to interfere between the public servants and merchants. In fact, wage payment in wheat flour was so vocally unpopular that the National Assembly advised the government to stop paying public servants with wheat flour. The government complied with the National Assembly's demand on 16 June 1959.

Not only was the state using surplus wheat flour as a currency in its transactions of wages, the state also allocated relief food for welfare institutions all in wheat-flour on several occasions. Recipients on government rations did not have much choice, but to incorporate

wheat flour in their daily diet. For April and May 1958, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs composed food ration packages almost entirely of wheat and wheat flour. 148 social welfare institutions in Kyŏngsang-namdo made a formal protest to the ministries. The institutions declared it inhumane to feed 10,000 war-orphans and 13,000 war-widows in addition to invalid children and the elderly with only wheat-flour for two whole months. They pleaded for barley and whole barley in relief ration. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs showed sympathy to their grievances. However, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was immovable, explaining that all allocated wheat-flour had to be consumed before summer. Otherwise, all that wheat-flour would expire.[32] In 1948, ration food, composed of only wheat-flour, affected all other groups on government welfare rosters. Residents in the make-shift tent village of Yong'am dong had to make themselves familiar with a porridge made with wheat-flour. Relief food for the dislocated (refugees) and the destitute families was also composed of wheat-flour only.

While the state could easily force public servants and relief recipients to accept wheat-flour, wheat-flour was not accepted when the state tried to pay other expenditures with it. Thus, the state produced numerous episodes in trying to dispose wheat flour, and these were broadcasted in newspapers half humorously and half sarcastically. In 1959, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry argued to pay the water fee for water transportation, drinking water, irrigation, and industrial water with PL 480 grains. Unfortunately for the ministry, the government-contractor refused to take wheat-flour. Not learning the lesson in the same year,

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[32] *Kyŏnghyang,* June 15, 1958.

the desperate Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry offered the rice farmers to trade wheat-flour with their rice. Predictably, no farmer responded. For twenty days, not a grain of rice was exchanged on the term set by the ministry.

When it was difficult to dispose of the imported wheat-flour, the South Korean state also found storing the unsold grain difficult. The state was responsible for leaving one tenth of the imported grain to go spoiled in storage in 1959. In order to prevent stored wheat from rotting, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry spent hundreds of millions of hwan in importing pesticides such as DDT, mercron, methyl bromide, and PGP chloropicrin in addition to vinyl to cover the grains from insects. When grain was stored, it had to be regularly sprayed with insecticides because the chemicals evaporated within several months. The state could have saved the expenses for pesticide and the cost of wasted grain, had kept it kept PL 480 imports to the domestic demand. In fact, in 1959, the United States advised the South Korean government to cut the request for surplus grains to half for the 1960 PL 480 program, capping it at twenty five million dollars. The U.S. warned the South Koreans that it was requesting more wheat than the nation could consume. The warning also came in domestic politics. Newspapers published articles that complained about superfluous wheat, which was imposed on unwilling consumers. An article in *Kyŏnghyang* criticized the state for importing needlessly large amount of wheat-flour from the United States to use it for military purposes.[33] However, the South Korean state's reference to Communist North Korea and the unfinished war seems to have won the day.

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[33] An article in *Kyŏnghyang* criticized the state for importing needlessly large amount of wheat-flour from the United States to use it for military purposes. *Kyŏnghyang*. September 13, 1958.

Thus, the state was unsuccessful at making wheat-flour a substitute for rice, and to induce market consumption of wheat flour. However, there were two points. First, despite the unwillingness of consumers to take wheat flour, the state found various channels to impose wheat-flour on them. Even when consumers did not like wheat flour, they nevertheless became familiar with the food. Secondly, the post-colonial mark on wheat flour shifted from poverty and U.S. imperial motivations, to the repression and corruption of the South Korean state.

Wheat-Flour Channels Political Corruption towards the April Revolution[34]

In the late 1950s, the post-colonial association of wheat was with Syngman Rhee's authoritarian state. On the other hand, what continued throughout the post-1945 period regarding postcoloniality was the awareness that Korea's liberation from the Japanese Empire in 1945, and the new "democratic" system in 1948 were "given" by the United States. These were presented to Koreans like the wheat-flour presents. Koreans in the south practices their rights to vote for the first time in 1948. By investigating the use of U.S. surplus wheat-flour in electoral corruption, we can glimpse at experiences of *minjujuŭi* ("democracy") on the ground level as the Korean people experienced it in their daily lives.

In the late 1950s, U.S. surplus wheat gained publicity for being used as bribe in election campaigns. Newspaper articles not only criticized the politicians who distributed wheat flour to wheedle the votes, but it also criticized the agricultural people (nongmin) who formed a

[34] Syngman Rhee's authoritarian regime was toppled as a result of the April Revolution of 1960.

psychological dependency on aid wheat. Election officials were quoted for complaining that election campaigns could not be managed without using wheat-flour bribes since the destitute agricultural people took receiving wheat flour for granted in electoral campaigns.

Wheat-flour was one of the popular items that candidates illegally gave out to entice voters. In the election of January 1958, other items chosen by candidates for illegal gifting were calendars, towels, and blankets. Some candidates were seen knocking on doors and purchasing national bonds from the housewives who were only glad to be ridden of the national bonds that they bought from the state involuntarily. Some campaign teams rode around on trucks in their electoral jurisdictions with things to give out to voters.

Newspaper articles ridiculed the candidates' using wheat-flour and cash presents to buy votes. It was criticized as "immature" practices. For example, in May 1958, one campaign staff of Yi Su-u, with no party affiliation, was seen purchasing vote-slips at 1000 hwan each on the open streets of Chinkap-ku in Pusan. In Yŏngdo-ŭl-ku of Taegu, a campaign staff of Son Ŭi-tong, a Liberty Party member, was caught bartering voting-slips with vouchers for wheat-flour ration.

Other accounts suggested that local governments were complicit in wheat flour bribes with the politicians. Both the Liberty Party and the Democratic Party used wheat as an enticement to persuade voters. In January 1960, in a re-election campaign in Yŏng'il and Yŏngchu, a journalist overheard three rural wives chattering on their way into the voting booth. The wives shared information with one another that only the ones who voted for a specific, or "endorsed," candidate could receive the wheat ration. It was possible to ensure

that the locals vote for the "endorsed" candidate by teaming three voters in a group as "three-people voting" or by practicing "open votes."[35] As this same journalist saw a Neighborhood Civic Service Office (Tong Samuso) that was withholding wheat flour rations until after the election, it seems likely that the three rural wives were exchanging a very veritable and useful piece of information amongst themselves. Interestingly, I could not find any reference to other foodstuff or other grain that was used to bribe the voters. The candidates were not known to be distributing canned port meat or rice.

The access to surplus wheat-flour was one of the ways that politicians and industrialists accumulated power illegally. Such corruption, in return, undermined the legitimacy of the new state and its elites. In the April Revolution of 1960, popular demonstrations led by students toppled Rhee Syngman's authoritarian government. Rhee abdicated on 26 April 1960, taking the responsibility for election frauds and political corruption.

In between the April Revolution of 1960 and Park Chung Hee's military coup on May 16, 1961, freedom of press was granted, and what we see on the press is the continued awareness of Korea's post-colonial situation in which Korea depended on U.S. assistance. This criticism was especially linked to U.S. food assistance. A four-cut cartoon on Seoul Kyŏngche Sinmun on Sunday, September 25, 1960, shows an American giving a cookie to a Korean boy. The boy only takes the cookie after the American confirmed Korea's independence. The author of these cartoons was Kim Sŭng-ok, who drew the cartoons as a college student. Later in his career, Kim Sŭng-ok becomes a writer. Kim's cartoons, titled "Pagoda Old Man" from 1960

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[35] *Tong'a,* January 27, 1960.

to 1961, captured the ideas of the April Revolution before Park Chung Hee's military coup d'état in 1961 usurped the state.

(cut1)
Man: Oh, poor boy, have this cookie.

(cut2)
Boy: Are you American, or not?
Man: I am American.

(cut 3)
Boy: Is our country an independent nation, or is it not?
Man: It is an independent nation.

(cut4)
Boy: If you say so, I can take it, surely.
Old Man: (looking at the scene) I feel like crying.[36]

The boy clearly wants the cookie, but he requires a ritual from the American to assure that Korea is an independent nation.

In another cartoon, published on September 27, 1960, Kim Sŭng-ok pokes fun at the political and economic fights amongst Koreans. The cartoon shows a beggar accosting a passer-by who is dressed like a gentleman.

(Cut 1.)
Beggar: Please, spare me a penny.
Gentleman: I DON'T HAVE ANY MONEY!

(Cut 2.)
Pagoda Old Man: (passing by the two who are arguing) Why can't he spare a coin to the beggar?

(Cut 3.)
Pagoda Old Man: (picking up a pair of glasses) Here is a pair of glasses that an American used to wear.

[36] Kim Sŭng-ok, [Pagoda Old Man], *Sŏul Kyŏngche Sinmun,* September 25, 1960.

(Cut 4.)
Pagoda Old Man: (looks back and sees two beggars arguing) Now I see that it was an argument between two beggars.[37]

Thus, the cartoon criticized the well-to-do in South Korea. When the source of their meager wealth came from U.S. aid, the rich feels no shame and it does not occur to him to share a little bit of his wealth with his compatriots. In the perspective of an American, via the glasses, both of them were mere beggars.

Here is another cartoon on the "Pagoda Old Man" on 25 October, 1960,

(Cut 1.)
Pagoda Old man: Why don't I go to the chapel?

(Cut 2. At the chapel)
Pagoda Old man: The director of the orphanage came, too.
Director of the orphanage: (praying by himself) Dear Farther in heaven, . . .

(Cut 3.)
Director of the orphanage: If God may have it that the holy spirit descend on the souls of the American people, ...
Pagoda Old Man: ?

(Cut 4.)
Director of the orphanage: (continues). . , pray that they, the Americans, send us much relief materials this winter."
Pagoda Old Man: A~~men.[38]

The cartoon again shows Koreans' reliance on U.S. foreign aid, and the absurdity of the Korean elites in relying on it. These cartoons mock Korea's post-colonial status that rely on U.S. assistance. It is interesting that the cartoons were a response or a result of the April

[37] Kim Sŭng-ok, [Pagoda Old Man], *Sŏul Kyŏngche Sinmun,* September 27, 1960

[38] Kim Sŭng-ok, [Pagoda Old Man], no. 53, *Sŏul Kyŏngche Sinmun,* October 25, 1960.

Revolution of 1960. Seeing that Rhee Syngman's regime being chased out after the revolution, Kim Sŭng-ok, through his cartoons, pointed out that it was precisely U.S. assistance that strengthened corrupt Rhee's regime.

Interestingly, while Korean intellectual and newspapers were criticizing Korea's over-reliance on U.S. assistance, U.S. reaction to the instability caused by the April Revolution was sending even more PL 480 food assistance to Korea. Using Title II, emergency program, of PL 480, US Operations Mission in Korea sponsored the "National Construction Service (NCS)" in 1961.[39] Below excerpt is from a priority cablegram sent from USOM/Seoul to Washington on January 31, 1961. Sentences are ungrammatically shortened in the cablegram in order to reduce the number of words to deliver. Moyer in Seoul writes,

> With emphasis urgent necessity prompt action subject project permitting Title II commodities arrive before end Feb in program […]
>
> Seriousness of problems of unemployed and underemployed stressed in numerous past communications. Bitter winter adding to distress and communist propaganda increasing dissatisfaction and social unrest. Urgent need for attention this problem greatly increased by events April 1960 permitting freer expression and criticism. Potentially explosive situation building up to which ROKG must respond promptly.
>
> Priorities Given to Areas of Greatest unemployment and poverty should result in additional economic development and increase political stability by providing more than 45 million man-days of labor. ROKG considers aid under Title III For this type program Already Approved in principle by Dillon.[40]

In his cablegram, Moyer uses expressions such as "communist propaganda increasing dissatisfaction and social unrest," "events (in) April 1960 permitting freer expression and

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[39] 1726-1770; 1733 (pamphlet); #139; Headquarter Office of Far Eastern Operations; RG 469

[40] Priority cablegram from Moyer, Seoul Far East Program, to Sheppard, ICA, January 3, 1961; 1671; #139; HQ; RG 469

criticism," and "potentially explosive situation." In other words, Moyer communicates that the freedom of expression granted by the April Revolution could be used to the advantage of the communists. In order to prevent Chang Myŏn's feeble interim government alive and to stop South Korean from going, possibly, "red," USOM implemented the National Construction Service (NCS) to give unemployed feeble work. Problems of unemployment and under-employment were serious in cities. To disperse the discontent laborers, the program created jobs for them in remote areas of Korea under the pretext of national construction.

In fact, the idea about rural development had been entertained by the South Korean Prime Minister in 1959, and the Committee on Economic Board (CEB) even proceeded to form a rural development committee in August 1959.[41] Given the urgency of the situation post-April Revolution, USOM implemented it in March 1961. The fund came from Title II (Emergency Short-Term Program) of U.S. Public Law 480. For 1961 NCS, Title II 202 to Korea was valued at $21.7 million, purchased by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). The United States contributed 85% of the cost for the National Construction Service Program in Korea. The South Korean state put in the remainder of 15%.

In Title II (Emergency Program) of PL 480, the U.S. government supplied their surplus grain to other nations in emergency situation. The recipient countries use the grain as part of wage to workers. In Korea, the NCS program paid workers half in U..S. surplus commodity coupons and the other half in cash coupons. Workers could redeemed the coupons later into

[41] S/Proposal to Expand the Functions and Responsibilities of CEBCOM and Establish a CEB Rural Development Committee, August 5, 1959; 2167; #13; P 319; RG 469

real commodity and cash. The commodities were US surplus cotton sheeting, wheat-flour and barley. The NCS Program funded 45.3 million of man-days (number of workers x number of days they worked) in 1961.[42]

In 1961 Korean program, the projects in the National Construction included 424 projects in flood control, which required 229,000 meters of excavation. Levee and revetment work was to protect 300,000 acres of farm land once completed. The program had 82 road projects, which newly paved, repaired existing ones and road improvement. The NCS also funded street, park and sever improvement in 41 municipalities, seemingly referring to myŏn-level. There were 400 small irrigation projects, 2000 small soil and water conservation projects, and reforestation of 245,000 acres.[43]

Although I mention the impact of the April Revolution in instigating the National Construction Program, using PL 480 grains for national construction programs was also new U.S. global strategy. Thus, South Korea was not the only nation that the U.S. supplied surplus grain to give as wages-in-kind. In April 1961, George McGovern, Director of the Food-for-Peace program under Kennedy administration, negotiated this new Title II programs with eight nations, including Dahomey, the semi-autonomous Eritrea region of Ethiopia, Greece, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco Taiwan and Tunisia. In Tunisia, 150,000 workers were getting part of their pay in food for eighteen months. The global context of this new direction in PL 480, called Food-For-Peace, will be discussed in chapter 6.

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[42] Figures vary from 38.6 million to 45.3 million mandays.

[43] 1655-6; #139; HQ; RG 469

Given that the U.S. Department of State initially planned the National Construction Program to support Chang Myŏn's interim government, it is ironic that U.S. Operation Missions's National Construction Service Program (NCS) was in fact used to consolidate Park Chung Hee's regime that usurped the state through a military coup on May 16, 1961. South Korean newspapers, under the censorship of the military coup regime, publicized the National Construction Service (kukto kaebal tan) as Park Chung Hee's achievement. Newspapers did acknowledge that the funding came from Title II of PL 480. However, it was phrased that Park Chung Hee's regime came up withe idea and successfully negotiated with the U.S. government to draw the assistance, and this National Construction Program was supposed to show the legitimacy of the military regime which the old corrupt Rhee regime did not have.

Chapter 6.

FROM DEPENDENCY TO SELF-HELP, 1962-1972

American Food Relief to the Korean Peripheries

> The American farmer is the hero, and Food-For-Peace is the unique institution which he… and all Americans… have created. It stands against hunger. It speaks on behalf of the children of the world. It works for economic development in the earth's far corners. And it speeds the growth of international trade.
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> - Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, "The Relationship of the multi-faceted Food for Peace program to American Agriculture", *Food For Peace Seminar Report, January 1- June 30, 1963*

In earlier chapters, U.S. food assistance began with emergency food relief from 1945 to 1955, then moved to civilian humanitarian food programs from 1955 to 1962, which in fact was originally sponsored by the U.S. Department of State. In chapter 1 and chapter 2, Korean recipients found U.S. relief food such as wheat flour and powdered milk unfamiliar and disagreeable to their palates. At the same time, Koreans suspected possible imperial motivations by the United States in giving food assistance while stationing a large-scale military contingent in the divided Korea. Under these circumstances from 1945 to 1955, U.S. food assistance failed to persuade the Koreans in the southern zone to side with the Americans in opposition to the communists in the north. However, in chapter 3 and chapter 4, beginning in 1955, U.S. relief food policy changed: the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (ICA) co-opted U.S. civilian voluntary agencies and international organizations in order to superimpose the image of humanitarian assistance on its food assistance. Food donations in the "civilian" programs were advertised to Koreans as having been voluntarily donated by individual American citizens, thus turning food assistance

into a metaphor of a more personified and decentralized image of U.S. hegemony in comparison to that of Soviet "imperialism." Finally, chapter 6 moves to the work-relief programs of the 1960s, which aimed for the eventual self-reliance of the Korean villages.

The U.S. Food for Peace Committee's self-help work (chajo kŭllo) programs, as amended in 1964, were modernization programs for Third World nations, which used only U.S. surplus food as an investment.[1] Although officially given a new name as the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program (CPDP), both the Koreans and the Americans continued to call it self-help (chajo) programs. However, the Provincial Program, as amended in 1964, differed from the previous self-help programs (1961-1963) in two crucial ways. First, the Provincial Program of 1964 excluded the use of technology and capital, and only invested surplus food, which was used as wages-in-kind for the workers. By this, the Provincial Program abandoned the conventional Third World developmental strategy of closing the development gap by employing engineering experts and advanced machineries. In the 1964 Provincial Program, funded under Title II of U.S. Public Law 480, the Food for Peace Committee could only use U.S. surplus grain for direct consumption by the workers and their families. In the previous programs from 1961 to 1963, the Food for Peace Committee had reserved the authority to sell U.S. farm surpluses to the domestic buyers in aid recipient countries. Thus, between 1961 and 1963, the program could obtain local currency by selling the surplus commodities, and these sales proceeds were then used to purchase raw materials and machines for construction programs. Through this process, in the previous

[1] The origin of addressing U.S. Public Law 480 as the Food for Peace Program goes back to U.S. President Eisenhower's uses of the term in 1959. "On January 29, President Eisenhower asked Congress today to scrap the Government's costly system of rewarding farmers for planting less. He urged that the United States and its allies join in harnessing their surplus food production for the cause of universal peace." … "To dramatize food as an instrument for building a durable peace…" in *New York Times*, January 30, 1959.

programs, the Food for Peace Committee could support large-scale industrial projects such as constructing hydraulic dams in India.

However, by banning Food for Peace Program committees from selling U.S. farm surpluses in its 1964 amendment, the Provincial Program of 1964 limited the self-help programs to small village-scale projects, which did not require technology and costly raw materials. Incidentally, the 1964 self-help work program was introduced to Koreans as originating from a U.S. domestic policy in the 1930s. This understanding of the program's origin had interesting implications on the U.S.-South Korea relationship as the U.S. Operations Mission in Korea was then applying a U.S. domestic policy of the 1930s to 1960s Korea. It was as if the U.S. government conceived Korea and other Third World nations as an extension of the U.S. territory, and thereby attempted to transform the recipient countries towards economic development.

In addition to excluding the use of science and capital investment, the 1964 amendment to the Food for Peace Program also required the Provincial Program to employ only unskilled laborers who were registered as "the needy" by the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. These workers were paid in U.S. surplus grains for working in upland reclamation for farming, irrigation, soil erosion control, reforestation, and fishery development (oyster and clam farming) projects. The projects only required raw materials that were free such as earth and stones. Thus, by making Title II, PL 480 grain as the only insertion from outside, to be used as wages-in-kind, the Provincial Program made sure that the projects were small scale and only required unskilled laborers.

Secondly, differently from the previous program, the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program (in short, Provincial Program) of 1964 transited U.S. farm surpluses directly from

the Food-For-Peace Committee-and-US Operations Missions Committee (from now on, FFP-USOM Committee) to South Korean provincial and local governments. In other words, the Provincial Program bypassed the central Korean state, and it also gradually weaned U.S. foreign voluntary agencies from Title III funding to direct South Korea towards self-help. In collaborating with the Food-For-Peace Program, U.S. Operations Mission in Korea set up the Rural Development Division (from now on, referred as RDD), and put this office in charge of supervising the amended self-help programs. Then, the Food-For-Peace and U.S. Operations Mission Committee allocated specific amount of PL 480 grains to each of the nine provinces and two cities of Seoul and Pusan.[2]

In the direct relationship between the Food-For-Peace and U.S. Operations Mission (FFP-USOM) Committee and each province, Individual projects were proposed by provincial governments (devised on the county (kun)-level), selected by the FFP-USOM Committee, funded by the Food-For-Peace Program, and administered by South Korean provincial governments. The USOM-FFP Committee drew contracts with individual county heads (kunsu), and also kept the communication channel with the villagers open. Previously, the U.S. Operations Missions had not been able to enjoy such direct contact with the locals, independently from the central South Korean government when the South Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, or when U.S. voluntary agencies' humanitarian programs distributed U.S. surplus food to the Korean recipients.

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[2] The nine provinces and two cities were Kyŏnggido, Ch'ungch'ŏng-namdo, Ch'ungch'ŏng-pukto, Chŏlla-namdo, Chŏlla-pukto, Kangwŏndo, Kyŏngsang-namdo, Kyŏngsang-pukto, Chejudo, and two *special cities* of Seoul and Pusan.

Importantly, then, I use Food for Peace Provincial Programs to demonstrate that provincial and local governments played active parts in South Korea's development in the 1960s. In current scholarship, 1960s South Korea is constructed as little more than a centralized authoritarian state that hauled the nation to a miraculous economic development. This scholarship does not consider provincial and local governments separately from the central state. Although Park Chung Hee regime placed local governments under the control of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs (Naemubu) and President himself, the Provincial Program shows that local governments could practice their own agency, unencumbered by the central state. For the Provincial Development Program, each country (kun) initiated and proposed its own self-help projects, and competed with other counties for the Food-For-Peace funding that the Provincial Government received. For example, articles in the magazine, *Local Administration* (*Chibang Haengjŏng*, 1952-present), show that lower-level bureaucrats in local governments were working and thinking at local-county (kun) level, and they were forming their relationship vis-a-vis the central state in those terms.

Thus, the Food for Peace Program killed two birds with one stone by employing government relief recipients in community's construction projects. Not only did the program provide food for the "general needy" families on government rosters, but by paying them in U.S. surplus food, it also channeled their labor for modernization and developmental projects. In the end, completed projects such as the farming lands and marine products cultivation fields were to function as long-term sources of income for the local participants. In other words, it was an relief-work program towards the end-goal of establishing self-help village communities.

The concept of village autarchy, which is similar to the functioning of self-help villages, has a long history in Korea since the Chosŏn period. Yi Yulgok, a 16th-century Korean literati, pro-

posed self-sufficient village economy established by Village Compact (Hyangyak), invoking Chu Hsi (Song Dynasty Confucian scholar)'s version of the Lü-Family Compact of 12th-century China.[3] However, Yulgok's 16th century Village Compact differed from Food-For-Peace's 1960s context as Yulgok's did not concern with making a progress and economic development as the Food for Peace Program did.

Although both the Japanese and Koreans adapted the term self-help (chajo) from a late 19th century British writer, Samuel Smiles, both Japanese and Korean intellectual-ideologues changed the subject of self-help from individuals, which Samuel Smiles had originally intended, to a nation-community. This was because these East Asian thinkers conceived a modern nation as the sum of individuals, each of whom was capable of individual self-help. According to Choe Hi-jŏng, Nakamura Masanao, who translated Smiles' book in Japan as Saikoku Rissi Hen (Sŏkuk Ipchi P'yŏn), and other advocates of self-help in late 19th century Meiji Japan argued that Japan needed to build a westernized nation if it wanted to escape western imperial domination. These advocates linked national independence to self-help by arguing that a strong nation could only be built when each individual Japanese experienced self-awakening by himself. Thus, when individual self-help was coopted for the purpose of building a nation, the question of self-help became a national problem. In Korea, too, the term self-help (chajo) was first introduced through the Japanese translation of Samuel Smiles' book, *Self-Help* (London: John Murray, 1859), and the term was coopted to the discourse of national independence from imperial powers.[4] Thus, the opening

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[3]See James B. Palais, *Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyŏngwŏn and the Late Chosŏn Dynasty.* University of Washington Press, 1996. pp. 729-731, and other places.

[4] Choi Hee-jung, "Han'guk kŭndae wa chajo chŏngsin .. "1930 nyŏn dae charyŏk kaengsaeng ron ŭi yŏnwŏn kwa singminji chibae ideologi hwa" *Han'guk Kŭnhyŏndae Sa Yŏngu*. 2012. Winter, Vol. 63.

phrase of Smiles' book, "Heaven helps those who help themselves," was malleably applied both to exhort for Korean national independence against imperial encroachments on one hand, and also for strengthening the Korean nation under the Japanese colonial state on the other.

It is also true that in the 1930s, Japan's colonial state in Korea invoked the term self-help in its Rural Revitalization Campaign (nongch'on chinhŭng undong (1932-1940), or keizai kōsei undō). However, 1960s U.S. assisted self-help programs in the rural, fishing, and foresting villages of Korea were fundamentally different from the 1930s rural campaign in their methods of carrying out the programs. For U.S. self-help programs in 1960s Korea, self-help was the goal and result to be achieved by investing U.S. surplus food in community-building programs. Thus, U.S. Food for Peace Program motivated individual Koreans to work with food as wages. On the other hand, in 1930s Rural Revitalization Movement, self-help was the method for the faming people to sustain themselves. Therefore, I disagree with the South Korean scholars who interpret South Korea's 1970s New Village Movement (1972-1989) as being influenced by 1930s colonial campaign.[5] I argue that Park Chung Hee's New Village Movement inherited the 1960s Food for Peace Provincial Program both in their vision of modernized villages and their enmeshment with a larger capitalist economy.

Japan's colonial policy emphasized self-help as the method and the mentality of individual rural villagers. Gi-wook Shin and other scholars argue that the colonial state invoked rural self-help in the 1930s as a justification for making farming people (nongmin) to fend for themselves.[6] Although the colonial state occasionally chose model villages and funded their community pro-

[5] See for example, Choi Hee-jung, 2012; 2014

[6] See Gi-wook Shin and Do Hyun Han, "Colonial Corporatism: The Rural Revitalization Campaign, 1932-1940," in *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, edited by Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson. Harvard University Press, 1999. p.82

jects, those were exceptional cases that the state staged in order to promote the campaign. Thus, by invoking self-help, the colonial state placed the responsibility for the adverse results of the socio-economic structure of the rural society on farming people as individuals. Incidentally, Governor-General Ugaki had his ideas for the Rural Revitalization Campaign in 1930s Korea from Japan's domestic rural policy in the 1920s. In 1920s Japan, the Japanese state had overstretched its empire in Asia at the expense of its rural population, and it had encouraged the rural people to emigrate to Japan's Asian colonies as settler-colonizers. In addition to being empty rhetoric to avoid the state responsibility for rural poverty, self-sufficient rural community both in 1920s Japan and in 1930s colonial Korea had anticommercial and anticapitalist tenets. In contrast, 1960s U.S. Food for Peace Programs and 1970s South Korean New Village Movement enthusiastically sought capitalist enmeshment and profit motivations.

That said, indeed, both 1930s colonial self-help and 1960s U.S. surplus food programs shared similar imperial motivations in one aspect. Shin Gi-wook argues that Japan's colonial state selected rural self-help as a policy in order to bypass the rural landlord class, and thus for the state to speak to the farming people directly. In order to forge a direct relationship with the people, the colonial government used rhetorics such as self rebirth (charyŏk kaengsaeng) and spiritual reform (chŏngsin kaehyŏk) of each individual. Likewise, U.S. Operations Missions officially admitted that a key advantage of the Provincial Program of 1964 was in bypassing the central South Korean government and in work directly with provincial and local governments, reaching the local villagers directly through U.S. surplus grain.

The U.S. Food For Peace Program in the 1960s emphasized forming relationships with local villagers, and helping them directly by building houses and drinking water wells for their every-

day use. This village-level picture clashed with Park's industrial economic development. However, despite the clash of opinions, U.S. Food for Peace Program was able to implement its vision of a Third World development in Korea. In fact, Food for Peace Program was able to stay independently from the South Korean state (when the program desired to be independent) because the program only used U.S. surplus food as an investment. The program did not need technical, such as heavy machineries, and monetary support from the central state when it was using only unskilled labor and raw materials that were free like soil.

In the early 1960s, both the South Korean state and the U.S. Department of State decided to implement economic development programs in South Korea, but the two had different reasons and also different visions of modernization. The condition of hunger was still prevalent in the late 1960s in Korea, and hunger was especially acute in rural villages. However, the situation was generally improving since the immediate post-Korean War period, and for this reason, foreign voluntary agencies had already made moves towards longer-term social development programs on their own.

In Korean politics, Park Chung Hee, a Major General in the national military, who usurped the control over the state in a military coup on May 16, 1961, strategized to establish his legitimacy by modernizing, industrializing and improving the living standard. South Korea's per capita income in 1962 was $72.28 - compare with U.S. per capita income $2250, India's $65, Pakistan's $53, and Burma's $47 -.[7] However, with the state's two Five-Year plans in the 1960s, South Korean economy was moving to a new industrializing phase. Park Chung Hee preferred to use American food aid in constructing industrial infrastructure and heavy industries. Exporting agar-

[7] *Tong'a*, August 8, 1962

agar and oysters to Japan was not Park Chung Hee's picture of modernization. However, the Rural Development Division, USOM, consciously decided that it did not wish to be complicit with Park Chung Hee and Kim Chong-p'il's "monumental projects," which were to aggrandize Park's regime,[8]

At the same time, Food For Peace's Provincial Development Program was also different from Escobar-style Third World development. Escobar criticizes U.S developmentalist programs in Third World villages for ignoring local conditions and thereby causing long-term damages in the natural environment.[9] It is true that the Food For Peace Provincial Program also altered the Korean landscape and costal lines through upland reclamation, and marine cultivation fields for clams and seaweeds. However, in the 1960s Korean program, Korean local government at the country-level were invited to propose village projects, and FFP-USOM Committee merely selected projects among those put forward by the provincial governments. Moreover, local villagers implemented the programs by themselves once the FFP-USOM Committee released surplus food through provincial governments.

In the end, this chapter argues that U.S. Food-For-Peace self-help programs in the 1960s was the predecessor of the New Village Movement in the 1970s. In a way, when the goal of provincial programs was to achieve local self-help, the implementation of the New Village Movement by South Koreans itself attests to the success of the self-help programs of the 1960s. On the other hand, the New Village Movement (1972-1989) differed from the Food for Peace Provincial Pro-

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[8] "Submission of UPI Washington Report on the U.S. Attitude Towards the ROKG] May 21, 1963, 3056-3058 #12? World Food Program, P583? RG 286

[9] Arturo Escobar, *Encountering development: the making and unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012

grams in embracing the use of technology and capital intensive projects. The New Village Movement focused on the projects implementing electricity, telephone communications, sewage pipes, methane gas facilities, and water supply to rural villages. On the other hand, the Food For Peace program was not enthusiastic with the use of heavy machinery and cash investment. Still, both were the village-level modernization programs that emphasized unskilled labor and using raw materials that were free. For instance, it is difficult to tell the pictures of the New Village Movement program apart from the ones of the Food For Peace Program. The timing of the New Village Movement also established it as a continuation of the Food For Peace Provincial Program into the 1970s. When the U.S. Department of State terminated Public Law 480 funds to Korea in 1972, Park continued the program with foreign loans, and also incorporated some of his preference of telecommunications and agricultural machineries to it.

Thereby, Park's regime appropriated the legacy of the Food-For-Peace Provincial Programs of the 1960s as part of the New Village Movement in the 1970s. When South Korean scholar working on the New Village Movement such as Ch'oe Kil-sŏng and Pak Sŏp explore the continuation of the agrarian self-reliance movement in the 1930s to the New Village Movement of the 1970s, their time-jumping linkage from the 1930s to the 1970s works to undermine U.S. Food-For-Peace Programs' influence in 1960s Korean development and its continued legacy into the 1970s.[10] On the other hand, when Yi Pyŏng-hwan acknowledges the continuity of the 1960s Provincial Program to the New Village Movement, he argues that Food-For-Peace Program was essentially a program owned by the South Korean Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to Yi, the United States provided surplus grain, but the South Korean Ministry of the Internal Affairs de-

[10] Ch'oe Kil-sŏng, 1997; Pak Sŏp, Yi Haeng, 1997; Kim Po-hyŏn 2011; Ch'oe Chin-a, 2003

signed to put the grain into use in village developmental projects, planned, implemented, and supervising.[11] However, Yi's argument belies my findings about the roles played of the Food For Peace Committee, U.S. Operations Missions and 11 local governments of South Korea. In fact, even when provincial governments requested technical help from the state, they directed it either to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry or to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, not to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. I did not find any reference to the Ministry of Internal Affairs with regards to the Food-For-Peace Provincial Programs. Instead, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had their own programs in parallel to the Food For Peace Program, and this will be discussed in conclusion following this chapter in comparison to the Food For Peace Program. Lastly, also considering similar self-help programs in Latin America and in Africa in the 1960s and the 1970s that made use of U.S. Food for Peace Program, Park's role in New Village Movement should be re-evaluated.

Fishing Villages in Food-For-Peace Provincial Programs, 1964-1968

Did U.S. surplus food in the Provincial Program of 1964 provide channels to create and shape U.S. influence in South Korea? In what ways? Or, did it work at all? I chose to discuss fishing villages and forests projects in the Provincial Program in order to clearly convey the different vision of U.S. Third World development projects. The Comprehensive Provincial Development Program did not only transform inland agricultural areas, but it also reached out to the furthest boundaries of the peninsula's coastlines and several hundreds of its small islands. When many of

[11] Yi Hwan-byŏng, "1960 nyŏn-dae maŭl kaebal kwa nongch'on saemaŭl undong ŭi ch'ogi chŏngae kwajŏng"

the post-1964 fisheries and coastal projects were designed to only require PL 480 grains and local unskilled labor, these projects clearly bring out the vision of the 1964 Provincial Program.

The U.S. surplus food given as wages-in-kind in the programs, while transforming South Korea's geography, reclaiming tidelands, building fishing villages and developing chosen types of marine products, also changed everyday food habits of their Korean recipients. Food-For-Peace work-relief programs distributed surplus wheat-flour (and also barley) to the needy families who participated in the program. In 1968, 8.2 percent of the total population was registered as the "general needy," which is a substantial number as people who were eligible to participate in the programs and therefore receive U.S. surplus wheat flour. The U.S. Department of State sent mainly wheat flour, and some barley, to be paid as wages-in-kind, but it did not include rice when rice was the favored staple of the Koreans. U.S. officials argued that by giving ill-favored food such as wheat-flour, the grain injection from the United States would not disturb the Korean rice market.

Families that were registered as the "general needy (yokuhoja)" could obtain one work-permit per family that made a person eligible to participate in the work-relief program. Although the member was specified to be a male member, in practice, female members often took up the opportunity to earn U.S. surplus food. She received 3.6 kilograms (8 pounds) of surplus grain for her daily labor. The amount, 3.6 kilograms, was based on the amount of grain required to feed a family of five people. This was to ensure that all grain was directly consumed by the family, and the family would not have any extra grain to sell in the market. A worker could work up to 20 days a month, and 20 days would bring 72 kilograms of grain to his family. It was a significant change in relief policy that recipients were given food by the number of days they worked, not

based on their needs. Before 1966, relief food could not be used, in principle, to induce people work (ch'ui-ro).

I will explain the 1964 amendment through the first Food for Peace model Fishing Village Project in a small town called Munam-ri in Ch'ungch'ŏng-pukto. Munam-ri received Food-For-Peace grant for two-year project in 1967-8, and the village project captures the process of Provincial Programs well. Munam-ri was located 13 kilometers north of the City of Sokch'o in Kangwŏn-do and 6 kilometers from Kangsŏng where the Kosŏng Country office was seated. The village had 761 people and 136 households in 1966, and more than three thirds of its households were engaged in fishing. Munam ri was first registered under the colonial state as a village in 1919. When the United Nations divided Korea in 1945, and the village was incorporated in the Soviet-occupied zone. However, after the Korean War, the South Korean state claimed the region back in 1954. The Government Action Law for Resettlement District (Subok chigu imsi haengjŏng choch'i pŏp) in July 27, 1965 incorporated the village to South Korea. Interestingly, Munam-ri, as part of Kosŏng-gun, had a large number of war refugees from the north who settled down in the area after the Korean War, ad Munam-ri was one of the resettlement villages. The sea adjacent to Munam-ri was a habitat for squid and edible seaweed (miyŏk), which the villagers made use of for their livelihood.

Munam-ri in Ch'ungch'ŏng-pukto was chosen as the model fishing village by a committee composed of six Americans. On March 6, 1967, L.E. Wakefield, Fishery Advisor in the Rural Development Division, USOM/Seoul, informed the South Korean Office of Fisheries Affairs that his committee, of two American Korean Foundation officials and four USOM officials, chose Munam-ri as the site for a pilot fishing village project. Earlier in February, Wakefield's commit-

tee had visited five proposed villages in Kangwŏn-do, which were Chumun Chin, Kisamun-ri, Oeongch'i, Inku-ri and in Munam-ri in Ch'ungch'ŏng-pukto. All five villages were in the same province because Food-For-Peace programs worked with bilaterally with each provincial government. Thus, it was a joint project between the Food for Peace Program and the provincial government of Kangwŏn. As mentioned earlier, by working directly with provinces, the program could enhance the extent of its independence from the South Korean state.[12] Since the villagers consumed U.S. surplus wheat-flour given by the program, it in a way formed an understanding of certain direct relationship between the Food-For-Peace Program and the locals.

Thus, Munam-ri project was administered by FFP-USOM/Korea and Kangwŏn Province provincial government. In terms of administering individual projects in the village, Kosŏng-myŏn, a county in the Kangwŏn Province, was actively involved. For the pilot village project, individual projects should not require much more than unskilled labor and the grains to pay them with. Although the project was to build a self-supporting village for fishermen, it was not limited to developing fishing industries for their sustainable livelihood. This comprehensive program aspired to change villagers' lifestyle from housing to social arrangement such as the fishing cooperatives (from kye) to the welfare of the elderly and the education of children in the village. The main projects included building port facilities (breakwater, anchoring yard, and fishing quay); coastal development (seaweed, octopus traps, ear shell pearl cultures, artificial fish habitat); public facilities (kindergarten, public hall, salty fish storage tank, public bath house, waiting room for fishermen, village wholesale and retail store); fishing equipment improvement; tourism de-

[12]The nine provinces and two cities were Kyŏnggido, Ch'ungch'ŏng-namdo, Ch'ungch'ŏng-pukto, Chŏlla-namdo, Chŏlla-pukto, Kangwŏndo, Kyŏngsang-namdo, Kyŏngsang-pukto, Chejudo, and two *special cities* of Seoul and Pusan.

velopment and livelihood improvement (housing, latrine, improvement, wall improvement, public well construction electric power installation (all 136 households), wire radio (all houses).

Nominally, the Munam-ri Model Fishing Village Project was a partnership program with the South Korean central state and the province of Kangwŏn. In that sense, it was an exceptional program in the Provincial Programs. However, that partnership was merely nominal, and throughout two years, the Food for Peace-USOM Committee played a central role in the projects. In the nominal partnership, in addition to PL 480 grain, the central state, Kangwŏn Provincial Government, the Central Federation of Fishing Cooperative (CFFC), and self-funding by the villagers each made commitment to contribute funding. Thus, according to the initial plan, the Food for Peace grain was supposed to be only part of the funding. However, subsequent process of the projects show that the RDD-USOM had the power to make decisions quite independently from the central state while the South Korean central state did not honor its commitment and stayed out of the project.

Whether the central government wanted to sabotage the model fishing village program by not providing the committed funding, or it could not, the central state ended up not providing the funds that it had pledged. Thus, PL 480 grain ended up playing a major role. The Food for Peace Provincial Program provided 701- 1000 metric tons of PL 480 grain for the Munam-ri project.[13] In its initial planning, PL 480 grain was to comprise only about 11 percent of the funding. However, by the end of 1967, Title II program released 267 tons of PL 480 grain, and thus, now the PL 480 grain took up 55.53 percent of the total investment. An increase from 11 percent to 55.53 percent was substantial. The central government only sent 16.8 million wŏn out of 67.3

[13] 4475-6, 4531, #2; P589; RG 286

million wŏn that was initially promised. The Fishing Cooperative (CFFC) had pledged to bring in loans from banks to construct cuttlefish drying plant and seaweed multiplication. However, only one ninth of the loan committed by the Central Federation of Fisheries Cooperative (CFFC) arrived.[14] In the end, it would have been difficult to continue the project without the help from the American Korean Foundation, which provided 5.8 percent of the total expenditure for the village projects. Together, the American Korean Foundation, self-financing of the villagers, and PL 480 grain took up 77.63 percent of the total investment.[15] However, the American Korean Foundation and self-financing were mostly for housing project, which raises the percentage of PL 480 grain contribution for other projects significantly. The cooperation from the central state and the Fishing Cooperative did not come in 1968, either, and thus Food for Peace Title II grain ended up providing 50 percent of the funding.[16]

The History of Food-For-Peace Program in the United States since 1961

In fact, the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program of the 1964 amendment came three years after Kennedy's initial Food for Peace Program in 1961. What the Kennedy administration sought to achieve through long-term development projects in the Third World, using U.S. surplus food was to develop an image of the United States that people in other nations - not their states - would later voluntarily choose to imitate. In the excerpt below, Richard W. Reuter, Special Assistant to President Kennedy and Director for Food for Peace Council, clarifies the goal of

[14] 4462, 4520; #2; P589; RG 286, CFFC

[15] 4506, #2; P589; RG 286

[16] 4501-4512, #2; P589; RG 286

the program to the National Conference on Food for Peace on September 30, 1963. Reuter clearly sets apart Food for Peace's as "development" program from the earlier "humanitarian" food assistance (1955-1962). In answering the question if U.S. surplus food was helping dictatorial and socialist regimes like Yugoslavia "against the will of the people," Reuter says,

> But to give a practical, as distinct from a humanitarian answer to that question, I would say simply that I do not believe it to be the case (that U.S. surplus food was sustaining dictatorial regimes)- and I think that the magnitudes involved make it plain that it is not the case- that the absence of our assistance in such a country would, in fact, be the instrument, or even one of many instruments, in bringing about a collapse of such a highly organized Communist society. They are not that near to a breakdown, and our help is not that great in its importance. We (Food-For-Peace) are not in a position, by what we do or do not do (through Food-For-Peace) in this rather limited area, to move governments in and out of power halfway around the world, leaving aside for the moment the question whether we should be in such a position, or would wish to be.
>
> *We are in a very different position, in which our relation to these governments is one element in their assessment of the directions in which they will bend, in due time.* Our assistance, even in areas which are Communist by their own proclamation or are tending or moving in that direction, is one more element in our assertion that the kind of world which we would like to have in our own interest in and in the interest of the peace of all is a world in which different countries, with different purpose, learn to exist together and to cooperate for the common welfare.
>
> Against the Communist notion of a monolithic society, organized under a single, centralized authority, we uphold the right of societies to develop in their own image and purpose and under their own convictions. It is therefore logical, in the very nature of our policy that we should be prepared to give cooperation and support, in areas that make sense to both sides, to societies very different from our own. And the act of doing so is a means of holding out to those societies a very different picture of the future of the world from the one which they can learn about from Moscow or Peking.
>
> That is why when you have an instrument that does serve interests of ours as well as interests of others, that does reach beyond the rather narrow and limited processes of states and of statesmen to the needs of people, you welcome and use it.[17] (italic emphasis, mine)

Aside from Reuter's particularly American belief in the universal good that what we Americans do in good heart, the others in foreign lands would appreciate, what comes through strongly in the above excerpt is the state and civil society division in Reuter's structuring of a nation. He

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[17] Richard W. Reuter, Special Assistant to the President, Director Food For Peace, to the National Conference on Food for Peace, September 30, 1963, 4/329 (note 5/67); #1; P153; RG 286

says, “we uphold the right of societies to develop in their own image and purpose…” The logic was that U.S. food assistance could possibly convince the societies to stand against their repressive governments, and in an ingenuous move, U.S. surplus food makes it possible for the United States government to directly, while vicariously, form contacts with the people in those societies.

However, although Reuter emphasized that the Food for Peace program could go “past governments to people,” Kennedy and Reuter’s Food for Peace Programs supported large-scale industrial projects. In these projects, the recipient governments were heavily involved in the planning and administering the programs. For example, Reuter’s speech was made when the Kennedy’s Food for Peace constructed the Rihand Dam (irrigation and hydroelectric power station) in India, which opened in January 1963. In Algeria, U.S. Food for Peace Program funded a large-scale reforestation project in order to alter the climate of the part of Mediterranean area.[18] Similar projects worldwide were in large part financed by selling U.S. surplus food to accrue local currency.

In fact, the Far Eastern Bureau of the USOMs was not the first to turn to use U.S. surplus food for economic development in the Third World. The Latin American Bureau of the USOMs recognized and practiced the community development concept before the Far Eastern Bureau did. In Korea, precedent to the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program was the National Reconstruction Program in 1961.[19] In Taiwan, the “free China, ”Food-For-Peace began in 1962. Taiwan program mostly employed unemployed and partially employed farmers. Interestingly, one USOM report described the projects in terms of food. For example, a dyke project was

[18] 4/329 #1; P153; RG 286

[19] For National Reconstruction Program of 1961, see my chapter 5.

explained as a project of "109,125 kilogram of flour, a similar amount of rice and 25,317 lbs. of edible oil." The nature of projects were similar as those in South Korea, building small dams for flood control, irrigation, drainage canals, wells, and cisterns, and building rural-to-market roads, reforestation, and soil protection and restoration.

Thus, Johnson's Comprehensive Provincial Development Program in 1964 partly inherited and partly transformed Kennedy's Food for Peace Program.[20] As a change, the ban on sales of PL Title II grains under Johnson's program shaped the types of projects that Food for Peace could sponsor. After 1964, the Food-For-Peace and RDD-USOM committee selected projects that did not require assistance beyond PL 480 grains. Thus, the unskilled village laborers were expected to move towards self-help without the assistance of machinery, construction materials, nor money.

Given these restrictions, the Food for Peace Provincial Program tended to support certain specific types of marine productions such as oyster, cockle, short-necked clams, and agar-agar. To add to the list, Munam-ri project planned seaweed (miyŏk) farming field. These marine products were chosen over others mainly because the projects for these marine products did not require high-tech experts, machines nor large cash investment. Their production was the results of a simple labor of stone cutting, transportation and spreading the marine product cultures. Not

[20] Johnson changes Food-For-Peace programs again in 1966. It had two goals of increasing food production and decreasing population. Johnson's War on Hunger amendment in 1966, Section 109 - Title I sales was supposed to be re-invested into agricultural production center. such as fertilizer plant. etc. Also, Johnson in his February 10, 1966 message on Food for Freedom approach laid out three changes. One was that food was no longer "surplus" but "reserve acreage be returned to production as needed." Two, Title I sales which had been for local currencies changed to long-term dollar credit purchases. Three, PL grains was to be used for family planning programs. Also, the amendment in Title I, Section 109 (b) made the recipient-nation be responsible to put a percentage of profit from Title I sales to self-help and agricultural production measures. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture had been supplying surplus food to Korea at one tenth of the price. Now a percentage of that nine tenth profit had to be invested in self-help and agricultural programs. Also, in 1966, U.S. Congress allowed using Title I and Title IV grains also for economic development in addition to title II grains.

only unskilled workers could fulfill the job, but also the projects did not need any raw materials apart from locally available stones that were free.

In fact, fishing villagers had been practicing oyster, agar-agar, and seaweed farming in the colonial period as well. Spoken of as a means of livelihood easily available to the poor and unskilled fishing villagers, the marine agriculture tended to invite class-struggle interpretations in newspapers. During the colonial era, Haech'ang bay in Kohŭng of Chŏlla Namdo was a well-known site for oyster (sŏkhwa) farming. An article in Tong'a newspaper explains that a Japanese resident, Tomita Gisaku, from Chinnamp'o of Pyŏngan-namdo, took out a loan to reclaim the tideland for clam farming. However, the clam farming would have claimed the costal area where the locals had been oyster farming for a long time, and thereby taking away the villagers' livelihood. Fortunately for the locals, Tomita did not proceed with the reclamation. When the deadline set for Tomita's reclamation had passed, 750 local Koreans gathered, and with the help of a Japanese official, they formed a cooperative to keep this coastal area for oyster farming.[21] Another Tong'a article mentions that Japanese companies increasingly invested in oyster fields in Yŏnghŭng of Hamgyŏng Namdo in 1931. The journalist interpreted the crowding-out of the locals by Japanese firms as a class struggle between labor and capital.[22] For our immediate relevance, oyster and clam farming was what poor coastal people could do for a living, and USOM chose these to be their work-relief projects towards self-help.

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[21] "Chop'aeryu yangsik ŭro yŏnsan paek'ip manwŏn" Tong'a June 27, 1927; Seiichi Tomita, *Singminji Chosŏn ŭi iju ilbonin kwa chiyŏk sahoe: Chinnamp'o ŭi Tomita Gisaku* (Kukhak Charyowŏn, 2013)

[22] "Ilbon Susan Hŭngŏpsa Sŏllip- Yŏnghŭng kul ŏjang chŏmryŏng" *Tong'a*, April 3, 1931

Another project that Food for Peace supported in Munam-ri (1967-1968) was the construction of port facilities such as wharves and breakwater. These projects did not require other materials as wharves and breakwater were entirely built with rough stones that were free. For example, Food for Peace's construction of breakwater and wharves in Ch'ungch'ŏng-namdo in 1965 allocated only 3 percent of the total expenditure for material expenses. The rest 97 percent was all expensed as wages-in-kind, which was the PL 480 grain.[23]

In many Provincial Programs programs (there were exceptions), PL 480 grain was the major contribution for projects. For 1965 Title II flat tidal area development program, the South Korean Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry calculated that 80.7 percent of the funding for the oyster and agar-agar culture fields was done through PL 480 grain. The central government and provincial governments divided the rest of the funding, each contributing approximately 10 percent.[24] In 1966, PL grain took up 90.6 percent of the total expenditure in 48 projects for oyster, short-necked clam, hard clam shellfish, and breakwater in Ch'ungch'ŏng namdo.[25] The projects employed 26,991 persons, paid for the total of 448,050 number of man-days (number of workers x number of days they worked). In Cholla Namdo, PL 480 grains took up 75 percent of the total cost.

The Food for Peace's Provincial Program had to turn down projects proposed at the local-level if the projects required cash to purchase machines and materials unless the the village could procure extra funding from the central government or the provincial government. In 1965, the

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[23] see picture; 4443, #4; P589; RG 286

[24] "1965 nyŏn-do Title 2 e taehan susan chŭngsik saŏp." Nongnim Pu, Susan kuk p.5; 4363 #4; P589; RG 286

[25] 4326 #4; P589; RG 286

provincial government of Ch'ungch'ŏng namdo asked the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to examine the feasibility of oyster, short and hard clam farming projects for the Provincial Program before the provincial government sent the proposal off to the FFP-USOM Committee. The Ministry responded positively for oyster and short-necked clam (pajirak) projects, but warned the province that the hard clam (paekhap) project might not qualify for the Provincial Program. The Ministry found Hard clam (paekhap) farming project impracticable because it needed bamboo fence, the cost of which material took up 36 percent of the total expenditure. The rest of the cost was wages-in-kind, calculated in PL 480 grains. Since the cost of bamboo was a problem, the number of hard clam farming projects had to be reduced from six to four in Ch'ungch'ŏng-namdo.[26]

Further, the particular picture of development that Food for Peace espoused, by minimizing cash expenditure and the use of machinery, can also be highlighted in its disagreement with the World Food Program (WFP) regarding flood control projects.[27] The U.S. State Department worked with its European allies in the U.N.D.P. to set up the project as a pilot project in 1966. The World Food Program, which had its Headquarters in Rome, Italy, was an attempt by the United States to move foreign food aid from multiple bilateral agreements between the United States and the recipient countries, to a multilateral effort. Except some slight difference in agenda, the Food for Peace and the World Food Program were essentially engaged in same projects. In fact,

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[26] "P'aejoryu Chŭngsik Saŏp Kisul Kŏmt'o Ŭiroe" from Tcha Kyun Hi, South Korean Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, to the South Korean Minister of Health and Social Affairs on April 21, 1965; also see 4333; #4 Munamli; P589; RG 286

[27] World Food Program (WFP) 2984-3001; #12; P583; RG 286

for the United States, funds for Food for Peace and World Food Program both came under Title II of Public Law 480.

The basis for disagreement between the Food for Peace and the World Food was that the World Food Program was especially interested in river projects, which required large capital investment.[28] This went against the amendment of 1964 Food for Peace's Provincial Programs, which minimized the use of capital and technology. Furthermore, the World Food Program in Korea sold its grain to obtain the local currency with which to purchase machineries and raw materials. On the other hand, the Food for Peace amendment had banned the sales of aid grain in 1964, and only to use surplus grain for direct consumption by the workers and their families. The World Food Program had a different opinion to this. It considered flood control projects in rivers an excellent use of surplus grain since the projects were labor intensive.[29] In the end, since Title II of PL 480 to Korea allowed 10.5 percent (16,601 MT) of the funding on flood control and watershed development, the U.S. Operations Mission in Korea notified the World Food Program that when the World Food Project allocated surplus grain on flood control projects, the USOM would commensurately reduce the allocation for Food for Peace's flood programs, which only had a fourth priority in the list of projects.[30]

In one other incident, when the South Korean Ministry of National Construction enquired about using Food for Peace PL 480 grain in highway construction projects in early 1967, the Rural Development Division, USOM, spurned the proposal, writing to the ministry that Food for

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[28] 3945; #22; P583; RG 286

[29] 3940; #22; P583; RG 286

[30] From AID/W to AID/TO Circular, sent on September 8, 1966, 3946; #22; P 583; RG 286

Peace grain was reserved for small village self-help, and labor intensive projects. This, once again underlines particular vision of development espoused by Food for Peace, of which independence was secured by only using PL 480 grain. The highway program, which would be aggrandized as an achievement by Park Chung Hee, required machineries, technological experts, and not a few number of skilled laborers. To this, the Food for Peace Committee maintained that technological expertise required for the project had to be within the capacity that provincial governments could provide. In other words, Food for Peace would not request technological assistance and machineries from the central Korean government. A highway project required special technology for major highway consolidation of embankment materials. In addition, the size and consolidation of base materials for highway could not be performed by using unskilled laborers. The consolidation of embankment was especially important as the project was proposed to be completed in a short period of time. It also required intricate technical design and it needed to be supervision by qualified field engineers and inspectors. Thus, the RDD, USOM, suggested that the South Korean Ministry of National Construction to take up the project on its own since it has the resources to use heavy machinery. Food for Peace would not take part in it. Further, the Rural Development Division also objected that the unskilled labor that the Ministry of National Construction proposed to hire in the highway project were not relief recipients registered with the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.[31] Instead, the South Korean ministry had proposed to use conscripted labor from Korean youth.

The Origin of Self-help

[31] May 10, 1967, 3323-3326 136-139/241; #16; P583; RG 286

Before Food for Peace's Comprehensive Provincial Program was implemented in Korea in 1964, the South Korean state and state-affiliated social workers began introducing the program to the South Korean public as a transplantation of 1930s U.S. policy to overcome the Great Depression. The origin of work-relief (kŭllo kuho) in 1930s American work-relief programs is interesting because it also has implications on the origins of the New Village Movement in the 1970s. Scholarship in South Korea maintains that the New Village Movement was inspired by the Japanese colonial campaign of the Rural Revitalization in the 1930s and that it was not significantly influenced by the U.S. programs in the 1960s.

However, here in 1963, before the beginning of the Provincial Program, Ha Sang-rak, a prominent professor of Social Works at Seoul National University, published on newspaper that the Provincial Program originated from a 1930s' U.S. policy to overcome the Great Depression. Ha Sang-rak cited U.S. President Roosevelt's FERA (Federal Emergency Relief Administration) and WPA (Work Project Administration) as the originals.[32] Excerpt is from Ha's newspaper column, "*A Path to Overcome Poverty: Work-Relief," published* in Tonga on 13 July 1963.

Providing relief to the poor by giving them work has many precedents. As an example, I will show the case of the United States of the 1930s. The infamous Great Depression of the 1930s created some miserable sites such poor people filling up feeding stations and starving men collapsing in the streets. Even in a relatively wealthier state, 40 percent of the population received aid from the state, and there was a state which had 90 percent of its population receiving the state aid. The United States government implemented many policies to get over this crisis. Among them, two programs were most effective: FERA (Federal Emergency Relief Administration) and WPA (Work Project Administration).

The FERA was administered in May 1933 with Harry Hopkins in charge. Work-relief was more effective than simple provisions of relief materials. Moreover, FERA, based on the premise that it could promote poor people's self-reliance without hurting their integrity, 1. provided work-relief to urban citizens in cities of populations over 5,000, 2. supported rural reconstruction

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[32] Ha Sang-rak, "Pingon ŭl nŏmŏ sŏnŭn kil: Kŭllo Kuho" Tong'a July 13 1963.

and development programs to make rural and fishing people self-reliant, 3. settled landless rural population in non-urban areas, 4. gave relief materials only to the needy who could not work.

However, since FERA was an emergency measure, it was reorganized as the Work Project Administration (WPA) in May 1935. The WPA was a colossal undertaking that rescued 13.5 million unemployed people (in the United States) by giving them jobs. The programs included construction and repair of public facilities such as roads, bridges, sewers, schools, hospitals, sport stadiums, airfields. The programs also implemented projects reclaiming unused land and developing drinking water, or providing jobs to unemployed professionals like artists, teachers and nurses so that they could contribute to their local communities.

However, Ha did not clarify if the Korean program was initiated by the U.S. Food for Peace Provincial Program in Korea, or if it was done by Park Chung Hee's regime.

Ha Sang-rak and many others used a fishing lesson analogy to explain the usefulness of work-relief programs, as originating from the United States. In the fishing lesson analogy, when you give the man fish, he lives a day, but if you teach him how to go fishing, he can use the skill for the rest of his life and live on it. Importantly, this fishing lesson analogy and the work-relief programs were presented to the Koreans as having been learnt from the Americans. In other instances, social workers and intellectuals cited Samuel Smile's first sentence, "Heaven helps those who help themselves" in order to motivate people to work in self-help programs. Ha Sang-rak in the newspaper column emphasized that Koreans should use work-relief programs to give hope to the rural and fishing poor. Strangely, it seems to credit the South Korean state for initiating and implementing self-help programs by actively learning from the 1930s American program and by putting it into practice in Korea in 1962 after the Typhoon Sarah. Thus, Ha did not clarify if it was the U.S. that was initiating the Provincial work-relief program in Korea, or it it was a Korean state's initiative.

Here is another example of explanation for work-relief programs in Korean newspaper. The article explains that the work-relief program was built on the basis of the Livelihood Protection

Law, Law No. 913, which the South Korean National Assembly had passed on December 3, 1961. Livelihood Protection Law had replaced Chosŏn Kuho-ryŏng, which was a colonial state's law. The colonial law was now given the verdict as having served no purpose for anyone. Work-relief programs were explained as an extension of the Livelihood Law.

The work-relief program, rigorously implemented since 1963, prevent the harmful effects of free relief, which is the reliance on the public (state), laziness, and the recession of employment (un-employment). At the same time, the programs also promote sound motivation to work and the spirit of self-help (chajo). In addition to providing livelihood, they provide for comprehensive local development. One side relief and one side construction, this kills two birds with one stone. In particular, this program is directly administrated by the state, so we can see the government is trying to implement creative and enthusiastic policies. The program already has achieved much.[33]

It was well known that the grains were U.S. aid grains from PL 480 aid. However, the article in the above excerpt, credits the South Korean state for administering the program, and does not acknowledge the role of the USOM/Korea nor does it distinguish South Korean central government from its provincial governments.

The Effects of the Work-Relief Programs

The agricultural section of the Food for Peace's Provincial Program mobilized 42,937 farm families and reclaimed 8,823 hectare of land in 1964. Since the amount of wheat flour for each day's labor was based on the gain requirement for a family of 5 members, the total number of people who depended on the Provincial Program wheat flour numbered 214,685. In turn, the whole Food for Peace Program fed approximately 397,564 people with U.S. surplus wheat flour (calculated based on 54 percent) that year. In addition, newly reclaimed land was distributed

[33] *Kyŏnghyang sinmun*, September 14, 1963.

amongst 16,318 families for their livelihood. The program also improved 39,504 hectare for increased production, helping to increase the families' income in the long run. In 1965, the program worked with 41,028 farm families. The projects reclaimed 28,858 hectare of new land, and it was distributed among 29,824 families. The 1965 program also improved 21,142 hectare of less productive land.[34] We can also surmise the impacts made by the program and the Food for Peace grains from the volume of grains made available through the program.

More than half of the Food for Peace Program grain that the U.S. Department of State sent to Korea was wheat flour. In 1967, the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program allocated 125,000 metric tons of grains to 11 provincial governments. Of this, 100,000 tons of wheat flour came from the United States, and South Korea provided 25,000 tons of barley. In the 1967 program, U.S. Food for Peace provided 48.8 percent of the funding, and the South Korean state provided 51.2 percent of the funding. The U.S. contribution to the Provincial Program was entirely made of wheat flour, in that 100,000 tons. The South Korean state paid its 51.2 percent with 25,000 tons of barley and the rest in local currency, hwan.[35] Although the Provincial Program existed since 1964, it was in 1967 that the Program picked up the momentum and started expanding rapidly. That year, the total wheat supply in Korea was 1,232,532 metric tons, showing 25.4 percent increase in wheat supply from that in 1966. In 1967, the PL 480 grain took up 37 percent of the total wheat supply to Korea, and in 1968, PL 480 surplus wheat flour took up 32.8 percent of the total wheat supply.[36] When the total grain consumption was about 10.5 million metric tons,

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[34] Part of report from Paul H. Russell, AD/P-FFP to L. Wakefield, RDD, 1966. "Provincial Comprehensive Development Program (Title II Section 202), 4315; #4; P589; RG 286

[35] 4320, #4; P589; RG 286

[36] 4320-2; #4; P589; RG 286. 136,900 metric tons of wheat to be processed into 100,000 metric tons of flour.

wheat comprised approximately 11.5 percent of the total grain consumption.[37] In 1968 program, the supply of wheat flour for the Food for Peace Program was also 125,000 metric tons.[38] Considering that the total wheat flour allocation per month was 25,000-40,000 metric tons for Korea, 125,000 tons was not a small amount. In addition, all these were supposed to go to the families designated as the "general needy" in government rosters. Therefore, these "needy" people's diet was more affected than people who were purchasing food in the market.

From 1961 to 1966, U.S. Operations Mission in Korea brought in $72,245,000 worth of Title II Food for Peace commodities to Korea, and of this, wheat cost $38,217,400, taking up 53 percent of the total.[39] The Bank of Korea calculated that a rural worker with five family dependents received 200 kilogram of combination of wheat and barley for 100 days of work. An average rural family consumed 400 kilograms of wheat and barley the year before.[40]

In 1967, grain from the concessional sales through Title I and Section 402 - called "concessional" because they were given at one tenth of the world market price -represented 2.2 percent of the total Korean grain consumption. It took up 2 percent for 1968.[41] The donated surplus grains for Section 202 under Title II was approximately 3.6 percent of the total grain consumption in Korea.

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[37] 3270-3275, #16 FFP; P583; RG 286

[38] 4310-4311, #4; P589; RG 286. The figure does not include WFP and PL 480 Title II, this is only for National FFP, February 1967.

[39] *Summary of U.S. Economic Aid to Korea, FY 1964-FY 1966 as of 30 June 1966*, United States Operations Mission to Korea, 3915-6; #22; Central Subject Files, Mission to Korea, P583; RG 286.

[40] Stats from the Bank of Korea, 1959

[41] 3266 #16; P583; RG 286

The self-help programs under Section 202 distributed 75,000 metric tons of grains for 20.6 million "man-days" worth of food ration in 1964. "Man-days" was the number of workers multiplied by the number of days, which would give the total portions of food to be distributed. In 1965, the PL 480 grain was 110,000 metric tons to pay for the 30.6 million mandays. In 1966, it was 125,000 metric tons to pay for the 41.6 million mandays.[42] 1966 was the first year that South Korea contributed grains with the 25,000 tons of barley. Before 1966, all Provincial Program grain was American donation.

Despite the familiarization through the fifties, eating wheat flour instead of rice was still considered a hardship that was reserved for the poor. A local official in Naju kun named Mun Hong-kyu from the Bureau of Internal Affairs sent a letter to the official gazette for local governments, *Chibang Haengjŏng*, empathizing with the suffering of the poor who depended on U.S. surplus wheat flour. In his letter, Mun argues that the government should make rice available for the self-help programs even if it increases the cost of the program. This remark shows that Mun does not grasp the overriding goal of the self-help grain programs. However, his point on the hardship of having to eat unfamiliar wheat flour is well-taken. Mun also points out that the market price of 3.6 kilogram of wheat flour is 100 wŏn when a day laborer can earn 200 wŏn for his daily labor. Despite the fact that the work-permit for the work-relief program was issued to one male member in the family, Mun argues that the low wage is the reason why women take up the job instead of men. Men could get better paying jobs elsewhere.[43] Indeed, the pictures of the self-help programs show many women engaged in the work-relief program.

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[42] 3267 #16; P583; RG 286

[43] Mun, Hong-kyu, "Chajo Kŭllo Saŏp kwa Kuho," *Chibang Haengjŏng*, Vol. 17, Issue 174. Seoul: Taehan Chibang Haengjŏng Kongjehoe, 1968. 162-165

Given that the criteria to be registered as the "general needy" was to earn less than a 3000 wŏn income per month, these families could afford little other provisions beyond food. It is possible that some families were dishonest about disclosing their income in order to be qualified for relief food and work permit. However, the percentage of income that families spend on food was also extremely high for an average household, not just the "general needy" household. On average, food took up 64.4 percent of the total family expenditure in 1959; 59.2 percent in 1962; 58.6 percent in 1966; and 55.7 percent in 1969 on average.[44] Assuming that with the "needy" population, the percentage of food expenditure was likely to be higher than that of the average, the impact of U.S. surplus food such as wheat flour and barley in their diet must have been substantial.

Outcome of programs

Korean villagers called the Comprehensive Provincial Development Program simply as self-help (chajo) program, and it is interesting to see how much local villagers depended on the self-help work program as a last resort to obtain food before facing starvation. It is not clear if these reports were meant to be critical of the state that could not otherwise feed its people.

In some villages, local villagers voiced that the self-help program grains were the only solution to their predicament of hunger. In 1965, the villagers of Sŏngsan Purak in Kyŏngsang Namdo informed a Tong'a reporter, Ko Su-kyun, that most of the villagers would have starved if there had not been the self-help (chajo) grains.[45] Ko heard that there were 116 families in the village, but only 10 families had grain to eat. The only way that the rest of the villagers could obtain food

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[44] Pogŏn Sahoe Pu, *Pogŏn Silchŏk kwa Chŏnmang [Pogŏn Sahoe Haengchŏng Paeksŏ]*, Pogŏn Sahoe Pu, 1971, p77

[45] Ko Su-kyun, Sŏngsan Purak, Chindong myŏn, Ch'angwŏn kun, Kyŏngsang Namdo, *Tong'a*, March 16, 1965

was by working for the self-help work program in Tongjŏn-ri, the program site, 20 ri (7.9 kilometers) away from their village. In order to walk 20 ri and get to the work site on time, the villagers had to get up at dawn. They relied on the 3.6 kilogram of cornmeal and wheat flour they received from the self-help program. However, the problem was that they could only work for 10 days a month, instead of 20 days a month as had been planned by the Program. With what they received for 10 days of labor, they could only feed their families with gruel for 7 days.

The same reporter, Ko Su-kyun, witnessed that the situation was not different in a neighboring village, Tongch'on. Its villagers also had to wake up at dawn and walk 20-30 *ri* (7.9-11.8 kilometers) to arrive at the self-help work project site. Unfortunately, some of the hungry villagers did not even have the energy to walk the distance to go to the site. According to its Village Head (ijang) in Tongch'on, out of the 130 households, only 4 to 6 families had some grains to eat. The rest merely depended on self-help work programs. However, district officials in the local government claimed that no household in Chindong myŏn was experiencing grain shortage.

In addition, Mun Hong-kyu, the officer in the local ministry of internal affairs in Naju-kun, also argued that the Provincial Program is the only hope for Naju-kun. Not only for food, but he believed that Provincial Program could solve the problem of rural exodus to urban areas ("inong hyangdo"). At the same time, Mun Hong-kyu, even as an officer in the local administrative organ, does not understand the objectives of the Provincial Program. Firstly, Mun discusses the Provincial Program as the South Korean central state initiative, which is far from the picture that I have gathered. As he misunderstands of the motivation and the goal of the Food for Peace program, this official Mun exhorts the central South Korean government to pay the workers in rice instead of wheat-flour, and also argues that the central state should not base the payment on the

number of days the villagers work, but base it on the worker's family's grain requirements. These were exactly the points that 1964 Food for Peace's Provincial Program set out to change.[46] Yet, the author remains very hopeful of the benefits of self-help programs for the locality.

In addition, the South Korean state was blamed for the failures of the Provincial Development projects even though it was the provincial governments that administered self-help programs. Often, the projects were not carried out as planned. For the 1965 program, Food for Peace ("Pyŏnghwa rŭl wuihan singryang") Committee had granted 1,096 project sites, but only 647 sites commenced the projects by September.[47] In Puch'ŏn in 1965, 184 tons of work grain was not paid to the workers. In 1968, Kim Paek-yong, 29 year old farmer, wrote to *Kyŏnghyang Sinmun* that he had not been paid for a year of work-relief labor, and he asked the authorities (tang'guk) to make the delayed payment.[48]

On the other hand, the letters of appeal sent to the Director of USOM in Korea shows the local recipients were aware that the surplus grains came from the United States and that USOM had the power to allocate grains. In the 1960s, local Korean recipients sent letters of appeal addressed to the Director of U.S. Operations Mission in Korea. In these letters, the locals asked for more U.S. surplus grains for their village communities. Two of such letters, written by slash-and-burn farmers in Wŏndang Ri, Kangwŏn do, and by the ones in Ch'ŏngsong kun, Kyŏngsang puk-to, are particularly interesting. Included with the letter of appeal, each head of families, 16 families representing 98 people, in the village wrote down his name and stamped his personal seal

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[46] Mun Hong-kyu, [Chajo Kŭllo Saŏp kwa Kuho] *Chibang Haengjŏng.* Vol 17, no. 175, 1968, pp. 162-165

[47] *Kyŏnghyang,* September 22, 1965

[48] *Kyŏnghyang*, August 10, 1968

around the pages of Wŏndang Ri, Kangwŏn do (Ch'unch'ŏn, RDD).[49] I present one letter here.

The translation from their original Korean language to English was done at the USOM.

LETTER OF APPEAL

November 17, 1966

To; Joel Bernstein
Director of USOM/K

We are grateful for the assistance rendered by the Government and the U.S. We were fire-field farmers before we came to resettle here. We now have our own reclaimed farmland and new houses, thanks to the Food for Peace Program.

We hope that we can repay such assistance rendered by you, doing our best in farming.

It seems, however, that farming cannot be done with physical efforts and zeal alone. Last year, we had little harvest on our farms because of frost and floods.

We are now faced with another serious problem, i.e. lack of fertilizer, oxen, farming loans, and labor. Our trouble is hot to continue our living without food this winter.

We hope that you will give a sympathetic consideration to our predicament and help us by providing grains for our subsistence for the period from November this year through June next year.

Sincerely yours,
Cho Ki-song (seal)
Kim Kun-chong (seal)
An Su-tong (seal)
Kim Hyon-song (seal)
Yi Pom-su (seal)
Pak Sang-pom (seal)
Pak Il-pong (seal)
Kim Ki-mun (seal)
Kim Su-san (seal)[50]

In another letter of appeal, 45 families, representing 238 people from Ch'ŏngsong kun in Kyŏngsang pukto, wrote a similar letter to the Director of US Operations in Korea, Joel Bernstein.[51]

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[49] A Reply From Roger Ernst, Acting Director USOM Korea, to Kim Su-San, representative of the fire field re-settlers at Wŏndang Ri, Tong-myŏn, Yangju kun, Kangwŏndo, to December 22 1966, around 3191 #16 P583 RG 286

[50] Letter of Appeal from fire farmers to USOM/K November 17, 1966; 3191; #16. Food For Peace I; P583; RG 286

[51] On fire farmers (Hwa nongmin) see 3191- 3197; #16; P583; RG 286

When they lived and farmed in mountains without ownership rights over the land, slash-and-burn farmers traditionally stayed outside the governing eye, not paying the state taxation and also geographically distant from the benefits of the modern amenities such as roads and electricity. The letters of appeal to the U.S. Operations Mission show that U.S. surplus grains were used to built settlement villages for slash-and-burn farmers and as a result brought them back in the fold of the state. Importantly, the farmers did not send their letters of appeals to their own provincial governments, which implemented the projects and distributed grains to the recipients, but instead addressed them to Director of the US Operations Missions in Korea. Roger Ernst, Acting Director, replied to both letters, re-directing the farmers to their respective provincial government for answers to their requests. The letters reveal that South Koreans who were as marginal as fire-and-slash farmers and foresters were informed that U.S. Operations Mission had the authority to give grains to their projects, and thus, the farmers sought direct communication with the USOM by addressing letters to its director.

It is significant that Food for Peace's Comprehensive Provincial Development Program (CPDP) reached out to Korea's furthest peripheries such as islands, coastal villages, and fire farmers in the forest by channeling grains to local village projects. While documents such as the farmer's letters of appeal to U.S. Operations Mission show that the recipients were aware of the grain coming from an U.S. source, we also saw some room for ambiguity in the Tong-jŏn li project in which the participants did not show any discrimination between the South Korean state and U.S. Operations Missions. However, regardless of which organization the participants of the program credited for operating the projects, it is very likely that these Koreans knew that wheat flour was coming as part of the PL 480 negotiation package with the United States.

Incidentally, the ground-level lack of discernment and interest about the source of power contributed to a facile transition from Food for Peace's Provincial Development Programs to Park Chung Hee's New Village Movement in 1972. When the objective of the Food for Peace Program was to make Korean villages self-reliant, i.e. no more need for foreign assistance, officials in U.S. Operations Mission assessed the New Village Movement as a successful result of the Food for Peace programs, implemented in the 1960s. South Korea needed a program such as the New Village Movement in 1972 because the U.S. government terminated the PL 480 aid to Korea in 1972. Park Chung Hee's New Village Movement successfully inherited the Food for Peace Provincial Program, and Park's regime became the beneficiary of the Provincial Program's expansion of power to Korea's peripheries.

However, contemporary South Korean scholarship denies the continuation from 1960s USOM-FFP programs to 1970s South Korea's New Village Movement. For example, Ch'oe Hi-jŏng summarily dismisses the Food for Peace Program for having left little impacts, implying thus that Food For Peace had little connection to the later New Village Movement. Instead, Ch'oe explains the link between 1930s colonial rural Re-Vitalization Program and 1970s New Village Movement. Firstly, when Food for Peace Provincial Program provided U.S. surplus grain to 2% of the South Korean population, I disagree that feeding 2% of the poorest section of the population, who saw the self-help (chajo) programs as their last hope for food, left insignificant imprints. Secondly, I agree that the spiritual aspect of the New Village Movement was similar to that of 1930s self-help campaign, in which each rural dwellers were left to fend for himself. However, such approach of a state leaving its people on their own was not particular to the Japanese colonial state's invention. Invoking self-help of individuals is the only policy that a state can

muster when it does not have resources to spare to the rural section of its population. Besides, a state could easily convince itself that agricultural people, by the virtue of their profession, should be able to feed themselves. On the other hand, I see Park's emphasis on the spiritual voluntarism with the slogan, "we can do it," as a choice imposed on the regime when South Korea no longer received the Food for Peace's Title II grains.

The transition from Food for Peace's Provincial Program to the New Village Movement makes more sense when we consider the beginning of the Food for Peace Title II program in Korea in 1961. Although Title II program made a crucial shift in 1964 to the Provincial Development, its basic structure of mobilizing unemployed workers in construction projects and paying them with PL 480 grains was established since the National Construction Service Program in 1961.[52] Letting aside the nature of U.S. Public Law 480 as a global program, an immediate motivation of the U.S. to institute the National Construction Service Program in Korea in 1961 - and not later - was to stabilize the society in the aftermaths of the April Revolution of 1960. The large number of small public works could absorb the unemployed workforce in urban areas and also disperse them throughout rural areas, thus dissipating their political and social discontents. However, the NCSP that the U.S. Operations Mission had requested to support Chang Myŏn's fragile interim government after Rhee Syngman abdicated from presidency as a result of the April Revolution, actually ended up supporting Park's new regime, which usurped power in a military coup on May 16, 1961. Park and his military supporters set up a revolutionary committee, consciously named as the "Supreme Committee for National Reconstruction (Kukka Chaegŏn Ch'oego Hoeŭi)." Having gathered 700,000 citizens of Seoul in Seoul Sport Stadium for the General Ral-

[52] See the end of chapter 5 for details on the National Construction Program of 1961.

ly for National Reconstruction (kukka Chaegŏn Ch'ong Kwŏlgi) on June 13, 1961, Park Chung Hee's spokesmen announced National Reconstruction as the rationale for the military coup and as its revolutionary mission (hyŏngmyŏng kwaŏp).[53] Chang To-yŏng, the puppet head of the committee, declared that "the committee staged the military coup on May 15, 1961 in order to rescue the unemployed," and announced his "revolutionary committee"'s plan to mobilize them in reclamation projects and to disperse them to rural areas. Chang characterized the NCS work program as a direct policy (chikchŏp chŏngch'aek) of solving the unemployment question. Further, the National Reconstruction Committee argued that now was not a time for political division, now was the time for national reconstruction, and the emergency legislations promulgated under the committee was called the Emergency Measures for National Reconstruction. From then on, while acknowledging the procurement of the fund from U.S. PL 480, Park's National Reconstruction Committee appropriated all the credits due to the Food for Peace's National Reconstruction Program.

The April Revolution of 1960 towards a democratic system failed as a result of Park Chung Hee's military coup on May 16, 1961. However, what ultimately reinforced the authority of Park's illegitimate Committee was the U.S. surplus wheat flour and cotton sheets donated for the National Construction Service Program under Title II of US PL 480. Many South Korean intellectuals and political opponents have considered, and many still do, the April Revolution of the 1960 as the lost chance to transform Korea to democracy, and it was the U.S. grain that supported the legitimatizing of Park's coup, or his "revolution." Thus, in fact, even before inheriting the New Village Movement, Park Chung Hee's regime was already appropriating Food for Peace's

[53] [kukka Chaegŏn Ch'ong Kwŏlgi] *Tong'a,* June 13, 1961, and many other places, including *Kyŏnghyang*, May 23, 1961

Title II program in 1961. The appropriation of the Food for Peace Provincial Program at the time of PL 480's termination in 1972 seems very consistent with the pattern of regime legitimation that Park assumed since 1961. Thus, the structure of repression only shifted from a postcolonial imperial power to a military dictatorship. Further, the military dictatorship attempted to legitimatize its rule by continuing U.S. food program, and to this, U.S. was complicit through out the 1960s until the programs end in 1972. Given this structural continuity from the U.S. imperial policy to the military dictatorship, I interpret Park Chung Hee's ruling period in the 1960s as a continued postcolonial situation.

Conclusion:

I use the history of familiarization and appropriation of U.S. foodstuffs in South Korea as a way of exploring various processes that brought about South Korea's modernization and development. The topic of foreign food becoming familiar enables me to present an example of globalization as interactive historical processes among local Korean recipients of food, local villagers, local provincial and city governments, nutritional experts, and Cold War military spending, all premised on the shipments of U.S. surplus -and non-surplus- foodstuffs.

Koreans were liberated from Japan's colonial rule on August 15, 1945, but they immediately faced other imperial influences under U.N. Trusteeship with United States occupation in the south and Soviet occupation in the north. Even after the formation of a separate South Korean state on August 15, 1948, food dependency on the United States - especially on U.S. surplus food programs of Public Law 480 after 1955-, was frequently mentioned to point out Korea's inability to function as a sovereign nation by political opponents of the new state. The April Revolution of 1960 especially revealed the discontents built around South Korea's post-1945, both new and old, political and industrial elites that were arrayed according to their accessibility and proximity to U.S. aid materials such as surplus wheat flour. I call the termination of Emergency and Self-Help programs (TitleII) and U.S. Voluntary Agency Programs (Title III) of U.S. Public Law 480 in 1972, the end of the "Aid Economy" in order to capture the pervasiveness of U.S. material aid in the Korean daily life in post-1945 South Korea.[1] By the mid-1970s, the Park Chung Hee

[1] A poet, Ko Ŭn, gives a sense of the early 1970s when the unprecedented scale of U.S. aid materials after 1945 was finished and South Korea was entering the age of mass consumption. "Ko Ŭn's autobiographical novel: Na ŭi Sanha, Na ŭi Sam, 122," *Kyŏnghyang*, October 2, 1994.

regime and the media were able to celebrate the transitioning out of the "Aid Economy" as an overcoming of the past poverty in the past, both ironically but logically, by continuing and appropriating former U.S. surplus food aid programs under the South Korean state.

While revisiting the earlier U.S. food assistance in the post-1945 period, I show that the importation of U.S. foodstuffs to South Korea did not sufficiently guarantee the production of markets for these unfamiliar foodstuffs. When new foodstuffs did not appeal to Koreans' cultural and physical taste, they avoided eating wheat flour, if they did not have to depend on relief food. While the supply of foreign foodstuffs through relief channels and direct state-to-state aid succeeded in imposing consumption, it was an unwilling consumption, of which meanings became associated with post-liberation poverty and dependency on foreign powers. In the late 1940s, newspapers such as the *Chayu Sinmun* that espoused anti-trusteeship stance feasted on the foreignness of the foodstuffs in order to taunt USAMGIK about their imperial motivations. In the late 1950s, the South Korean state attempted to induce a market for wheat flour through nutritional education and national campaign. However, Koreans still did not even consider replacing rice with wheat flour. Not only the failure to spur the market demand for wheat flour, the inducement also backfired by channeling media attention of even politically rather modest newspapers like *Tong'a* and *Kyŏnghyang* to the corruption of the South Korean state elites that functioned on U.S. surplus wheat flour as a fodder. However, it is crucial to note that the earlier efforts in the 1950s began to produce results by enlisting voluntary consumption of formerly unfamiliar food such as wheat flour and milk when the South Korean state coopted wheat flour and milk for South Korean national development. By framing - or rather subsuming- the foreign

foodstuffs under national economic development and catching up with the West, the state succeeded in mobilizing much of the South Korean nationals (kungmin) in the 1970s.

Thus, the state education and promotion under the Park Chung Hee regime brought about markets for wheat flour and milk in the 1970s and the 1980s. In particular, Park coopted wheat flour, which was still U.S. imports, in the efforts to industrialize. Cheap U.S. wheat flour was to feed the workforce in urban areas, and the state propped up mass-produced ramyŏn (fried instant noodle) as a viable substitute for rice.[2] Ramyŏn - ramen in Japanese- was invented in 1958 by a Japanese businessman, Ando Momofuku, who founded Nissin Food. According to Ando's own words, he invented ramen in order to make use of the large quantity of U.S. surplus wheat flour in post-1945 Japan.[3] The food was introduced in the Korean market in 1963 by Samyang Company. However, enlisting consumers for ramyŏn needed more than the product's introduction in the market. For the first three years, the sales record of ramyŏn in the consumer market was miserable. The market took off only after the state instigated a mass campaign for the "promotion of wheat flour food (punsik changryŏ)" in 1967, and the Seoul City implemented "Distribution Reforms (yut'ong kaehyŏk, 1969-1974)" and began operating city-controlled "supermarkets." The city government and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry instigated "supermarkets" in order to facilitate the delivery of ramyŏn and other mass-produced daily commodities directly from the factories to the urban consumers at cheap prices. Assisted by state promotion, in 1987, average annual ramyŏn consumption per person increased to 9.9 kg. When

[2] Ramyŏn is instant noodle product, which was mass-manufactured by frying the dough of wheat flour kneaded with salt and alkali agents.

[3] George Solt, "Taking Ramen Seriously: Food, Labor and Everyday in Modern Japan." *Ph.D. Dissertation*. UC San Diego, 2009. pp.135-139

total wheat flour consumption per person per year was 35.8kg - compared to 19.6kg in 1956 -, ramyŏn took up 25.7% of the use of wheat flour.[4]

Then, did the formation of a commercial market for wheat flour in the 1970s and the 1980s mean that the earlier American efforts of supplying surplus wheat flour for free or at concessional prices ultimately succeeded in creating markets for U.S. wheat flour in foreign nations that did not have substantial markets for wheat flour before? As seen in chapter 5, the South Korean state imported far more U.S. wheat flour than there was demand in Korea because the state made exceptional rates of profit by importing U.S. surplus wheat flour at the concessional rate of U.S. Public Law 480 (Title I), which sold surplus farm commodities at one tenth of the market price. However, by the end of the 1960s, the market was produced, and more significantly when U.S. terminated concessional sales of wheat flour in 1972, the demand for wheat flour in Korea did not substantially decrease despite having to pay the full price for it now.[5]

We can see the acknowledgement of ramen and wheat flour industry from the panic caused towards the the end of the Public Law 480 aid. The approaching end of the aid prompted the South Korean state and state-affiliated research institutes to search for an alternative to U.S. surplus wheat flour in the late 1960s. The attempt was unsuccessful. Despite having to pay the full price for U.S. wheat flour, the wheat flour food industry in Korea continued to import wheat flour from the United States in the 1970s and 1980s.

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[4] Chinese restaurants purchased more than 33%, but given the late habit of instant noodle eating, the percentage percentage is significantly high. Kim Sŏng-gon, "Milgaru ŭi p'umjil t'ŭksŏng kwa ramyŏn ŭi p'umjil," *Han'guk Siksaenghwal Munhwa Hwahak Chi*, 1991

[5] Title IV of Public Law 480 was not terminated.

Conclusion

By 1970, U.S. foodstuffs such as wheat flour and powdered milk began to take on new meanings, which were largely instigated by the South Korean state. After the prelude of establishing milk as the most naturally nourishing and scientifically complete food in the 1950s with the help of UNICEF and U.S. voluntary agencies, milk was now coopted in the nation-building, especially pertinent to the care of school aged children who were help up as the future of the nation. Thus, when domestic factories in South Korea began pumping out packs of instant noodles (ramyŏn) and milk in the mid-1960s, it was celebrated as a moment in which South Koreans began superseding yesterday's dependency on foreign powers. The time of "eating" milk gruel - because people depended on U.S. food assistance - was over, and milk was newly established as a supplementary feeding, which was in fact its original purpose when UNICEF started the program. From then, Koreans begin drinking milk. Milk (gruel) was no longer a substitute for rice, but now it was a complementary food. By incorporating milk into its nation-building process, the South Korean state successfully appropriated the history of milk in Korea which started with the UNICEF milk feeding program in 1953.

In other words, the familiarization of wheat flour and powdered milk can only become meaningful when it is seen as a process, changing from unfamiliar foreign commodities to familiar domesticated national products. Importantly, by seeing it as a process, the associations that U.S. relief foodstuffs had formed earlier with post-liberation poverty and the presence of a large-scale U.S. army contingents was not forgotten, but was given a new crucial role. Overwritten on the past memories, the food commodities were now contributed to and produced by South Korea's nation-building and industrialization. Thus, in the 1970s, it was only by remembering the bygones of the post-liberation and post-Korean War hardships that Koreans

could celebrate the overcoming of the past before consumer commodity markets and industrialization. The initial shock and repulsion against U.S. surplus wheat flour and powdered milk was incorporated into the narrative of South Korea's modernization. Needless to say, catching up with the West and industrialization bring about another form of subjugation to the hegemonic system, both global and local. Regardless, since the 1970s, Koreans have considered ramyŏn (fried instant noodle), milk, and instant coffee-mix as their "national people's foodstuff (kungmin mŏk'kŏri)," and only recently have they replaced this foreign food turned familiar with other foodstuffs such as "home meal replacement (HMR)," probiotic yogurt drinks, and multinational Starbucks' Caffè Americano.[6]

Emphasizing the history of familiarization and appropriation of foreign food as processes is important for our understanding of globalization as their historical processes tell us not to naturalize the habit of wheat flour and milk eating. The vulgar misrecognition of globalization as inevitable and as "natural" results of market competition and scientific management is the result of disregarding the processes of familiarization. Thus, organic expressions such as a "growing" milk market are politically fraught rhetorics. The new dietary habits spread rapidly in post-1945 Korea as results of convergence of several historical incidents; first was the availability of surplus wheat flour and nonfat powdered milk - for example, instead of bananas or quinoa - in the United States, and U.S. government's decision to link the problem of its domestic farm surplus to foreign food assistance as a tool to create its sphere of influence in the Cold War competition. Ideas like the competitiveness of U.S. capitalist market, principles of democracy, and advanced science and technology were not merely transplanted, but they were channeled

[6] Kang Chin-kyu, "Millyŏnanŭn uri mŏk'kŏri," April 15, 2015, *Han'guk Kyŏngje Sinmun,* p. A21, and http://www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2015041416001

through U.S. imperial governance, which depended on the number of U.S. warships to overhaul surplus foodstuffs over the Pacific Ocean, and on instigations of various food assistance policies such as humanitarian food assistance and local self-help programs through which the United States distributed food to local Koreans. Also importantly, South Korean vendors in the black market and corrupt politicians who channeled U.S. mass-manufactured foodstuffs and surplus wheat flour did so in their own terms, further giving other meanings to the foodstuffs. On the other hand, these other meanings given by black marketeers and corrupt politicians, in return, shaped Korean understanding of U.S. imperial governance because the origin of the foodstuffs from the United States could not be crossed off. Counterfactually, had there not been food shortages in post-1945 Korea, and had there not been U.S. sponsored humanitarian milk and school lunch programs for children and the Food for Peace development programs in Korea, foodstuffs such as wheat flour and powdered milk would have been channeled through different networks, and thus, they would have developed very different meanings.[7] Likewise, "things," de-attached from their cultural memories that have been attained in the process, would write different histories from the histories that we have.

[7] In U.S. foreign food aid, foodstuffs were substitutable, which meant that powdered milk could replace cornmeal or wheat-flour, and vice versa. Had powdered milk not been on the list of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities in several of its surplus years, Koreans would have quite different experience with milk.

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